Thread by @navalhistorian

A point from the Integrated Review that seems to have attracted little attention, but *might* be one of the most interesting moves of all is the "strategic hubs", which will be key to being "persistently engaged worldwide through forward deployment" (p. 73)gov.uk/government/pub…

For any talk of agility/mobility/etc., these hubs & whatever they comprise will form the "foundations" - the geography of any overseas strategy. Some of these hubs appear, in some respects, obvious & are based on pre-existing facilities.

For example, although the bulk of British forces left Germany in February 2020, the remnants at @BritishArmyDEU would seem a solid place to start with what is likely to be a predominantly land-based, continued commitment to @NATO & the defence of continental Europe.

Gibraltar's presence as a naval & air base at the western entrance to the Mediterranean & the big Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on Cyprus in the east, are well known & long established, though it will, of course, be interesting to see any improvements there too.

Perhaps the most interesting part, however, might lie in the Indian Ocean.
Probably the most significant facility here is the Oman "hub" based around the UK Joint Logistics Support Base at Duqm, a major expansion to which was announced in September 2020 janes.com/defence-news/n…

Yet two other "hubs" in extremely interesting locations were also named - Singapore & Kenya, each at either end of the Indian Ocean.
Once again, both of these countries do have existing British military facilities, with the small @BDSSU_UK at the former naval base at Singapore.

While Kenya has a primarily @BritishArmy presence at @BATUKOfficial, which also appears to have been receiving improvements under the UK-Kenya Strategic Partnership.
The key question here is how might these remarkably strategically located sites improve? gov.uk/government/new…

Perhaps inevitably, Oman will remain the biggest of the Indian Ocean facilities, particularly from a naval perspective. If nothing else, a lack of money will ensure that neither Singapore nor Mombasa, though fantastic harbours, end up with the capacity to take an aircraft carrier

Singapore also almost certainly lacks the space, one suspects the politics of doing anything on that scale in either country would be - shall we say - tricky, &, let's face it, the @RoyalNavy doesn't have that many ships to go round.

Nonetheless, might something more be done at either of these locations at a rather smaller scale? @darshanabaruah, suggests in her @WarOnTheRocks piece here (notably in the context of the US) that naval presence, even at a lower level would be useful

https://twitter.com/navalhistorian/status/1373605779379458050?s=20

So, given it is highly likely that at least @HMS_Tamar is going to be forward deployed, potentially to the Indo-Pacific region, might there be case for a permanent or semi-permanent @RoyalNavy OPV presence at at least one, or even both (in the event of local agreement)?

Naturally, one or two OPVs, even backed by a frigate based at Bahrain, are not going to "tip the balance" in the Indian Ocean, particularly if it ever came to a shooting war, but naval presence is much more than that - reassuring allies, law enforcement, surveillance, disaster...

response, training & engagement with local navies... all of these well within the capabilities of such vessels if this is to be Britain's overseas strategy in future.

Possibly worth adding here, of the @RoyalNavy's OPVs @HMS_Forth & @HMS_Medway are already forward deployed to the Falklands & Caribbean. respectively, covering the North & South Atlantic
@HMSTrent is allegedly earmarked for the Gibraltar "hub", thus leaving @HMS_Tamar & @HMS_Spey

Perhaps more succinctly from staff at one of the "hubs" in question:

https://twitter.com/BDSSU_UK/status/1371814614896283653?s=20