Thread by @AlexPanchenko2

IMPORTANT context of the supposedly-imminent further #Russia invasion of #Ukraine: outsiders might assume that recent domestic UA developments are somehow unbearable for #Putin or ruining his Ukraine takeover plans.
They're NOT (analysis🧵👇)

Despite #Ukraine public's steady and overwhelming resentment of #Russia and capitulation to the latter (as shown by polls), Kremlin's chances for a successful "hybrid" (less-bloody) capture of Ukraine (for a short time, of course) aren't completely gone:

1. There's demonstrable, increasingly-overt pro-Kremlin influence in #Ukraine President Zelensky's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, courts etc.
This influence might be rival to the #Putin's relative & traditional envoy Medvedchuk, but it's certainly beneficial for #Russia.

2. #Ukraine economy is vulnerable now due to coronacrisis, war expenditures, botched energy reform and also to the MASSIVE corrupt infrastructure project. This certainly gives Kremlin hope that corrupt UA elites might still agree to a capitulation even without RU tank offensives.

3. #Zelensky regime has been stepping up domestic political repression ag. #Ukraine #activists (of really all fields), war vets etc.: people fervently, in great detail, vilified by #Russia propaganda since 2013. This is Putin's dreams coming true, and a blow to Ukraine's defense.

4. Zelensky regime, despite some unwarranted praises from West, is far from being stable or united. 3 big oligarchs openly influence the regime from inside. And buying/intimidating/dividing #Ukraine oligarchs is something MUCH easier for #Russia than a major military offensive.

Considering the above, I think a wider military invasion is still neither the only nor the optimal scenario of #Russia's hybrid aggression in #Ukraine. Therefore, the recent RU army moves are likely just a huge world-intimidation operation.
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