I have nothing but respect for the @WSJ reporting team - @laurnorman, @SuneEngel and others are among the best in the game.
But goodness me does the Ed Board get it wrong. [thread 🧵] on.wsj.com/2PTerKs
2/ From day US left JCPOA, few major papers have as loudly & consistently banged max pressure drum.
"Prudence... suggests a wait-and-see attitude toward Mr Trump’s reversal", they said that May. "A year from now, the world may be safer without it".
Narrator: It wasn't.
3/ From the outset, today's editorial predictably uses the JCPOA critics' adjectives of choice - flawed, bad - to say we're going "back to the future of 2015-16".
I dunno, from a non-proliferation standpoint, that's not so shabby.
4/ News of the Natanz op rightly noted, strangely explained: it's not the deal that failed to stop Iran from making progress, it's the *absence* of the deal that's resulted in the escalation. Otherwise Natanz today would have <300kg uranium stockpiled at <4%.
5/ Then we have a tried & tested criticism of JCPOA: not covering other issues of concern. It was a valid critique in 2015, but clear lesson of 2018-present is that max pressure didn't just fail to fix on missiles and malign behavior - it also undid nuclear restrictions.
6/ As proof of "concessionary courtship" by Biden admin, journal says WH "ended fight on snapback" and hasn't rejected Iran's IMF loan.
a) Fight on snapback was over last year. Trump administration got KO'd bigly.
b) Iran's IMF loan still nowhere to be seen.
7/7 I could go on, but bottom line is this: JCPOA has been in place for 5 years, 4 of which were under Trump, 3 of which have been under max pressure. And critics still haven't delivered a serious, realistic plan to better it.
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Senior Israeli official tells @Reuters: "1 of the problems w/ the [JCPOA] is that it left Iran w/ a nuclear infrastructure in place which allows it - at a point of its choosing - to move ahead relatively rapidly... JCPOA puts infrastructure in the freezer or in mothballs".
2| Here's the thing: at no recent point has total denial of infrastructure been serious possibility, neither thru negotiations nor sabotage. JCPOA worked - and senior Israeli mil/intel officials noted this - bc mothballs, freezers are solid non-proliferation gains, undone now.
3| Don't take my word for it. Here's the recently-retired head of Mossad just last month [via @TimesofIsrael]
In the aftermath of the Natanz attack, Iranian hardliners are busy spilling all sorts of beans around intelligence & security. The best you can say is giving an impression that's anywhere from indiscreet to incompetent. [Thread]
2| First there's @arzakani4, perhaps best known for gloating about Iran controlling 4 Arab capitals in 2014 and giving every critic who overstates Iranian regional influence a footnote citation. bit.ly/3scyhgE
3| In an interview, he revealed that the explosion in Natanz last July was done with 300 lbs of explosives that were built into a centrifuge calibration working station that Iran had sent to Europe for repairs. It was detonated remotely by satellite.
Despite the fact that Iran's nuclear program has rarely been off the front pages for better part of a decade, reporting and commentary around it continues to be riddled with basic misunderstandings and errors. A thread to help clarify a few things [1/5]:
2|"Iran is only weeks/months away from a nuclear weapon".
No. JCPOA put Iran's "breakout time" at 1 yr. This is time it would take to have enough fissile material for a weapon - not a complete nuke. US estimates are that this period is now 3-4 months; Israel pegs it at 6.
3| Something something "... nuclear weapons program".
There is no evidence of weapons-related work at present. Recent IAEA findings on radioactive traces relate to activities in late 90s/early 00s; even Trump admin noted that in here & now, no current weapons dimension:
There seems to be some confusion about the legislation Iranian parliament approved today and the Guardian Council turned into law. So here are the key fact: mashreghnews.ir/news/1151218/%…
1. 20% enrichment should start immediately and the govt is required to accumulate min of 120kg of 20% LEU every month
2. The govt should immediately increase below 5% enrichment to 500 kg per month (up from the current rate of around 170 kg)
We @FPI_SAIS are releasing a series of reports on Iran Under Sanctions. Iran’s economy has been sanctioned in one form or another since the 1979 revolution. Yet little systematic knowledge exists on the short- and medium-term impacts of sanctions [Thread]. rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanct…
2| The focus has often been on a few metrics that flare up with sanctions tightening: currency depreciation, inflation, and recession, followed by increases in unemployment & poverty. But the more comprehensive picture is lost in political cacophony around the policy's merits.
3| This is the gap that @FPI_SAIS is filling with its Iran Under Sanctions project, which is a 360 degree in-depth view on the implications of sanctions for Iran. This 1st-of-its-kind research provides for an instructive case study on the use of sanctions as a tool of statecraft.
Absent from the debates around the Trump administration's plans to become a JCPOA participant after it officially terminated its participation in May 2018, this time to terminate the JCPOA once and for all, misses an important point: Iran's reaction [Thread] 👇🧵
2| I put this question to @araghchi at Moscow Nonproliferation Conference back in Nov. He stated clearly that re-designating Iran under UN Charter's Chapter VII as a "threat to international peace and security" will lead Iran to revise its nuclear doctrine ifpnews.com/return-of-un-s…
3| That means only one thing: withdrawing not just from the JCPOA, but also from the NPT altogether. Some think this is a bluff as it would undermine Iran's long-held position that it is not seeking nuclear weapons. They are wrong... financialtribune.com/articles/natio…