Despite the fact that Iran's nuclear program has rarely been off the front pages for better part of a decade, reporting and commentary around it continues to be riddled with basic misunderstandings and errors. A thread to help clarify a few things [1/5]:
2|"Iran is only weeks/months away from a nuclear weapon".
No. JCPOA put Iran's "breakout time" at 1 yr. This is time it would take to have enough fissile material for a weapon - not a complete nuke. US estimates are that this period is now 3-4 months; Israel pegs it at 6.
3| Something something "... nuclear weapons program".
There is no evidence of weapons-related work at present. Recent IAEA findings on radioactive traces relate to activities in late 90s/early 00s; even Trump admin noted that in here & now, no current weapons dimension:
4| "The JCPOA will soon expire".
This old chestnut relates to the fact that some nuclear restrictions are relaxed over time, which is correct. But key restrictions remain in place, and under max pressure the "sunsets" are taking place now instead of years down the line.
5|5 "Iran is about to end inspections".
Incorrect! Tehran, per a parliamentary law passed after killing of a top nuclear scientist, is threatening to curb inspections under the Additional Protocol, implemented as part of JCPOA. This limits but does not end IAEA access.
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There seems to be some confusion about the legislation Iranian parliament approved today and the Guardian Council turned into law. So here are the key fact: mashreghnews.ir/news/1151218/%…
1. 20% enrichment should start immediately and the govt is required to accumulate min of 120kg of 20% LEU every month
2. The govt should immediately increase below 5% enrichment to 500 kg per month (up from the current rate of around 170 kg)
We @FPI_SAIS are releasing a series of reports on Iran Under Sanctions. Iran’s economy has been sanctioned in one form or another since the 1979 revolution. Yet little systematic knowledge exists on the short- and medium-term impacts of sanctions [Thread]. rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanct…
2| The focus has often been on a few metrics that flare up with sanctions tightening: currency depreciation, inflation, and recession, followed by increases in unemployment & poverty. But the more comprehensive picture is lost in political cacophony around the policy's merits.
3| This is the gap that @FPI_SAIS is filling with its Iran Under Sanctions project, which is a 360 degree in-depth view on the implications of sanctions for Iran. This 1st-of-its-kind research provides for an instructive case study on the use of sanctions as a tool of statecraft.
Absent from the debates around the Trump administration's plans to become a JCPOA participant after it officially terminated its participation in May 2018, this time to terminate the JCPOA once and for all, misses an important point: Iran's reaction [Thread] 👇🧵
2| I put this question to @araghchi at Moscow Nonproliferation Conference back in Nov. He stated clearly that re-designating Iran under UN Charter's Chapter VII as a "threat to international peace and security" will lead Iran to revise its nuclear doctrine ifpnews.com/return-of-un-s…
3| That means only one thing: withdrawing not just from the JCPOA, but also from the NPT altogether. Some think this is a bluff as it would undermine Iran's long-held position that it is not seeking nuclear weapons. They are wrong... financialtribune.com/articles/natio…
میخواهید بدانید چرا علی رغم معافیت کالاهای بشردوستانه از تحریمها، مبادله این اجناس تحت تاثیر تحریمهای آمریکا قرار میگیرد؟ و چرا از مقامات ارشد سابق دولت آمریکا گرفته تا دبیرکل سازمان ملل و سازمانهای امدادرسانو همسایگان ایران خواستار لغو یک سری از تحریمها هستند؟
رشته توییت:
۱. پیش از همه چیز، خوب است بدانید که به گفته وزیر امورخارجه آمریکا ۸۰٪ اقتصاد ایران تحریم است و به علت همین تحریمهای گسترده و جریمههای سنگین نقض تحریم، تاجران و بانکهای خارجی به صورت کلی و فارغ از موضوع معامله، رغبت کمی برای تجارت با ایران دارند. washingtonpost.com/world/middle_e…
۲. مبادله کالاهای بشردوستانه مستلزم طی کردن روندهای پیچیده و ارزیابیهای موشکافانه است تا اطمینان حاصل شود که نه تنها موضوع معامله، بلکه دریافت کننده/پرداخت کننده نیز مشمول تحریمهای آمریکا نیستند. مثال:کانال مالی سوئیس که تا کنون تنها یک تراکنش مالی در آن اتفاق افتاده.
New from @CrisisGroup: our annual (maybe final) #IranDeal status report. The JCPOA is hanging by a thread: US has abrogated it, Iran has violated it, & Europe has put it on notice. A US-Iran tactical detente needed for breaking escalatory cycle. [Thread] crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
2| We look at the two sides of the JCPOA's implementation record over the past year - nuclear commitments by Iran, and sanctions relief commitments for Iran. These are the two key elements that make up the deal, and they're dying by a thousand cuts.
3| In May 2019, Iran announced it would start curbing its nuclear compliance if the economic normalization expected from the deal doesn’t materialize. It has since carried out 5 steps rolling back its compliance, most recently on 5 Jan. nytimes.com/2020/01/05/wor…
It would be a risky gambit if France/Germany/UK were to trigger the #IranDeal's Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM). Here's why [Thread]:
2| First question: What's the DRM?
Under JCPOA Article 36, a party to the deal can claim significant non-compliance by another party. Claim goes to Joint Commission, ministerial level/3-person advisory board, and eventually to UNSC if not resolved.
3| Article 36 was devised to tackle technical breaches, not a political crisis prompted by U.S. exit & Article 37 is a poison pill. But duration of each stage in the process can be extended by mutual consent, though the end state of UNSC sanx sanpback could happen within 65 days.