#Ukraine_Moldova: The scandal surrounding the kidnapping of former Ukrainian judge Ceaus allegedly by Ukrainian citizens with connections to special services is getting worse. 1) The Moldovan MFA requested the Ukrainian embassy in Chisinau to lift the diplomatic immunity of ⤵️
the military attaché Sergey Smetanyuk. This would allow to initiate the investigation into the alleged participation of him in the committed kidnapping of Ceaus. The Ukrainian embassy apparently declined the request. 2) At the same time, the Ukrainian embassy informed Kyiv ⤵️
that President Sandu made several attempts to contact Zelensky's office, without success. Zelensky apparently doesn't have a plan / reaction. 3) As stated by the MFA of Ukraine, no Ukrainian authority has participated in the kidnapping. This leaves however unexplained the use ⤵️
the car with diplomatic numbers that allegedly belong to the Ukrainian embassy in Chisinau. 4) The Ukrainian embassy agreed to organize a meeting between its military attaché Smetanyuk and the Moldovan prosecutors on the embassy territory. 5) The Ukrainian ambassador has ⤵️
Kyiv that President Sandu is suffering an image blow from the kidnapping of Ceaus. Pro-Russian forces in Moldova pressure Sandu to take political responsibility for the case or toughen the tone towards Kiev. Here are more details about the case. 👇
#Russia_Turkey: Relations with Turkey differ in many ways from Russia's with China. In recent phone conversations between Putin and Erdogan, they made no mention of Western sanctions at all. Although Ankara faces sanctions from the US, those coming from the EU are rolling back⤵️
Russia would be happy to replicate the anti-Western talks it has with China in the Turkish direction. But Turkey has little desire to enter into a confrontational relationship with the West. However, Turkey sees in the partnership with Russia cooperation in the joint supply & ⤵️
joint production of Sputnik V (including to attract Russian tourists), security cooperation in Karabakh, Syria and Libya and support in the construction of the Istanbul canal, along with the existing ones (1936 Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the Straits).
#Moldova: The Presidents Sandu and Zelensky signed two memorandums. The first one stretches over the strategic bilateral cooperation and the synchronization of the steps regionally. 1) In this sense, Sandu wants Moldova to join Ukraine’s bid to adhere the “3 Seas” initiative.
2) Sandu has insisted to mention in the memorandum a domestic political dimension by suggesting that her victory at the elections “confirmed the European choice” of the country, along with public request for fighting the corruption.
3) Sandu and Zelensky agreed to endeavor jointly in order to achieve the EU membership, including via Association Agreements’ implementation. They underlined the individual dialogue between Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine with the EU, besides the EaP.
#Moldova: The president Sandu is in Kyiv in her first official visit abroad. She and her team went by car (that is quite strange security-wise). 1) Her agenda is filled with a several symbolic ceremonies of commemorating the victims of Holodomor and the “Hevenly Hundred Heroes”.
2) Sandu is expected to sign several bilateral documents. There is zero transparency about what is to be signed. The Moldovan and the Ukrainian presidency offices didn’t disclose any info about that. 3) President Sandu will also meet with the Ukrainian PM and Speaker of Rada.
4) The agenda press-release from Zelensky’s office tells that the two presidents will hold negotiations (it’s unclear in what exactly). Nothing was communicated about negotiations by the Moldovan side 👇 bit.ly/3nCM51u
#NagornoKarabakh: Using the precedent of the 2020 truce, Putin plays again a pivotal role in closing another deal between Armenia & Azerbaijan. 1) The new trilateral doc. signed in Moscow focus on economic-transportation ties, increasing Russia’s role as region’s peacemaker.
2) The second deal shakes further Pashinyan’s premiership. He has tried to speak in Moscow in favor of Armenian interests - the status of Artsakh, the exchange of the war prisoners. But that might be not enough to save his political career. 👇 en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
Let us remember what the ceasefire armistice of Nov. 2020 consisted of 👇
#Moldova: In less than 30 min, the protests are going to start. By means of these protests, the opposition and president elect Sandu are demanding for early parliamentary elections. This thread covers the situation around these protests. THREAD:
1. The major trigger of the protests were the legislative actions of Socialists/Dodon to limit some competences of the President elect Sandu. I explained it here 👇
2. The EU and Romania have signaled their support to the criticism of Sandu and the opposition regarding the limitation of the competences and overall the correctness of legislative process. 👇
The president elect Maia Sandu may encounter problems in the relations with Russia. Here is the THREAD (/18):
1.The election of the new Moldovan president inevitably influences FP, but less structurally and more at the institutional level. Objectively, the qualitative transformations in FP began after the fall of the oligarchic regime in the summer of 2019. neweasterneurope.eu/2019/11/13/the…
2.The presidential elections in November 2020 and the victory of Maia Sandu can produce qualitative changes at the level of the president's institution. Therefore, under Sandu's leadership, the president's office needs to escape from "isolation", and less so the country.