I’ve been asked a number of times the past couple of days what I think of @joebiden’s announcement to withdraw all US troops from #Afghanistan by September. I haven’t had the time to write a proper op ed, so instead I’ll give you my thoughts in this THREAD. 1/n
My top-line take is this: What choice did @joebiden really have? If you examine his situation through the lenses of #Afghanistan, terrorism risk, credibility, domestic politics, & global US priorities, you’ll see the answer is “he had to do it.” 2/n
Let’s start w/#Afghanistan. Recognize first that the US isn’t in South Asia! We were always visiting, which means at some point, we would leave. Only Q has been when that would happen. That Q was answered in the US-#Taliban Agreement: We would leave by 1 May. 3/n
That deadline was contingent on the #Taliban meeting their commitments w/in the deal. Some (including me) have argued that they haven’t fully done so. But those arguments are hard to make—& the TB reject them—b/c the TB’s commitments are vaguely stated. 4/n
Thus, for all intents and purposes, @JoeBiden inherited an agreement *made by the USG* to withdraw all non-diplomatic personnel from #Afghanistan by 1 May, w/little ability to convincingly argue otherwise. A bad deal, yes. But a deal the US agreed to nonetheless. 5/n
Some argued @JoeBiden should leave the deal. Ignore the deadline. Peg withdrawal to conditions instead of a timeline & if the #Taliban walk away from the peace process & their CT commitments, so be it. These were effectively the recs of the #AfghanistanStudyGroup, for ex. 6/n
What would that option have done for #Afghanistan? Guaranteed war for as long as the US stayed. Thousands of dead Afghans every single year in perpetuity, as I discussed previously. 7/n warontherocks.com/2019/03/weighi…
The #Taliban have been clear: there'll be no peace until the US leaves. Pundits arguing the US should stay to bring about conditions for peace ignore the TB’s stance on this. It’s true peace may not come to #Afghanistan after the US leaves. But it'll def not come if we stay. 8/n
What abt #alQaeda & #ISIS in #Afghanistan? Yes, they’re still there & might expand after the US leaves (tho that’s debatable given better options elsewhere). But arguments that go from that to “attacks on the US homeland” make enormous leaps of logic & ignore relative risks. 9/n
For example, while the intel community may say “the risk to the homeland will go up,” what they won’t do is put that into broader context. How *much* will the risk go up? How does that risk compare to the risk of any of a hundred other threats to the average American? 10/n
The risk of an avg American being killed by #alQaeda/#ISIS today is negligibly low. Yes, some of that's due to US CT efforts overseas. But a lot is due to hardening the US homeland & monitoring terrorist threats. & some is due to preferences of terrorist groups themselves. 11/n
Yes, the risk of a terrorist attack might rise after we withdraw from #Afghanistan. But will it rise more than a negligible amount? Is the prevention of that rise worth billions of dollars and thousands of dead Afghans every year? The IC & pundits don't answer these Qs. 12/n
IMO, it’s not worth it. The cost-benefit analysis of US #counterterrorism activities has been out of whack for a long time. I know a lot of USG leaders know this—including many in #DOD—b/c they’ve told me so. A recalibration of our terrorism risk calculus is long overdue. 13/n
What about US credibility?? Many of the pundits & officials pressing for the US to stay argue that US credibility will take a hit for leaving #Afghanistan in defeat. Interestingly, many of these same people argued for the US to leave the Paris Agreement and/or the JCPOA. 14/n
I’m no diplomat. But for me, it seems like US credibility takes the biggest hit when we go back on things we’ve publicly agreed to do. The US signed an agreement in which it committed to withdraw from #Afghanistan. Seems the credibility argument would suggest honoring that. 15/n
Some are asking, “what about Afghans?” & Afghans are asking, “what about us?” These are reasonable Qs. But @JoeBiden isn't the pres of #Afghanistan. He’s the US pres. & while most Americans know nothing about what’s happening in AFG today, polls show those who do want out. 16/n
Many in his own party also want out. @JoeBiden can’t ignore those domestic politics. Especially when he’s trying to advance a domestic agenda that requires *every single vote* his party has in the Senate. 17/n
Now consider #Afghanistan in the broader context of US interests globally. US policy on AFG's a priority to those who focus on it. But the instant you adopt a global lens, AFG’s importance to the US ⬇️ & the opportunity costs of our presence there are staggeringly apparent. 18/n
The days of the US being able to throw its money & forces around the globe in unprioritized and astrategic ways are GONE. The US has to be more circumspect & smarter. IT HAS TO. Continuing to spend $20-30B/yr on #Afghanistan makes no strategic sense. None. 19/n
So, as the US president, who took office after an insurrection & amidst a pandemic, facing global challenges like belligerent Russia & China & climate change, w/terrorism farther down the risk list than before, & w/a withdrawal commitment: Did @JoeBiden really have a choice? 20/n
No, I don’t really think he did. Despite what your personal views are, the cold calculus of a serious policy review could only reach one conclusion: now’s the time to go. 21/n
Of course, what happens next will be critical for the future of #Afghanistan, and in some ways @JoeBiden will have more leeway to make the many follow-on decisions that will come. But deciding to leave was the only logical choice the US president had, all things considered. 22/22
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Today, @USGAO released a report that describes the efforts of @StateDept, @DHSgov & @DeptofDefense to counter foreign disinformation. 1/n
@USGAO @StateDept @DHSgov @DeptofDefense GAO cited the following as examples:
- @StateDept's Global Engagement Center helps federal agencies, embassies & int'l partners develop analytic skills, policy responses & technical capacity to counter foreign disinformation overseas. 2/n
@USGAO @StateDept @DHSgov @DeptofDefense - @DHSgov's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency educates the public on the risks of disinformation and partners with state and local election officials to disseminate educational materials to help them identify disinformation. 3/n
Fascinating account here of how #alQaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri reportedly ended up in a Siraj Haqqani safehouse in downtown Kabul (& the #Taliban's request for AQ to not acknowledge the event). Will put some key points in this thread. 1/n
According to the article, a young #Taliban intel (GDI) officer brought Zawahiri to Kabul in 2022 b/c the latter was suffering from "heart, kidney and skin problems" & needed treatment in the capital. They traveled over the course of 3 weeks from Helmand province. 2/n
Al-Zawahiri was initially posted in a #Taliban intel (GDI) safehouse, but after a drone was sighted flying overhead, he was moved to a second safehouse (near the Sai Rahi Aludin roundabout) in the capital. 3/n
As with its last report, this latest report on the #Taliban’s relationship with #alQaeda in #Afghanistan is 180 degrees out from the current US assessment. 1/n cbsnews.com/news/afghanist…
“According to the report presented to the UNSC [#alQaeda] has established ‘up to 8 new training camps in #Afghanistan, including four in Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan & Uruzgan Provinces, w\a new base to stockpile weaponry in the Panjshir Valley….’ 2/n
“…The terrorist organization also operates 5 madrasas - religious schools where it trains and indoctrinates children to become fighters - in the east & northeast of #Afghanistan, the reports said…” 3/n
I was recently passed a pre-publication copy of Feridun Sinirlioğlu's independent assessment of the situation in #Afghanistan, conducted for the @UN
I'll put some thoughts about it in this THREAD. 1/n
@UN (Since the report isn't out yet, I can't link to it, but you can find various news articles about it via Google, such as this one by @VOANews: ) 2/nvoanews.com/a/un-mandated-…
@UN @VOANews Overall, the assessment is clearly written & admirably forthright, especially given that its audiences are wide-ranging, from the #Taliban to those who hate the Taliban.
Its primary conclusion: "the status quo of int'l engagement is not working." 3/n
Today, the #Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an evaluation report of its contribution to the Resolute Support mission in #Afghanistan that *pulls no punches.*
I'll string together its primary findings in this THREAD. 1/n
Before the findings, a quick comment: the Dutch MFA produced this report b/c "Dutch contributions to missions under Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution are subject to an obligation to evaluate the deployment after it's been completed"
Today, the @JoeBiden admin released its National Security Strategy. I’ll summarize its major points & put some thoughts on #terrorism & #Afghanistan specifically in this THREAD. 1/n
@JoeBiden The strategy exists in 5 parts: (1) overview of the problem; (2) sources of US strength (solutions); (3) global priorities; (4) strategy by region; (5) conclusion.
Oddly, part 1 starts on page 6. Nitpicky, I know, but still weird--who counts the cover as page 1? 3/n