THREAD How worried should US/EU policymakers be about Russia’s harnessing emerging technologies like AI & machine learning (ML) to support its assertive foreign policy agenda? I dug into these issues for a new paper as part of Carnegie’s project, The Return of Global Russia 1/x
There’s no doubt the Kremlin’s ongoing campaign of mayhem (the war in #Ukraine, interference in the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections, #SolarWinds, etc) has shown Russia’s operators are highly technically capable, operationally aggressive and innovative. 2/x
Part of what makes the Kremlin’s current calling cards so easy to spot—and more difficult to counter or deter—is a remarkable indifference to the knock-on effects of its behavior. This kind of operational art and bravado can mean more sometimes than pure technical chops. 3/x
Russia's had a lot of “firsts” in this domain. Since the mid-2000s, it has piloted & refined strategies that combine traditional cyber operations w asymmetric attacks to undermine adversaries’ information ecosystem and political processes @MarkLandlernytimes.com/2007/05/29/tec… 4/x
The war in Ukraine pushed these efforts to the next level (eg cyber ops that turned off lights/heat in the dead of winter and NotPetya, which quickly spread beyond Ukraine’s borders and caused billions of dollars in losses) @a_greenbergwired.com/story/notpetya… 5/x
But what’s also striking is the split-screen between Moscow’s ability to foster an image in our minds of all-powerful, technological prowess and daring and the country’s long-standing difficulties in developing advanced technologies or promoting innovation. 6/x
As Thomas Rid has warned, “The Kremlin’s...particularly adept at gaming elements of this new age or at the very least are good at getting everyone to talk about how good they are which could be the most important trick of all” newyorker.com/magazine/2020/…@RidT@yaffaesque 7/x
Russia’s mastery of the black arts of tech is somewhat belied by the country's falling further behind in key technologies. Russia’s best IT specialists are leaving in droves. Senior FSB officials portray that as a major national security threat. interfax.ru/russia/762434 8/x
Unlike China, with a vast population and vibrant economy, Russian engineers have few innate national advantages when it comes to the large data sets/comm'l applications that underlie innovation in AI. This statistic really jumped out at me cset.georgetown.edu/research/russi…@RitaKonaev 9/x
Faced with a race it can’t win, the Kremlin is focusing AI/ML investments on key defense/natsec areas (eg robotics/autonomous systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, info operations). Some of these are paying off @SamBendett@RitaKonaevwarontherocks.com/2019/07/russia… 10/x
Still, it's difficult to pinpoint signs of major tech advances in recent Russian influence ops or malign activities. The Kremlin's techniques in 2020 U.S. presidential election had more in common w 1920s heyday of Comintern than sensationalized media coverage about AI, etc. 11/x
The much-hyped Russian Internet Research Agency spawned websites with funny/vulgar names so blatant they seemed to betray a desire to be uncovered. Nor did it take a ton of savvy to amplify readily apparent divisions in the US electorate
The biggest shocker, perhaps, was that a sitting president of the United States and his allies gleefully embraced (yet again) the fruits of a Russian active measures operation. With friends in such high places perhaps the Kremlin realized it didn't really need fancy schmancy? END
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THREAD The West's relationship with Russia is broken. Its Russia policy is, too. How can the Biden administration build a more effective--and sustainable--approach for dealing with an increasingly adversarial Russia? carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/09/bac… 1/
I argue that a “back to basics” approach is the best option for the US/EU to address the damage stemming from 4 years of Trump’s madcap handling of Russia and ever more disruptive moves by the Kremlin in a new paper co-written with Eugene Rumer 2/
To succeed, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic will need to make some compromises (not least because their perceptions of Russia will never align 100%) while making sure Moscow is unable to drive wedges between the US and EU. 3/
Question: am I correct that @JosepBorrellF's briefing this week was the first time the EU has formally said that containment is one of the main goals of its Russia policy? That word drives the Kremlin crazy.
Putin's comments in a speech at FSB today are a case in point 1/
Putin speech earlier today: "We are confronting a policy of containment of Russia. We're talking about an aggressive policy aimed at slowing our [economic] development, creating problems along our borders & provoking internal instability..." 2/
Putin (cont'd): "In the end, it's aimed at weakening Russia and subjugating us [once again] to the control of foreign powers." 3/
What does the Kremlin think #Navalny's weak points are and how does that inform its current pressure campaign? Fascinating piece by @baunov. Quick thread 1/ carnegie.ru/commentary/838…
Baunov points out the effectiveness of the Kremlin's ongoing effort to disparage Navalny as a tool of Western intelligence services bent on provoking a street revolution. "This [claim] may sound preposterous, but it will resonate with certain segments of the public." 2/
Well-publicized state-sponsored violence and forced video confessions may shock people in the West, but they're also a deliberate attempt to make Russians think twice about the higher cost the regime will make them to pay for engaging in unsanctioned political activity. 3/
Don't let the hoopla over first Biden-Putin phone call overshadow the fact that White House is underlining the fact of Russian interference in the 2020 presidential election (not/not 2016) 1/ whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
The Kremlin, relying on a network led by a known Russian intelligence agent named Andrii Derkach, successfully mounted an influence operation to tilt the outcome of the election by spreading false information about @JoeBiden and his family. 2/
That operation (outlined here: home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…) didn't rely on the sexy online and social media tools seen in 2016 but it successfully ensnared Donald Trump, @RudyGiuliani, @DonaldJTrumpJr, and many parts of the pro-GOP media apparatus. 3/
How were the #Navalny demonstrations across Russia on Saturday different from past waves of mass protest? @Baunov breaks it down and challenges some of the wishful thinking that is now in circulation.
For example: @Baunov says the protest was less about supporting Navalny personally and more about public anger "about the Kremlin's lawlessness and the usurpation of power of allowing President Vladimir Putin to effectively remain in the job for life"
The make-up of the demonstrations is also important: "the most militant protesters didn’t look like the typical supporters of pro-democracy protests...[they mostly] work in the service sector or office jobs and are [people] dissatisfied with their jobs, salaries, and prospects"
Are we listening enough to average Russians? Nope! Thread on @CarnegieRussia-@levada_ru focus groups on political change, enduring appeal of paternalism, "strong hand," govt control over economy, wealth redistribution 1/ carnegie.ru/2021/01/14/how… @AndrKolesnikov/D.Volkov/A.Levinson
Anger over official corruption was a constant theme. But not necessarily in the way you'd expect -- eg the desire for Chinese-style solutions and "Stalinist methods" among tradition-minded participants. 2/
These folks support Putin's foreign policy, no questions asked. But they want the government to pivot to addressing domestic ills laid bare by the pandemic. 3/