I think i've teased you all enough. So here it is, how the FORTIS '21 (the Royal Navy's name for the deployment of the @HMSQNLZ carrier strike group's deploymenet to the Pacific) compares with similar annual group deployments conducted by the Royal Navy over the last 40 years./1
First of all, here are the four largest peacetime group deployments since 1982:
Argonaut '01 containing a whopping 26 ships of all types conducted in Exercise SAIF SAREEA 2 off Oman.
Aurora '04 visited the USA to develop amphibious skills after the '98 & '03 Defence Reviews./2
Ocean Wave '97 saw the group visit the Pacific & oversaw the ceremonial handover of Hong Kong.
Cougar '11 saw the roll out of the new "Response Force Task Group" concept after the 2010 SDSR, exercised in the Gulf before elements of it took part in the 2011 Libya Intervention./3
Cougar '13 involved exercises in the Gulf with the US and Saudi navies before HMS Illustrious was detatched to aid the Philippenes in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan.
Taurus '09 saw the deployment of the UK's amphibious group to the Pacific, including landing exercises with Brunei./4
Orient Express '83 involved the deploymet of the carrier group to the Pacific, including a visit to Australia, marred by controversy over whether she was carryng nuclear weapons, and exercises with the USS Kitty Hawk group in the South China Sea./5
Baltic Protector '19 saw the deployment of the UK amphibious group into the Baltic for combined NATO exercises under the new new Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) framework which includes a number of Scandanavian and Baltic states./6
Here we reach FORTIS '21, the QE carrier group's initial outing, on a slightly larger scale - in terms ships, than the Orion '08 carrier group deployment.
Auriga '10 and Argonaut '99 were both amphibious exercises in North America & the Mediterranean respectively./7
It is notable that the two Pacific carrier group deployments of the late 1980s and early 1990s did not feature a group as large or capable as the one deploying on FORTIS '21.
QE's deployment is also larger than the 2006 carrier group deployment to the Gulf & Indian Ocean./8
Obviously there are many other such deployments - the graphics above simply reflect the largest of them over the last 40 years, so for those who are really interested in the bigger picture and how it all breaks down here are the stats.
This table sorts by ships involved./9
Note: The 'heat map' colour coding system works in comparison to FORTIS '21. 'Hotter' is larger than 'Cooler' is smaller than./10
This table shows the same data sorted chronologically./11
And here is the list including only the deployments which visited the Pacific - note that these only include the whole group visiting, so ATG '18 which Albion joined from the Pacific and Cougar '13 where Illustrious departed for the Philippenes are omitted./12
Some interesting factors to note about FORTIS '21 which don't come out immediately from the raw numbers:
- The deployment contains the joint 3rd largest No of escort ships of any since 1982, only Argonaut '01 & Ocean Wave '97 had more.
- It is one of only 9 to feature an SSN./13
-Although the figures are not in the tables, it does contain the most fixed wing aircraft of any UK group deployment since 1982.
-There are have only been six larger group deployments in the last almost 40 years than FORTIS '21 and the largest of those were ~ two decades ago./14
In conclusion FORTIS '21 sits amongst some of the most substantial 'peacetime running' deployments of the last four decades.
The only group deployments to substantially surpass it were a handful of truly exceptional occasions around the turn of the milennium./15
Contrasted against previous RN deployments to the Pacific it is substantial and competitive with all but the largest - Ocean Wave '97 - and in some areas: specifically the number of UK escorts and multinational fixed wing aircraft involved it even compares well with that./16
So, it's Friday and the sandcastle guy is gonna talk about aircraft carriers again.
I thought it would be worth it, in the general context of the recent rumors surrounding the QE Programme, the upcoming Defence White Paper and various social media reactions to the above./1
I hope that the last several years spent outlining why these ships, and other aircraft carriers, are the way they have percolated through to my audience.
That said, there are still a great many people who seem convinced that the whole programme is a delusional nonsense./2
Clearly, if you've followed me for any length of time then you'll know that I disagree with that view. Having studied the subject for a good while I have come to the conclusion that aircraft carrying warships remain very useful implements for defence and wider UK state policy./3
Right, it's THREAD time on the Royal Marines' Future Commando Force, amphibious shipping, budgets and options.
I'll preface everything I say here with a couple of caveats. This is very much a 'first contact' impression and some somewhat rough thoughts, I'm not possessed of all the facts & amphibious warfare practitioners within the RN & RM who do have them are free to correct any mistakes
Second, this isn't a forensic analysis of the budget (although direction of travel and some options will be discussed) and as such any proposed structures and concepts may be taken with a grain of salt.
Frigates, Destroyers and some cool graphics explaining why the recent "15 RN escorts" stories in the newspapers aren't telling the whole story in some rather important ways.
First of all here's the key for these graphics.
Blue = In the water, avalable for tasking (including working up and training).
Black = In refit, out of the water and not available for tasking.
Grey = Laid up without a full crew (including units allocated for Harbour Training).
Orange ships are those which have received significant power and propulsion upgrades. These include the Type 45 PIP and Type 23 PGMU upgrades.
The numbers at the top and bottom represent the number of escorts and OPVs in the water & crewed. i.e. the number of blue/orange ships.
A hackneyed opening that dismisses carriers as "vulnerable white elephants" after zero engagement with the very live debate around their modern utility.
"Originally scheduled for 2012"
Yes, that rather inconvenient recession got in the way.
Presumably other maritime capabilities, such as the UK's existing amphibious shipping, nuclear deterrent and mine warfare forces do not require protecting with big expensive surface escorts.
As for the "only strategic purpose" line, flippant and laughably wrong.
THREAD:
If you've ever taken any one of a number of ferries from Portsmouth International Port that shuttle back and forth to the continent you may have looked out and seen a rather sad-looking hulk. Stripped of her weapons and radars, she sits quietly alongside Whale Island.
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You may even have taken a moment to wonder what that funny looking grey ship was, how did she get there and why?
This is the story of HMS Bristol, monument to a fleet that never was, one of the last testaments to the "white heat" of a promised technological revolution.
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Our story begins on a cool, clear day in June 1953. Amidst the pomp and circumstance of the coronation of a new Queen the Royal Navy had, as it had for centuries, turned out in all its finery with over 300 ships for a grand fleet review at Spithead in the Solent.
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Our first metric, and most basic starting point, is a flat comparison of the number of ships and submarines of various types in-service with the four navies.
From this we can see a pretty clear hierarchy with the Russians leading by a substantial margin in 4 of the 6 fields.
However, anyone looking carefully should pretty rapidly see the shortfalls of this metric.
For example, in the 'patrol vessels' category a 30 ton patrol boat and a 2,000 ton OPV both count as 1.