tl;dr for something that was to be so transformative, there's not actually much immediate change coming
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We can start by observing that what was the central question of British politics for the past 5 or more years finds itself shunted behind Covid (and various other things) to page 48 of the document
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Potentially the most important part of of the section is this, given its nebulous objectives and scope for longer-run change.
Note the focus on removing barriers (and, possibly, apostrophes), but also the lack of outputs so far, suggesting there aren't many easy wins
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But the Govt has found some things
But not all of them are actually very Brexit-y
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Both subsidies and procurement are certainly notable shifts from EU constraints: indeed, leaving the EU has meant that new policies were required, so there's been an effective continuation of the old systems
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Freeports are not an EU-forbidden thing, whatever you're told, just an economically unsound thing, so let's keep them out of it (at least until their incompatibility with FTAs crops up some more)
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Likewise, the UK always had control over non-EU immigration, so that Professional Qualifications Bill could have turned up at any point before now
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The Planning Bill's divergence from previous environmental impact standards will depend on the detail, but remember how much the rest of this Queen's Speech is putting into greenery, so maybe it'll be more about tidying-up
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The less said on Turing, the better, except to reiterate that exchange schemes tend to work better when you have: A) places to exchange with, and B) funding to support those exchanges
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Last on the list is animal welfare, but from the reading of the text on these Bills, it's not obvious how higher domestic standards than EU minima would have been impossible beforehand.
Looks good, though, because everyone loves animals
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So, to sum up:
- some replacement systems that will mark some divergence (although the LPF commitments in the TCA);
- more things that weren't stopped before by the EU;
- a general intention to do more, just as soon as someone works out what
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This morning, Govt was talking about 'revivification', but I struggle to see how this package is yet enough to disturb a light snooze
A propos not much, let's talk a bit about why trust matters so much to the EU in its relations with the UK
tl;dr without it, it's very hard to do anything
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I've talked a lot about trust over the past years of Brexit, mainly because it's a central part of all negotiating: it's the grease in the system that makes things run much more smoothly
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How to build trust is pretty simple, as I've sketched out below.
An apposite day to announce I'm going to be next @UACES chair
Moving out of @SurreyPolitics office, ahead of starting @OUPolitics in May, and remarking in what a big part of my professional career @UACES has been
Since I started by PhD @LSEEI in 1999, @UACES has been central to my work, first with @UACESgf colleagues and then with those working on euroscepticism, including the very excellent @NicholasStartin, whose shoes I will be trying to fill as Chair
But @UACES folk have been there since I was a student, with their numerous textbooks and research outputs, and the events so numerous that I gave up trying to count a bit before lunchtime
I'm struck by the parallels between this and Brexit: in both cases, there's a failure to accept that making rules for your state doesn't mean being able to make rules for other states
In the asylum case, Patel is suggesting that 'illegal' entries by asylum-seekers will result in rapid removal from UK
But removal to where?
How do you get other (even 'safe') states to accept what are, under international law, people who are within their rights to be in UK?
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Likewise, Brexit debate has been about 'taking back control', but that can't mean 'forcing others to accept whatever you want', only 'asking others to see what they'll agree to'
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