That's still nearly 1 in 5 not being compliant, on reduced volumes, with the issue hereto being dealt with away from ports that have minimal capacity to process non-compliant cases
So yes, good to remove some paperwork, but maybe setting everyone up for more problems
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An apposite day to announce I'm going to be next @UACES chair
Moving out of @SurreyPolitics office, ahead of starting @OUPolitics in May, and remarking in what a big part of my professional career @UACES has been
Since I started by PhD @LSEEI in 1999, @UACES has been central to my work, first with @UACESgf colleagues and then with those working on euroscepticism, including the very excellent @NicholasStartin, whose shoes I will be trying to fill as Chair
But @UACES folk have been there since I was a student, with their numerous textbooks and research outputs, and the events so numerous that I gave up trying to count a bit before lunchtime
I'm struck by the parallels between this and Brexit: in both cases, there's a failure to accept that making rules for your state doesn't mean being able to make rules for other states
In the asylum case, Patel is suggesting that 'illegal' entries by asylum-seekers will result in rapid removal from UK
But removal to where?
How do you get other (even 'safe') states to accept what are, under international law, people who are within their rights to be in UK?
2/
Likewise, Brexit debate has been about 'taking back control', but that can't mean 'forcing others to accept whatever you want', only 'asking others to see what they'll agree to'
3/
To recap: at one level, EU can feel it's done a stand-up job with Brexit
- protected members' interests
- didn't have to compromise on red lines
- secured legally-binding commitments from UK
- UK keeps having to come back to those commitments
2/
In large part, this comes from dominant position that EU holds, as larger party in process
Yes, UK has significant capacities, but can't escape econ/pol/geopol weight of EU system
3/
Thinking again about the UK's European policy and why it doesn't work
tl;dr EU doesn't think UK has a credible alternative to making things work in long-run
1/
To recap, since Johnson's entry to No.10, UK has not only picked at the scabs of the Brexit process, but has actively sought out points of conflict and tension
IMB; non-implementation; unilateral delays; EU Ambo status; EU office in NI; etc; etc
2/
Today's announcement about EU starting dispute proceedings against UK is unsurprising, in the context, and much more likely to result in UK giving way than the EU
3/
How does yesterday's UK announcement to unilateral extend grace periods compare to previous challenges to WA/TCA?
1/
Well, like IMB and COM's mention of Art.16, this has not yet come into effect, so it's still more potential than actual
However
2/
COM was looking to use a power it actually held under Art.16 (albeit not following proper procedure and with poor political judgement about acceptability)
UK in both IMB and now is seeking to overturn legal obligations under the treaties
3/