A propos not much, let's talk a bit about why trust matters so much to the EU in its relations with the UK
tl;dr without it, it's very hard to do anything
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I've talked a lot about trust over the past years of Brexit, mainly because it's a central part of all negotiating: it's the grease in the system that makes things run much more smoothly
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How to build trust is pretty simple, as I've sketched out below.
In short, parties have to feel confident that the other party will keep its word and act in good faith when there's an issue
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That's why the IMB proposals last September caused so much concern for the EU: the UK was not only acting explicitly against the operation of pacta sunt servanda for the WA, but also raising doubts about why it might later do with the then negotiations for the TCA
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Even at the time, it was clear this was a move that would have numerous strongly negative effects for the UK, especially in its dealings with the EU
It was just possible that a rapid u-turn on IMB might have contained the impacts, but that issue dragged on through the rest of 2020, and since has been joined by various other instances, including:
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The various invocations of Art.16 as an option, the unilateral extension of grace periods, and more general rhetoric about not having to follow commitments
Also keep in mind that EU sees a UK willing to challenge even the niceties of interaction, as with the EU's ambassador's status (still not resolved BTW)
But we drift a bit from the original Q of why all this matters to much to the EU
Largely because negotiation (and its attendant principles) is what the EU is
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EU rests on a system of very dense interaction between members; interactions that help to foster trust, which in turn allows for more constructive outputs
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If you'd like a bit of theory, this is Karl Deutsch's communication theory: closer ties generates a community
(and yes, there are critiques of that, but let's run with it)
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To flip that around, accepting challenges to a core part of the negotiation model would mean a challenge to the operation of the EU itself: if member states could just do as they wished, then the system would lose meaning
[insert HUN/POL RoL punchline here]
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There are sanctions that could be applied, but they rely on a general willingness to apply them. Look at the Excessive Deficit Procedure for an example of what happens when that's not there
And that's for member states, where the options are much greater than for 3rd states
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So poor trust in the UK (mirrored by UK's poor trust in EU) makes it hard to enter into any constructive process: the cost-benefit is tipped much more to the former
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One upshot of this is that this isn't a gambit by EU to draw concessions from UK
Instead, it's a need for sustained, broad-based demonstration of trustworthiness
That means sticking to commitments and working through problems constructively, w/in agreed mechanisms
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That's necessarily a slow and uncertain process, and one that UK doesn't look immediately ready to engage with (certainly politically), so expect trust to remain a key sticking point in the coming years, not least 2025 at the first full review
An apposite day to announce I'm going to be next @UACES chair
Moving out of @SurreyPolitics office, ahead of starting @OUPolitics in May, and remarking in what a big part of my professional career @UACES has been
Since I started by PhD @LSEEI in 1999, @UACES has been central to my work, first with @UACESgf colleagues and then with those working on euroscepticism, including the very excellent @NicholasStartin, whose shoes I will be trying to fill as Chair
But @UACES folk have been there since I was a student, with their numerous textbooks and research outputs, and the events so numerous that I gave up trying to count a bit before lunchtime
I'm struck by the parallels between this and Brexit: in both cases, there's a failure to accept that making rules for your state doesn't mean being able to make rules for other states
In the asylum case, Patel is suggesting that 'illegal' entries by asylum-seekers will result in rapid removal from UK
But removal to where?
How do you get other (even 'safe') states to accept what are, under international law, people who are within their rights to be in UK?
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Likewise, Brexit debate has been about 'taking back control', but that can't mean 'forcing others to accept whatever you want', only 'asking others to see what they'll agree to'
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To recap: at one level, EU can feel it's done a stand-up job with Brexit
- protected members' interests
- didn't have to compromise on red lines
- secured legally-binding commitments from UK
- UK keeps having to come back to those commitments
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In large part, this comes from dominant position that EU holds, as larger party in process
Yes, UK has significant capacities, but can't escape econ/pol/geopol weight of EU system
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Thinking again about the UK's European policy and why it doesn't work
tl;dr EU doesn't think UK has a credible alternative to making things work in long-run
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To recap, since Johnson's entry to No.10, UK has not only picked at the scabs of the Brexit process, but has actively sought out points of conflict and tension
IMB; non-implementation; unilateral delays; EU Ambo status; EU office in NI; etc; etc
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Today's announcement about EU starting dispute proceedings against UK is unsurprising, in the context, and much more likely to result in UK giving way than the EU
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