Putin and Xi have launched construction of 4 new blocs on 2 Chinese nuclear power plants built by @rosatom. A reminder that 🇨🇳🇷🇺 energy cooperation is not just about hydrocarbons, and that there are areas beyond arms where Russia still is a source of high-tech for China. 1/
2/ This @business piece provides a good background of the $3.1b deal (signed during Putin's 2018 state visit to 🇨🇳) that involves construction of 2 blocks of Tianwan (田湾) in Jiangsu & 2 blocs of Xudapu (徐大堡) in Liaoning bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3/ For @rosatom, the 2018 deal was important in competition against @EDFofficiel & @WECNuclear in 🇨🇳 market. No less important was the 2019 contract to supply nuclear fuel (took a painful year to negotiate it after the main contract was signed) rosatom.ru/en/press-centr…
4/ Xi in his remarks at today's ceremony talks not only about 🇨🇳🇷🇺 & importance of nuclear energy for 0-carbon goal, but also need for better "global energy governance" 全球能源治理体系协调发展xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-…
5/ Putin in his remarks vows to expand cooperation between @rosatom & CNNC, including in R&D and joint operations in other countries etc. kremlin.ru/events/preside…
6/ Given China's rapid progress in nuclear technology, it remains to be seen how much cooperation with @rosatom will be required in 10+ years. Tianwan plant is a good example. In the first 4 blocks, 🇷🇺 was the main builder, but had to localize some technology.
7/ This time around, in both Tianwan and Xudaipu @rosatom supplies the reactor, which without doubt is the most valuable and complicated part of the station, but the rest is built by 🇨🇳.
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THREAD 🧵
Tectonic shifts in Russia's trade and exposure to global centers of economic gravity are happening quietly, but surely. In 2013, before Crimea and Western sanctions, 🇷🇺🇪🇺trade volume was 5x of 🇷🇺🇨🇳. Just 7 years after, trade with EU is only 2x bigger than with China. 1/
THREAD
It's hard to predict how many people will show up to January 31 rallies in Russia to support @navalny. But the risk of violent incidents has gone up significantly, and one of the key factors here is choice of location for Moscow protest. Let me explain it quickly 👇
2/ Team Navalny has chosen Lubyanskaya and Old Squares in Moscow. That's where HQ of FSB and the Presidential Administration (PA) are located. According to organizers, the logic is that @navalny was poisoned by FSB squad, and the decision was likely taken by the Kremlin.
3/ Why does this choice of location create additional risk of violence and incidents compared to Pushkinskaya Square a week ago? There are three main reasons.
THREAD
What is overlooked in analysis of #RussiaProtest after @navalny's arrest? It's sophistication that the Kremlin has developed in addressing such threats, and lack of realistic strategy by Putin's opponents. Let's put together some unpleasant facts 👇 foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/26/put…
3/ @navalny's investigation about Putin's palace (>96 million views now!) and street protests are seen as a serious challenge by the Kremlin, which is visible in heavy-handed crackdown on Navalny's team&family, as @HenryJFoy & @maxseddon document here: ft.com/content/45be9f…
A great read by @AbrahmL in @nytimes on how Russia might win from climate change, and how it can handle potential migration from China. The story has lots of interesting facts, and features Sergey Karaganov's bear skin. Couple of additional points... 1/ nytimes.com/interactive/20…
2/ The article describes 🇷🇺government attitude towards climate change as overwhelmingly positive due to new farming potential in Siberia/FarEast, and cites @RodSchoonover who describes potential "🇷🇺 agricultural dominance" as an "underappreciated geopolitical threat"
3/ Of course, I'm not a climate expert, but based on my limited knowledge talking to 🇷🇺 officials, Moscow's view on climate change is much more nuanced and increasingly focused on risks. Good starting point is President Putin's speech at Valdai: en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
THREAD
Today's agreement may turn another bloody page in the tragedy that is Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Setting emotions aside, here are couple of quick points on Russian calculus and handling of the issue - and some possible implications for 🇷🇺 standing in the Caucasus.
2/ For many Russian decision-makers, resumption of hostilities in NK was a matter of "when" rather than "if." The Kremlin took note of 2016 war, and the conclusion was that time is on Azerbaijan's side if Baku becomes determined to use force.
3/ This is why Russia had encouraged Yerevan to become more flexible, and has always been clear that the 🇷🇺🇦🇲military alliance covers only internationally recognized Armenian territory, but not NK - a point reinstated very clearly by @MID_RF on 10/31 mid.ru/en/foreign_pol…