There's a lot of hyperventilating in my feed right now -- mostly from US, UK and EU neocons, but also from various others in CEE -- about the implications of the Blinken/Lavrov meeting in Reykjavik. Everyone needs to calm down.
/1
We don't have a report from DC yet (at least not that I can find), but it's noteworthy that State are treating this meeting as an afterthought in Blinken's Denmark/Iceland/Greenland tour. state.gov/secretary-trav…
/2
Contrast that to the treatment by the Russian MFA, where the meeting is the top news item. Moscow is playing this for political looks and preening in the spotlight; Washington is nonplussed. mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol…
/3
Further, from everything we can tell, the meeting was brief and cursory in content: they covered strategic arms control, nodded in the direction of joint interests, but kicked the can on an agenda for a Biden-Putin summit.
/4
That agenda will now be hashed out by the respective natsec grandees, Sullivan and Patrushev -- and that discussion will be both less public and less diplomatic.
/5
As I've written before, Moscow isn't really part of the solution to any of Washington's most pressing problems, and so there are no grounds here for a grand bargain.
/6
Accordingly, Moscow is looking much more eager for something approaching a reset than Washington, but we're seeing no indication that Biden is interested.
/7
Beyond reversing diplomat expulsions (which would be a good thing, IMO, at least if it allows for normal visa issuance), there's no commensurable quid pro quo on the table -- or anywhere near the table.
/8
More important to Washington, however, is restoring the trans-Atlantic alliances, and that is the context in which I would read the withdrawal of sanctions on NS2: evidence of a more equitable approach to Berlin, rather than of caving to Moscow.
/9 moscowonthames.wordpress.com/2021/05/19/bac…
If people want Washington to help deter further Russian aggression in the Eastern Neighbourhood, then they should understand that such deterrence is contingent on trans-Atlantic solidarity.
/10
I expect Moscow to play Berlin and Washington off one another. But Warsaw and Riga shouldn't play that game. If EU member states are concerned about the impact of NS2 (and don't get me wrong - they should be), they need to fight that battle in Brussels, not Foggy Bottom.
/11
Maybe I'll be proved wrong, of course, and Biden/Blinken will prove to be naive dreamers. But we don't have any evidence of that just yet.
/END
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Но отмечу один очень важный момент: я не говорю (и никогда бы не говорил!) ни об “авторитарных гражданах”, ни об “авторитарном человеке”. Наоборот, я пытаюсь осмыслить “гражданство” в авторитарном контексте. Получилось ли осмыслить – судите сами!
There’s an adage in political science that you shouldn’t predict the future if you’re likely to live long enough to see it. It’s a good maxim, and while I generally try not to break it, I sometimes fail.
/2
One of those times was back in November 2018, when I looked at the challenges facing Vladimir Putin, the options on his menu, and tried to predict what he’d do. Looking back, I was right about most things, but wrong about one. I wish I hadn’t been.
In that post, Navalny's team presents an overview of the materials they were allowed to see relating to the accusations of extremism against Navalny's organizations. To remind, that trial -- in which Pavlov represents the team -- is being held behind closed doors.
/2
Among the revelations was the news that the authorities were preparing a case against @navalny, @leonidvolkov and @ioannZH, essentially accusing them of running not a political organization, but an illegal sect.
And so, #Russia de-escalates: First at home, and then in Ukraine.
(A quick thread. TL;DR: None of this is over just yet.)
/1
The most recent and very welcome piece of news is Shoigu's announcement that Russian troops will be pulling back from the Ukrainian border. It is very good to know that a full-scale invasion of #Ukraine is apparently not in the offing.
There will be a lot of mostly pointless arguing over why this happened. Some will claim that Russia never intended to invade. Others will claim that deterrence worked. Only Putin knows, and he isn't talking.
/3
While we wait for the protests to kick off, it's worth spending a bit more time looking at the economic aspects of Putin's speech today.
TL;DR: It's underwhelming, but informative.
/1
For context: Broadly speaking, Russia has an economic problem, but not a fiscal one. The budget is in deficit but the fiscal position is strong, as are reserves, and the country can afford to borrow (even despite US sanctions on sovereign debt).
/2
GDP growth is unstable and anemic -- the headline projection of 3.8% is unimpressive, given what happened in 2020 (and projections of 5-6% in more mature markets).
/3
The dust hasn't yet settled, but we can draw some early conclusions from today's protests in #Russia. TL;DR: The Kremlin and the opposition are at a stalemate.
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I don't see reliable nationwide turnout figures, but this feels similar in size & scale to the 2017 Dimon protests, which brought out 60-100k nationwide. This may be bigger. Either way, more than the Kremlin was hoping to see, but probably less than the opposition wanted.
/2
The Kremlin went to extraordinary lengths to keep people off the streets - including preventive arrests, online censorship, and threats to workers and students - and there's little indication it worked (though, I suppose, turnout could have been even higher).
/3