In this passage, Waltz introduces his three "levels of analysis": the individual, the state, or the system.
For Waltz, the first image (the individual) lies at the heart of Morgenthau's work. He says the following in his chapter on the "first image" (note he brings in Morgenthau's views on World Government -- see previous #KeepRealismReal thread):
As for the second image, this is actually something that Waltz himself would explore a decade later in his 1967 book, "Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics" amazon.com/Foreign-Policy…
His goal in writing the book? He didn't agree with democracy being "disparaged" as ill-suited for effective foreign policy.
Who was disparaging democracy? He quotes Tocqueville
This phrase, according to Waltz, has achieved "the prestige of frequent quotation" in academic and foreign policy circles
Here's the thing: Waltz doesn't fully disagree with the quotation. Democracies seem not as well equipped to "play the game" of power politics.
But Waltz thinks that democracies have one notable advantage in foreign policy: prudence
As for the third image, this is Waltz's purpose for writing his 1979 book, "Theory of International Politics". amazon.com/Theory-Interna…
In Chapter 4, he again brings up Morgenthau's "second image" focus.
He also calls out Henry Kissinger for having a second image focus in his academic work
But Waltz thinks this is wrong...or at least uninteresting. He says so in this passage, which also offers his clearest description of what is meant by a "third image" or "system level" theory of international politics (note: reference to the security dilemma)
A theory of international politics explains general patterns that will be observed in the world (e.g. states will seek arms; wars will happen; cooperation shallow) not the behavior of particular states
He likens it to a theory of the market compared to a theory of the firm
Indeed, he admits later in the text that a "third image" theory won't predict exactly what a particular state will do at a given moment, but that's also not the point
And he calls out Morgenthau for not seeing this distinction
Why did Waltz now insistent on distinguishing "international politics" from "foreign policy"? According to @dbessner & @GuilhotNicolas in @Journal_IS, it was to further his effort of saying that "liberal democracy" was not disadvantaged in world politics muse.jhu.edu/article/601983
You might be wondering? What does all of the above discussion have to do with realism?
Not much, really.
In fact, you want to know two words that never appear in "Theory of International Politics"?
"Realism" or "Realist" (though "Realpolitik" shows up a bit)
Oh, and definitely NOT the term "Neorealism".
The term "Neorealism" was apparently coined by Robert W. Cox to describe Waltz's work.
At least, that is the claim of Robert Keohane
That passage is from the introduction of the 1986 volume, "Neorealism & it's Critics". amazon.com/Neorealism-Its…
Morgenthau takes the idea of a world state seriously. As James Speer wrote decades ago in @World_Pol: "Morgenthaus' entire treatment of world politics thus centers upon the requirements for the world state." cambridge.org/core/journals/…
This is not surprising. By the late 1940s, creating a world government was prominently viewed as necessary for avoiding nuclear annihilation
Don't get me wrong: Carr definitely talks about Realism in the text. But the text is about much more than that (as he writes in Chapter 2)
Carr began the text in the late 1930s. By then, the onset of another war seemed likely: Germany had remilitarized the Rhineland, Japan had invaded Manchuria, Italy conquered Abyssinia, etc, etc.
When I teach my Intro to International Relations students how "Realism" developed as an idea/theory/school/paradigm, I ground it in the real world issues facing scholars at the time they wrote.
Why? because that's what those scholars did. Hence, #KeepRealismReal
I start with work written in the 1920s.
That means no Machiavelli, no Hobbes, or no Thucydides
Shocked by the Biden administration's (lack of) response towards the #COVID19 crisis in 🇮🇳? Stunned that export constraints are taking priority over humanitarian assistance?
Don't be. 🇺🇸 has a long history of being an a**hole in foreign policy.
[THREAD]
I'm not going to recount every instance in history.
Instead, let's recount instances where the US refused economic assistance (via exporting a good or providing financial relief) to an ally (formal or nominal) in a crisis.
Those are cases most similar to 🇺🇸🇮🇳 relations at the moment: 🇮🇳 is a nominal ally (via the Quad).