A quick Monday morning run-down of where the UK is on the Northern Ireland Protocol
tl;dr yes it creates problems, but those are ones of the UK's choosing
1/
This weekend's G7 was very much at the worse end of possible outcomes, with much digging into positions and a degree of opportunity cost to UK on the actual agenda of the meeting
A lot of the annoyance seems to have come from Macron's remarks on NI being apart from the rest of UK. Johnson's response (above) is true, but misses a key part of the picture - he agreed to NI being apart from the rest of UK
3/
As we know, the UK was not forced to sign the Protocol or the Withdrawal Agt that contains it
Yes, the costs of no-deal were very extensive, but that's something different
Under the norm of pacta sunt servanda, the necessary prior for contracting parties sticking to their commitments is that those parties enter freely into them in the first place
As a result, Johnson (and Parliament) accepted a differentiated solution to withdrawal, in order to protect other obligations under the Good Friday Agt
6/
To reiterate, this causes problems for the UK, in many ways, but the decision of the govt was that those problems were preferable to those created by another model, or by not concluding a deal at all
It's the relative weight of these options to one another that matters
7/
For the EU - and the rest of the G7 it seems - the priority is getting that agreement to work in practice
For UK, it's to minimise the problems, which is something rather different
8/
As this weekend showed, that mismatch is a real problem: without being publicly and demonstrably engaged in implementation of the Protocol, the UK isn't getting any hearing for accommodations
9/
I've summarised this before, but generally speaking, the more you are sincere (or look it) about making things work, the more traction you'll get
So, unless and until the UK govt starts serious implementation, it'll find all efforts to reduce problems will be dismissed as self-serving and in poor faith, regardless of any intrinsic merit that might exist
11/
And - if it wasn't already clear - the longer this situation exists, the harder it will be to end it
/end
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Today sees the first meeting of the TCA's Partnership Council, as well as the WA's Jt Cte: worth noting their distinct remits, powers and the different dispute settlement mechanisms they have access to
And just so you have them, more info on those dispute settlement mechanisms
In both cases we're still right at the start of these, but they both contain significant scope for penalties for infringement of treaty obligations
And here's a couple of graphics about options on the Protocol
Tl;dr here is that it might be problematic, but it's a lot less problematic than the alternatives
The general formula is that - ceteris paribus - if you're looking for the other party in an agreement to help you out, you're more likely to get that if you've demonstrated that you've tried to make the agt work
2/
So, in a non-random example, if you agreed a 6 month grace period on chilled meat products accessing the other party and you said you'd use that time to adjust, then if you didn't try to adjust then you're less likely to be cut any slack
3/
Some thoughts on the crossover between the Swiss and UK relations with the EU
Tl;dr you can't avoid having a relationship, so finding a modus vivendi makes sense
1/
Swiss relations with EU look messy mainly because of failure to convert historic relations at time of EEA (early 1990s): switch from many, narrow, separate agts to a single framework ran into domestic CH opposition
Far enough
2/
Subsequent history has been about trying to work that model work, with varying levels of success
Yes, lots of upgrades over time, but also assorted setbacks
3/
Making NIP work as it stands needs UK to either make big advances on implementation, or to fall back on dispute settlement mechanisms to test whether its more 'flexible' interpretation is viable (spoiler: almost certainly not)
2/
Finding an alternative sounds great, but it's not as if no one has been looking for such a thing for several years now.
NIP isn't great, but that doesn't mean it's not the least worst option.
And that's even before Q of whether either side want more negotiating fun
3/
tl;dr for something that was to be so transformative, there's not actually much immediate change coming
1/
We can start by observing that what was the central question of British politics for the past 5 or more years finds itself shunted behind Covid (and various other things) to page 48 of the document
2/
Potentially the most important part of of the section is this, given its nebulous objectives and scope for longer-run change.
Note the focus on removing barriers (and, possibly, apostrophes), but also the lack of outputs so far, suggesting there aren't many easy wins