Some thoughts on the crossover between the Swiss and UK relations with the EU
Tl;dr you can't avoid having a relationship, so finding a modus vivendi makes sense
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Swiss relations with EU look messy mainly because of failure to convert historic relations at time of EEA (early 1990s): switch from many, narrow, separate agts to a single framework ran into domestic CH opposition
Far enough
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Subsequent history has been about trying to work that model work, with varying levels of success
Yes, lots of upgrades over time, but also assorted setbacks
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This week's giving up on a new Institutional framework has been a long time coming for CH, and does risk compromising access to EU's Single Market over time
But not automatically or necessarily
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Key point is that CH has to have a relationship with EU, given its location, so as before, it will work to find domestically-acceptable solutions at both immediate and strategic level
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I'm not sure it's clear what those might be, but CH govt has left lines of communication open to work on this
A local problem (pretty significant one TBH) doesn't mean throwing out everything else
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But what to take from this?
1st: you start from where you start. Institutions and agts are sticky, so much easier to work on that basis than to start from scratch
Hence EU-CH have stuck with current jumble despite issues
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2nd: a problem in one area becomes a problem in other areas too
CH have numerous experiences of this, although UK catching up fast: just because there might be separate legal instruments, doesn't mean there's no political linkage
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3rd: yes, everyone has domestic audiences to satisfy, but this has to be balanced against working relations with neighbours
UK might not be as dependent on EU as CH, but still significant for enabling agendas on trade, climate change, security, etc
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4th: this is all independent on what kind of relationship you have with EU
CH will be very much closer to EU than is UK for foreseeable future, but all have interest in making whatever relationship it is work
Smooth running ≠ rachet
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In sum: just because you don't like something, doesn't make it go away
Making NIP work as it stands needs UK to either make big advances on implementation, or to fall back on dispute settlement mechanisms to test whether its more 'flexible' interpretation is viable (spoiler: almost certainly not)
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Finding an alternative sounds great, but it's not as if no one has been looking for such a thing for several years now.
NIP isn't great, but that doesn't mean it's not the least worst option.
And that's even before Q of whether either side want more negotiating fun
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tl;dr for something that was to be so transformative, there's not actually much immediate change coming
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We can start by observing that what was the central question of British politics for the past 5 or more years finds itself shunted behind Covid (and various other things) to page 48 of the document
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Potentially the most important part of of the section is this, given its nebulous objectives and scope for longer-run change.
Note the focus on removing barriers (and, possibly, apostrophes), but also the lack of outputs so far, suggesting there aren't many easy wins
A propos not much, let's talk a bit about why trust matters so much to the EU in its relations with the UK
tl;dr without it, it's very hard to do anything
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I've talked a lot about trust over the past years of Brexit, mainly because it's a central part of all negotiating: it's the grease in the system that makes things run much more smoothly
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How to build trust is pretty simple, as I've sketched out below.