Thread by @rgoodlaw

Questions to ask @DeptofDefense about U.S. strike on "Iran-backed militia groups in the Iraq-Syria border region."

Question 1: What can you say to assure Congress and the American people this will deter (rather than continue/escalate the cycle of violence).👇

#Iran #Iraq

https://twitter.com/BCFinucane/status/1409296982074609667

Question 2: Why does the DoD/USG think this strike will deter, when the February strike didn't?

Question 3: Does DoD/USG acknowledge the February strike did not deter?

Good background reading (by @Mikeknightsiraq and Crispin Smith from May 2021).👇

washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…

Question 4: The Feb. 25 U.S. strike was only in Syria. Did Iraq consent to June 27 U.S. strike on its territory?

Question 5: If Iraq did not consent, what's the international legal justification, and will the US submit a letter to United Nations (under article 51 of UN Charter)?

Question 6: DoD states it targeted facilities used by "Iran-backed militia groups, including Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH)." Does DoD/USG acknowledge that KH is a unit of the Iraqi armed forces?

Background reading (by Crispin Smith Jan. 2020 on KH and Iraq):

justsecurity.org/67917/united-s…

Question 7: If DoD/USG acknowledges KH is a part of the Iraqi armed forces, does that affect the analysis for the President's conducting these operations under domestic and international law?

Question 8: The DoD statement appears to be playing with words, or else is clumsily written.👇

Were the "operational and weapons storage facilities" that the U.S. struck being used by the groups to target U.S. personnel and facilities via UAVs (or were they for other purposes)?

Question 9: In answer to questions that involve an intelligence assessment (eg Questions 1 & 8) what is the U.S. intelligence community's level of confidence in that assessment?

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Addendum

This addresses Q8:

"A U.S. defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity ... said one of the sites hit was used in the launch and recovery of armed unmanned aircraft."

via @AlexHortonTX reporting

(h/t @LemonSlayerUS)
washingtonpost.com/national-secur…

NYT's report also addresses Q8:

"American officials said the militias used the sites targeted in Syria mainly for storage and logistics purposes; the site hit in Iraq was used to launch and recover the armed drones."

@EricSchmittNYT reporting

nytimes.com/2021/06/27/us/…

NYT reporting also helps to answer, in part, Q9 on level of confidence in intelligence assessment:

"Pentagon planners have been gathering information for weeks on the sites and militia networks that use them, American officials said on Sunday."

On Q1 (whether these strikes will actually deter):

@Mikeknightsiraq is quoted in WSJ's report:

"The 2020 airstrikes did not stop rocket attacks, and the likelihood is that these strikes will not stop drone attacks either.”

@mgordonwsj reporting

wsj.com/articles/u-s-c…

On Q8:

Military Times reporting all three sites nexus to UAV attacks.

"The three targets were specifically associated with the militia drone threat — command, control and logistics — the defense official told Military Times."

via @haltman reporting

militarytimes.com/flashpoints/20…

Following the Feb. 25 strike, I mapped out some of the international legal arguments the USG is likely claiming here with respect to a series of ongoing military strikes against US personnel and facilities.

justsecurity.org/75056/legal-qu…

Note on the series of strikes:

DoD is saying at least five militia drone attacks directed at U.S. forces in Iraq in recent months.

Independent expert Michael Knights told WSJ, by his count, even more: at least eight drone attacks directed at U.S. forces in Iraq since April 14.