Most benignly, the govt offers to work fully within the NIP, with the EU to resolve issue, and leaves it at that
This is unlikely, esp. given that mention of a 'new balance'
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Option 2 is to say they'll stick with the current text, but work to build further extensions/grace periods/non-applications to smooth the path
Again, not very likely
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Option 3 is to ask formally for a renegotiation of the NIP
More likely, although unclear there's a clear alternative text to promote right now
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Finally, option 4 would be to talk about Art.16/binning NIP completely: general walk-away stuff
Possible, but again, no alternative in place
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Pointedly, I've not talked about EU response (which'll be v.frosty to anything other than option 1), not least because UK govt still seems to have failed to recognise that EU matters in this
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tl;dr I'll be surprised if this turns out to help move things along in any constructive kind of way
More info here: definitely not going to work (as the EU has indicated repeatedly for months now)
A couple of comments
Equivalence is a problem because it's not dynamic: standards might be equivalent now, but how to you police any changes?
Also, the EU's precautionary model makes it really hard to build in any flexibility
Also, we should be concerned about Frost's querying of the externality of the border: NIP might bring NI into single mkt/CU, but there's still a clear step out to the world and that's not going to change, unless UK govt policy moves
Essentially, this all looks like @StevePeers's response to my original thread
Since I've written a lot about #Brexit (and for longer than 5 yrs), I thought I'd share some content that speaks to the bigger picture and that might still be of use now
tl;dr it's gone about as well as I thought/feared
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This, from Nov 17, tries to explain how Brexit is an exercise in apportioning costs
A quick Monday morning run-down of where the UK is on the Northern Ireland Protocol
tl;dr yes it creates problems, but those are ones of the UK's choosing
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This weekend's G7 was very much at the worse end of possible outcomes, with much digging into positions and a degree of opportunity cost to UK on the actual agenda of the meeting
A lot of the annoyance seems to have come from Macron's remarks on NI being apart from the rest of UK. Johnson's response (above) is true, but misses a key part of the picture - he agreed to NI being apart from the rest of UK
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Today sees the first meeting of the TCA's Partnership Council, as well as the WA's Jt Cte: worth noting their distinct remits, powers and the different dispute settlement mechanisms they have access to
And just so you have them, more info on those dispute settlement mechanisms
In both cases we're still right at the start of these, but they both contain significant scope for penalties for infringement of treaty obligations
And here's a couple of graphics about options on the Protocol
Tl;dr here is that it might be problematic, but it's a lot less problematic than the alternatives
The general formula is that - ceteris paribus - if you're looking for the other party in an agreement to help you out, you're more likely to get that if you've demonstrated that you've tried to make the agt work
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So, in a non-random example, if you agreed a 6 month grace period on chilled meat products accessing the other party and you said you'd use that time to adjust, then if you didn't try to adjust then you're less likely to be cut any slack
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Some thoughts on the crossover between the Swiss and UK relations with the EU
Tl;dr you can't avoid having a relationship, so finding a modus vivendi makes sense
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Swiss relations with EU look messy mainly because of failure to convert historic relations at time of EEA (early 1990s): switch from many, narrow, separate agts to a single framework ran into domestic CH opposition
Far enough
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Subsequent history has been about trying to work that model work, with varying levels of success
Yes, lots of upgrades over time, but also assorted setbacks
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