Mainly videos in Mandarin, Cantonese, or Mandarin + English.
Low quality, high volume, on:
Guo Wengui (from 2018)
Hong Kong protests (2019)
Chinese achievements (Feb 2020)
US crises (early 2020)
US-China rivalry (mid-2020)
We don’t have attribution on this op yet.
It’s persistent, well enough resourced to produce over 1,400 videos in a year, and closely tracks Chinese state messaging.
But who exactly is running it remains a question.
That said, a lot of the amplification it achieved (which was still modest) came from Chinese government accounts, including "wolf warriors" like @zlj517.
That's insufficient for attribution, but Spamouflage often promoted, and was promoted by, Chinese officials.
Spamou's prolific but profligate. The platforms have taken down tens of thousands of assets since we exposed it in 2019.
That’s kept its impact generally low, and forced it into a tactical shift, experimenting with fewer accounts with more persona.
Don’t make the mistake of thinking this is the “Russian playbook”.
Spamou doesn’t pretend to be American, and we’ve seen no attempt to polarise US audiences.
Main audiences so far: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Venezuela, Pakistan.
Main message: China’s rising, America's fallen.
This looks like geopolitical competition for the 21st century: point to all the bad things you can find about your rival, in places where the rivalry’s acute or there’s a chance to make inroads.
Spamou has always been low quality, low impact.
The quality hasn't improved. These images were used to illustrate a video on COVID problems in the U.S.
Comunidad de Madrid?
You might fairly ask why it's worth studying an operation that never seems to break out of its bubble.
Answer: because there's always the danger that they might one day get something *right*, and then it'll be important to identify and expose quickly.
Case in point: Russian operation Secondary Infektion. Nearly six years with no breakout worthy of the name. Then it interfered in the UK 2019 election.
But we, and the great @jc_stubbs, caught it before the vote, because we already knew how SI works.
And Spamouflage has finally started getting some breakout in some areas. Limited and sporadic, but more than it's ever had before.
Here's the Venezuelan foreign minister retweeting a Spamouflage fake account.
(No indication he knew this was a fake.)
And George Galloway, quote-tweeting and following.
Again, no evidence he knew this was a fake.
This was one of a handful of persona accounts that Spamouflage began running in mid-2020.
Stock profile picture of a young lady, tweeting about geopolitical issues. Quite a few different accounts followed that pattern.
This account, screen name "李若水francisw ", had a significant following from Chinese official accounts.
I would love to know how exactly they found "her".
It's been through seven iterations so far. The earlier ones lasted up to two months each. Recent ones, just days.
Each time it re-spawned, it reached out to potential amplifiers, trying to get their attention.
Same with this persona. Again, apparently a young lady posting about geopolitics. The call for follows is overt here.
This persona stole its "personal" pics from a Weibo user.
Note how the Twitter image is cropped to remove the Weibo handle.
On YouTube, there were also persona channels amplifying Spamouflage videos - and often then deleting them a week or so later.
Unclear whether the people whose identities they claimed were actually involved in the amplification, or whether this was Spamou borrowing their names.
These channels have thousands of followers, and primarily focus on Hong Kong and Taiwan. Some of their videos get views in the hundreds or low thousands.
Still not massive, but more than Spamouflage has ever achieved before.
Note the messaging on US "democracy export".
Breakouts like these were a small minority of the total output, though. The great bulk of Spamouflage posts failed to get any attention at all.
The fakeness of their accounts is one likely explanation. The clunky execution is another.
Someone broke the space bar?
In fact, there's an incompetence to this operation that's sometimes almost endearing.
Voice-overs that pronounce "U.S." as "us". Mediaeval headlines ("Chinese sword!")...
... headlines that read like something straight out of CCP propaganda manuals...
... headlines that are trying really hard, but somehow, just don't quite get there...
... I'm not even sure what to say about this headline.
But there's a nasty edge to its content too. Finding the very worst moments of American news, and trying to portray them as typical.
The good thing is, this operation has come under sustained pressure. Tens of thousands of fake assets taken down. Repeated exposures by the team at @Graphika_NYC, and by @FireEye.
That helps curb the spread, because it makes it harder to build any audience or momentum.
But this is a persistent threat actor, apparently well resourced, capable of some adaptation.
Don't overstate its reach, but don't assume that historical incompetence automatically means future ineffectiveness - especially with Chinese state amplification.
The best way to stop operations like this achieving their goals is to keep the pressure on, keep exposing and disrupting them, and catch any tactical shifts early on.
UK telecoms regulator @Ofcom just revoked the licence of Chinese state broadcaster CGTN to broadcast in the UK, arguing the licence is held by an entity which doesn't have editorial control, in breach of UK rules.
And this, just out from @MsHannahMurphy and @SVR13: questions about the hundreds of thousands of followers that the same Huawei Western Europe execs have.
I'll leave it to others to analyse the 800k+ accounts involved in these followings, but one anecdotal sidelight on the fake network of accounts that attacked Belgium: some of its other amplification came from glambots from a network that also boosted Huawei Europe.
Glambots = automated accounts that use profile pictures taken from glamour shoots and similar sources.
One sidelight on the Russian protests today: #Navalny is probably the single most consistent target of Russian disinfo and influence operations.
He's been a target for at least 8 years, by ops including the Internet Research Agency, Secondary Infektion, and the Kremlin.
Way back in September 2013, @Soshnikoff investigated the then newly founded Internet Research Agency, and reported that it had been trolling Navalny when he ran for Mayor of Moscow.
January 2014: op Secondary Infektion set up its most prolific persona, with a pic of Navalny’s face painted blue. It started out by attacking the Russian opposition.
The username, bloger_nasralny, is a toilet pun on his name.
Question for the #OSINT community: can anyone else find TikTok videos about protests for Navalny that become unavailable if you watch via a Russian server?
If you check TikTok for key hashtags about Navalny and the protests, some of the most popular videos don’t show up when browsing through a Russian VPN.