And this, just out from @MsHannahMurphy and @SVR13: questions about the hundreds of thousands of followers that the same Huawei Western Europe execs have.
I'll leave it to others to analyse the 800k+ accounts involved in these followings, but one anecdotal sidelight on the fake network of accounts that attacked Belgium: some of its other amplification came from glambots from a network that also boosted Huawei Europe.
Glambots = automated accounts that use profile pictures taken from glamour shoots and similar sources.
These particular glambots amplified two things:
1. The fake pro-Huawei accounts; 2. A most likely fake screenshot of a tweet attributed to @bgarlinghouse, offering a crypto giveaway (no such tweet exists in his timeline).
Now, here's the amplification of a Huawei Europe tweet.
Not just glambots, but...
... glambots that tweeted the same screenshot of an alleged tweet from @bgarlinghouse.
The likelihood that this is *not* assets from the same network is, shall we say, remote.
These look like throwaway rental bots, so again, not enough evidence to prove who paid for them.
But inauthentic amplification? Absolutely.
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One sidelight on the Russian protests today: #Navalny is probably the single most consistent target of Russian disinfo and influence operations.
He's been a target for at least 8 years, by ops including the Internet Research Agency, Secondary Infektion, and the Kremlin.
Way back in September 2013, @Soshnikoff investigated the then newly founded Internet Research Agency, and reported that it had been trolling Navalny when he ran for Mayor of Moscow.
January 2014: op Secondary Infektion set up its most prolific persona, with a pic of Navalny’s face painted blue. It started out by attacking the Russian opposition.
The username, bloger_nasralny, is a toilet pun on his name.
Question for the #OSINT community: can anyone else find TikTok videos about protests for Navalny that become unavailable if you watch via a Russian server?
If you check TikTok for key hashtags about Navalny and the protests, some of the most popular videos don’t show up when browsing through a Russian VPN.
Just out: @Facebook's latest update on influence op (IO) takedowns. Fourteen new ones in this report, from nine countries. @Graphika_NYC did a write-up on one of them, from separatist-held Ukraine.
A cluster of inauthentic assets on FB, boosting a network of fake websites focused on Europe and the former USSR: pro-Kremlin, anti-Ukraine, anti-Navalny, anti-EU.
H/t @alexejhock and @DanielLaufer for the first reporting on parts of this network, based around a fake outlet called Abendlich Hamburg ("evening Hamburg").
A couple other sites had "evening" in their names, others had "echo of [country]".
We came across part this botnet in the summer, when it was boosting the pro-Chinese network "Spamouflage."
This, from @conspirator0, is a typical profile. Note the broken sentence and word in the bio. No human typed that... at least not on that Twitter account.
Now compare the bio with the version of Dracula that's online at Tallinn Technical University: lap.ttu.ee/erki/failid/ra…
BREAKING: @Facebook just took down two foreign influence ops that it discovered going head to head in the Central African Republic, as well as targeting other countries.
There have been other times when multiple foreign ops have targeted the same country.
But this is the first time we’ve had the chance to watch two foreign operations focused on the same country target *each other*.
In the red corner, individuals associated w/ past activity by the Internet Research Agency & previous ops attributed to entities associated w/ Prigozhin.
In the blue corner, individuals associated w/ the French military.