Thread by @JJSchroden

A number of people have been asking my thoughts on recent developments in #Afghanistan. Now that I’m back from a week of sandcastle building, a THREAD to that effect. 1/n

1st, a few thoughts on recent #Taliban gains. That the TB are suddenly gaining ground in rural areas shouldn’t have been a surprise to anyone. eg, I predicted the group would have a slight military adv post-US withdrawal in a @CTCWP paper back in JAN: ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s… 2/n

@CTCWP The #Taliban have—for years—been employing a strategy of capturing rural areas IOT generate position & resources to threaten more populated areas, as we @CNA_org described in our independent threat assessment for Congress back in 2013 (cna.org/cna_files/pdf/…). 3/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org The USMIL presence—most notably, airstrikes & log/maint support—was able to slow the #Taliban’s strategy, but not stop it: the group made steady territorial gains since 2015 & even before the US withdrawal decision, it had effectively surrounded >6-8 provincial capitals. 4/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org The US taking its thumb off the scale has revealed what the inter-Afghan military balance really looks like: the #ANDSF (sans direct US support) is not nearly as mighty as US & @NATO military leaders want/ed to believe. 5/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO Indeed, it’s been interesting to see comments from @POTUS & @PentagonPresSec suggesting that the #ANDSF have all the capabilities they need to contest the #Taliban, but are lacking the will to fight. 6/n

https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1414603855006928896?s=20

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec These comments are circular though, insomuch as they only count *lethal* capabilities & ignore *supporting* ones (eg logistics, maintenance, force mgmt)—which the US didn’t adequately build & whose absence is sapping the #ANDSF’s will to fight. 7/n

https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1414603726837452804?s=20

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec (Again, none of this should have been surprising. I’ve led four independent assessments of the #ANDSF since 2013 & all of them conveyed some form of the message that the #ANDSF were not as strong as #DOD believed. Also, see: @SIGARHQ) 8/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ All that said, it did surprise me that the #Taliban made such a big (& successful) push in the north. This is a departure from the pattern of previous, contemporary insurgencies in #Afghanistan. 9/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ It’s clearly designed to proactively sever actual & potential foreign support to militias in the north, to isolate those areas from Kabul, & to generate more revenue for the #Taliban from captured border crossings. 10/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ It has also highlighted how poorly arrayed & supported the #ANDSF were in those areas. The surrenders & abandoning of installations & equipment by some units has been disconcerting & has contributed mightily (& dangerously) to a narrative of “#Taliban inevitability.” 11/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ The govt’s inability to retake all of these areas—& its heavy (& sometimes dangerously hasty) reliance on Commandos to retake some of them—has provided further evidence that the military balance in #Afghanistan is a lot closer to even then many assumed. 12/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ That the #Taliban have not yet attempted to seize a provincial capital (when it seems likely they could have captured at least 1-2, eg Feyzabad) speaks to how much they value the US-TB Agreement (in which they supposedly agreed not to do so, in the unpublished annexes). 13/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ But it also speaks to the ⬆️difficulty of doing so relative to rural areas. Seizing a city requires massing forces, which makes them vulnerable to airstrikes. The #Taliban have learned this lesson before (the hard way), as did the mujahedin in the battle for Jalalabad. 14/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ I thus disagree w/the reported intel assessment of potential govt collapse in 6 mos. I don’t think the #Taliban will push so quickly for mil capture of Kabul—but will seize territory where they can, while laying siege to cities IOT generate pressure for concessions in #Doha. 15/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ As I've said, I’m unconvinced the #Taliban can conquer #Afghanistan militarily. Rather, if @ashrafghani's govt is going to fall, it'll fall politically via abandonment of Afghan elites & fighting forces—a macro version of what happened in Badakhshan. 16/n thediplomat.com/2021/05/will-a…

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ @ashrafghani Will this happen? Hard to say; much depends on whether @ashrafghani chooses to be more inclusive & concessionary in the future. The trends in that vein have not been encouraging of late, but the events of the next 6-12 months may compel a different course. 17/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ @ashrafghani Some thoughts also on the future of US support to #Afghanistan. The new C2 structure for AFG leaves a 2* + several hundred troops at the Embassy, which is yet skin in the game. The US is providing 37 add’l UH-60s, 3 A-29s & $3.3B in mil aid for FY22. 18/n

https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1414604439139328003?s=20

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ @ashrafghani There have also been tenuous reports that the US will provide training for Commandos in #Qatar, that it’ll provide big-ticket maintenance for AAF aircraft in #UAE, & that it’ll provide some amount of remote/virtual contract maintenance support as well. 19/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ @ashrafghani These may seem like trifles rel to the past, but they look to me like #DOD trying hard to not just walk away from #Afghanistan—doing what it can w/in the parameters of @JoeBiden's decision. & there are yet discussions w/regional countries about basing.20/n

https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1414589573489991683?s=20

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ @ashrafghani @JoeBiden All that said, it was clear from Biden’s #Afghanistan presser last week that: a) he is 💯 comfortable w/his decision; b) he will accept 0% blame for anything that happens next; & c) he will not be sending US troops back unless there’s a clear CT threat to the homeland. 21/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ @ashrafghani @JoeBiden Which means the immediate future for #Afghanistan is unfortunately going to look like a slug fest in/around the cities between the #ANDSF (w/US $$ + advice) & the #Taliban (w/PAK & others’ $$ + advice) + a bunch of militias in the mix. 22/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ @ashrafghani @JoeBiden The next 12-18 mos looks like a highly unstable transition period for #Afghanistan, in which the best case scenario is movement to a “new stalemate” + revitalized talks in #Doha & the worst case scenario is unbridled civil war that draws AFG’s neighbors into the fray as well.23/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ @ashrafghani @JoeBiden The missing piece of all of this is what US diplomacy will do & seek to accomplish going forward. With “the moonshot” #Turkey Conference apparently dead & the US consumed by withdrawal + SIV issues, we’ve seen little in the way of proactive diplomacy. 24/n

@CTCWP @CNA_org @NATO @POTUS @PentagonPresSec @SIGARHQ @ashrafghani @JoeBiden For the US to try & steer #Afghanistan toward a best-case scenario, it’s going to need a vastly better strategic (read: sync’d diplo, mil, econ, info) approach than it has now. Sadly, given how reactionary the US has been since 1 May, I don’t envision seeing that soon. 25/25