Interesting and valuable graphic and the article is even better — kudos to @LongWarJournal@billroggio ... but it’s a bit misleading to start the clock on the Afghan war in April 2021. It would be more illuminating to show the trends over the last several years leading to now
The Taliban’s strength did not spring up de novo in April 2021 after the US announced withdrawal. Years of Taliban advances have led to this moment. The hollowness of the Afghan government and security forces is striking despite 20 years of US assistance
It’s a good graphic and article, but I am disappointed in a larger trend in reporting and commentary about the Taliban’s recent gains since April that gloss over the Taliban’s gains over the last several years that have led to this moment
If the only thing that was holding back a Taliban advance like this was the perception of US support then things were already quite bad off.
If after 20 years of US assistance the Afghan security forces cannot hold this territory, I would like to see more critical analysis questioning the assumption that staying would achieve a different long term outcome. Or is the idea that we stay in Afghanistan indefinitely?
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This article by @TheEconomist@shashj get it right: "We’re reaching the apex of the armour versus gun race—and armour has lost that race." Armor alone is not enough in an era of precision-guided anti-tank munitions
This trend has been building for a long time. The steady proliferation of ATGMs is a real threat to armor. Drones complicate the equation b/c can attack from above where armor is thinnest.
Tanks won't go away, but survivability will depend on more than just armor.
First off, the 500+ ship Navy plans are less crazy than they sound because they count uninhabited (“unmanned”) ships, which account for the bulk of the new ships. The # of crewed large surface combatants stay roughly the same.
There’s room to debate the specific #s of the plans, but the broad outlines of the plans make sense in terms of the “manned-unmanned mix” of the fleet. They're headed in the right direction.
Serious question for journo & tech colleagues -- why isn't there a micropayments model for reading online content a la carte?
I'm a huge believer in "pay the writer." I believe writers (and outlets) should be paid for content. But why are the only $ models subscriptions or ads?
There are maybe 1-2 outlets I read enough to justify a monthly subscription, from which I get most of my news. But I read some very specific writers from a range of outlets, but just those individuals. I would be *happy* to micro-pay per article for their stuff.
This article by @Aviation_Intel absolutely *nails it* in diagnosing what's wrong with how DoD builds things & how to fix it. This is much bigger than NGAD.
He's talking about aircraft, but the same problems apply across DoD.
It's not about acquisition reform, or at least not as we normally think of it. This is about a radical transformation in how DoD builds complex systems, a transformation that is long overdue.
@Aviation_Intel:
"we are talking about an ecosystem of networked platforms that will share modular sensors and a common communications architecture here, not a new super fighter"
This is a convenient lie the Pentagon has told itself to excuse two decades of investing in legacy, wasting assets. It's embarrassing to see the Secretary of Defense repeat it.
Interesting threads from @YunaHuhWong & @Fermat15 on how the lack of observability of AI military capabilities might affect deterrence and stability.
TL;DR - I don't know the answer but it's a very interesting question [THREAD]
@YunaHuhWong argues that uncertainty about adversaries' AI capabilities (and the tendency to over-estimate others' capabilities) may enhance deterrence and lead to greater stability
@Fermat15 suggests the opposite, that the lack of clarity regarding relative military capabilities increases the risk of miscalculation and instability