Yesterday I was delighted to join an Aspen Italia/@Russian_Council roundtable on Russia & EU, with @martadassu @DmitriTrenin, Andrei Kortunov, Pasquale Terracciano et al. The following thread summarises some of what I said, on why Russia-EU relations are unlikely to improve. /1
Russia is locked into a gentle economic decline, because its leaders don't want to move away from dependency on natural resource exports, or improve rule of law. As Europe cuts demand for oil & gas, Russia will lose some bargaining power. Standards of living are falling. /2
But Russia faces no awful economic shock. And its leaders probably believe that their illiberal vision of society, focused on God, family & ethnicity, is winning out against the decadent miscegenating godless West. So they see no urgent need to patch things up with EU or US. /3
The price the West would set for a rapprochement - a compromise on Donbass, and better behaviour in terms of Skripals, Navalny, cyber-attacks etc - is not acceptable to Putin. Which is why EU govts cannot detect any willingness on Russia's part to settle the Ukraine conflict. /4
The EU will stick to its '5 principles' for dealing with Russia: implementation of the Minsk accords on Ukraine (it knows Kiev is not fulfilling its side of bargain); strengthening Eastern Partnership; strengthening resilience v Russian aggro; support for Russian civil society;/5
and selective engagement with Russia on certain topics eg Iran, health, energy, climate. On the last of those, the EU's imminent carbon border adjustment mechanism will greatl annoy the Russians - Russian exports will face tariffs. /6
.@EmmanuelMacron & Merkel still want a broader strategic dialogue and recently tried to restore regular EU-Russia summits. For Macron it is geopolitical, wanting to pull R from China's embrace. For Merkel it is more about trade and the special R-G rel that goes back to WW2. /7
The EU said no to meeting Putin because Macron & Merkel failed to prepare the ground and because others didn't want summits sans R giving something. The EU in fact divides into many camps on how to handle Russia: a) the French geopolitical school - be tough but always talk; /8
b) the 'Wandel durch Handel' school - trade with R so it behaves better. This is Germany, Austria, Italy, Finland etc; c) the Southern Europeans who believe human rights should not be important in foreign policy; d) the North European school which thinks h rights do matter - /9
Balts & some Central Europeans like Poland and Czechs agree; e) Hungary - Orban is ideologically aligned with Putin's illiberal worldview. But despite these divisions & the fact that about a third of member-states really don't like sanctions on Russia, EU sanctions will stay. /10
This is because Russian conduct (eg on Navalny or Belarus) makes it impossible for its friends in EU to argue for lifting them. Even Orban doesn't veto sanctions renewal. Another factor is the US: Biden's lobbying is more effective in more capitals than was Trump's. /11
Plus FRA & GER, though they want dialogue, are firm on Ukraine, which is the reason for the sanctions. Russia dislikes EU sanctions but not that much. If Putin wanted, he cd probably get them lifted by appearing to compromise on Donbass; then one EU state would veto renewal./12
In long term, rapprochement with West is unlikely - partly because values matter to both Western leaders and Putin, and that reduces willingness of either to compromise. That fact, plus its economic woes, mean that Russia will drift gradually into Sinosphere. /13
For Russia, close ties to China are a lesser evil than paying the price for Western friendship. Moscow and Beijing agree on spheres of influence, illiberalism & opposing US hegemony. US officials say R-Ch co-op on technology, military issues and diplomacy is closer than ever. /14
I don't think Macron can pull R from Ch's embrace. Russian speakers argued strongly that R was not in the Sinosphere, and that a fundamental principle of its foreign policy was to avoid being junior partner to anyone. Russia would maintain the freedom to act how it saw fit. /15
I am sure that is the Russian desire but can a country with such problematic economic prospects continue to act as a quasi-superpower, on its own? The same question could be put to the Brits, but even the most patriotic Tories don't really see the UK as a superpower. ENDS
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More from @CER_Grant

24 Mar
Our @CER_EU webinar on the UK's Integrated Review will be posted on cer.eu soon. @LordRickettsP was constructively critical, pointing to lack of priorities and to little being said about EU. How can UK be a leader power in European security or Sci-Tek, /1
or a leading regulatory power unless it has good relations to EU? He said UK soft power weakened by cuts to overseas aid, scrapping Difid, visa restrictions and threats to int'l law. But he was happy that 'tilt to Indo-Pacific' was mostly rhetoric - no real cut in commitment /2
to European security. @LordRickettsP praised the review on China - it was right to see it as both a strategic competitor and an economic partner. As for the defence paper, he worried if tech could really be a substitute for mass. Responding, @KoriSchake was more positive. /3
Read 4 tweets
11 Jan
Though the UK and the EU have agreed a Trade and Co-operation Agreement, massive uncertainties still swirl around the future of their relationship. Here are 5, in a short thread. @CER_London 1/6
The TCA says virtually nothing about future co-operation on foreign policy and defence; the UK wanted no institutional links. But will a future UK govt see the case for ties that would enable it to learn what the EU governments are thinking, and influence them? 2/6
Will the new quasi-border in the Irish Sea prove politically sustainable? Unionists (and some Tories) will hate the checks on goods going from GB to NI, and the fact that NI stays partly in EU single market & customs union. Some may be tempted to tear up the NI Protocol. 3/6
Read 6 tweets
24 Dec 20
.@CER_EU will be analysing the #Brexit deal in due course, when there is a text to study. In the meantime here are 10 reflections on the Brexit process - a thread. /1
1. Getting a free trade agreem't done in less than a year is unusually quick. Both teams of negotiators deserve praise. UK's refusal to extend transition may have helped, by concentrating minds. The cost: great uncertainty for firms, which haven't known what rules to expect. /2
2. Most Brits have no idea how hard Brexit will be. Travelers, manufacturers & farmers will suffer irksome friction at borders; service companies will lose access to EU markets; businesses that import EU workers will be hurt. So UK will be less attractive to foreign investors. /3
Read 11 tweets
8 Dec 20
Both sides in the Brexit talks seem to be suffering from a dearth of intel on what the other side is really thinking. At the moment, EU may not appreciate that Johnson really doesn't seem to care about the rational arguments pro a deal. He is relaxed about no deal. @CER_EU /1
But the UK has persistently mis-read EU throughout Brexit process, eg thinking German exporters will ride to rescue, or that the nice member-states need to intervene v. the nasty @MichelBarnier, or that the EU is so scared of no deal, that if UK is tough Barnier will fold. /3
At the top of UK government there are few ministers, civil servants or special advisers with a profound knowledge of the EU, or wide-ranging networks of contacts in European capitals. Many of the people who know about the EU have been side-lined. /4
Read 5 tweets
27 Nov 20
On the #Brexit talks, I hear good and bad news - a short thread. The good news is that on most of the contentious issues - state aid, level playing field, dispute settlement - there has been movement and real progress. @CER_London /1
The bad news: there has been no progress at all on fish. Neither EU (pressed by France) nor UK can easily compromise. Tory MPs care more about fish than eg state aid. And I hear @MichelBarnier is today meeting fisheries ministers - who will presumably tell him not to move. /2
Someone quite close to the talks says he worries that the nature of the process could lead to an unintended crash. All the talking has to happen between Barnier and @DavidGHFrost and their teams - neither team wants others involved. Yet neither team can easily be flexible. /3
Read 5 tweets
7 Nov 20
What will be the impact of Trump's 4 years, Biden's arrival and COVID-19 on global politics, over the next five years or so? A few thoughts in a thread. @CER_EU /1
America is weaker. Trump's antics have damaged the US's soft power - and the recent election process hasn't helped. Poor handling of the pandemic has harmed the US's reputation and economy. Biden will polish its image but Republicans will stop him making big changes. /2
Conversely China has had a good COVID-19, apart from an initial wobble, having successfully suppressed the virus and even achieved economic growth this year. This will further boost its already excessive self-confidence. /3
Read 18 tweets

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