The amount of value you can find when you go down the mkt cap curve is fairly astonishing. Today's eg: The Works, $WRKS.LN, a UK-listed games retailer at <2.5x pre-COVID EV/EBITDA - w no debt.

As always the goal is to find situations where it's v difficult to lose $$

🧵🧵
If you look up 'world's best businesses' you won't find $WRKS.LN looking back at you but that's not what this is about. Post restructuring in 08 the concept has successfully grown to 500 stores, generated ~220mm GBP revs pre-COVID, and put up ~13mm in EBITDA:
Today's mkt cap is ~34mm GBP so ~2.5x EV/EBITDA. Note this biz was putting up positive LfLs, successively, pre COVID and growing the concept (toys/games/gifts, kinda like $FIVE in the US).

Ie this is not some left-for-dead shrinking concept.
That said this saw yrs of declining 4-wall profitability, driven primarily by costs - rents, lower GMs (competition), and labor.

The thesis is basically, a lot of cost levers have dropped out, demand is coming back, and pre-COVID EBITDA is a low bar.
First, on costs. Basically every physical retailer in the UK used COVID to renegotiate rents. $WRKS.LN is no exception:
Note $WRKS.LN can break their avg rent in 2yrs. Here are the main cost buckets from 2019. A simple 5% fleetwide rent cut - far lower than broken lease renegotiations, from what I've heard - adds 2mm+ to EBITDA (all else equal). Low hanging fruit.
Then there's COGS. Two drivers here: discounting (or lack thereof); and FX. As a purely domestic retailer that sources basically all product offshore, a stronger GBP is a big beneficiary.

Whilst the pound has come off from 1.42 to 1.38, its still massively higher than recently..
...meaning you're looking at between a 5-8% tailwind from FX, going forward, vs FY19-20:
Let's say 5% on the same COGS base (from 2019) 81mm = ~4mm of extra gross profit - again vs 13mm or so of baseline EBITDA.

Even if a good portion of this is given back in discounting/freight, it should still be quite additive.
Finally there's the underlying demand. When $WRKS.LN stores were actually open this fiscal yr (FY21 meaning basically mid '20 to mid '21) they generated strong LfLs:
More recent trends - post partial UK reopening appear to be quite positive. in recent trading update they said Store Lfls (meaning non-online sales) were +6% for full year, when they were actually open. This implies (to me) a double digit performance since re-opening...
...whilst performance since re-opening has been 'very encouraging.'

Obvi online sales will normalize but what are you really paying for here?
With 527 stores and a 34mm mkt cap and no debt you're paying ~65k per operating box. I think that's somewhere b/w 1/3 and 1/4 of replacement cost...and this historically is a solid cash flowing business (growing units consumed some cash in the CFS):
<2.5x pre COVID EV/EBITDA, and 4x pre-COVID PBT, seems wildly wrong. I think post-COVID EBITDA could be closer to 20mm than 13mm (FX, rent savings; stronger LfLs; less competition). Look at $FIVE, $BBW etc performance (admittedly US but same category) since re-opening...
Why couldn't this trade for 5x new-normal EV/EBITDA of 15mm++ EBITDA? that gets you a 150% return here.

Note that historical avg EV/EBITDA in 2018-19 - during post Brexit environment - was something like 4x EV/EBITDA. Even there on new normal earnings you should see a double...
Basically I'm saying the bar is v low, and if you're bullish on re-opening + 'return to normal' (which the mkt is clearly questioning, again, now) then there are many ways to win.

In sum, I don't think much has to break right over next 18mos to see this at >120.

GLTA, DYODD 👊

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More from @puppyeh1

14 Jul
It's been a little while so let's catch up on a few ideas. Am not going to cover every detail but will give thoughts on a few live situations I've tweeted about in the last few months (in no particular order).

Unless otherwise disclosed I'm long all these names, DYODD 👇👇

🧵
1) Cambria Auto, $CAMB.LN. See original 🧵 below.

Looks like Lavery is gonna steal the co for 80p but not yet confirmed. Am voting NO, but given capitulation of other holders + bullshit workaround he pulled on board it seems tough.

Assuming it gets done at 80p, this will simply be a sub-par outcome but - given entry in mid-high 70s - certainly not a disaster and a positive return. Still, will likely leave a bad taste in the mouth 🤮🤮
Read 21 tweets
14 Jul
Raper Capital Origin Story, pt 4. We have arrived at 2017.

I had moved back to buyside (in London) to get more experience so performance is simply static long book only (essentially forced to close short book and no new trading)...bit boring 😰

🧵🧵
Still there are lessons to be had. 2017 was a v good yr for the mkt - SPX +19% - and a good yr to run naked long. I did pretty well - +21%, 2.2 Sharpe, mirrored the mkt but a touch better:
I was running v concentrated w chunky positions in $AER, $5184.T (Nichirin), $TFG.NA and $TOWR so there was a bit of vol mid year but ultimately returns were worthwhile (ball only dropped on $AER in 2018...)

There wasn't much rocket science in 2017...
Read 8 tweets
9 Jul
Back by popular demand 😁, here is the Raper Capital Origin Story, pt 3. The year - 2016.

🧵🧵

For earlier editions see 👇👇
Entering 2016 I was pretty confident. Now in Singapore, I had put up v high, and uncorrelated, returns thru 2014/2015, and built my capital base substantially. But it was still subscale and one goal I had in 2016 was to 'bootstrap' my own fund launch...
Unfort it all went a bit pear-shaped in 2016. Here's how I did: +1.3% vs SPX +10%, so first year of underperformance. Sharpe collapsed to objectionable levels (0.2). I got hurt badly on shorts this year (3 out of 5 top losers were shorts):
Read 13 tweets
6 Jul
Pt 1 seemed to be popular so here is 'Raper Capital Origin Story', pt 2. The year: 2015.

For the original thread and 2014, see 👇👇
2015 was a very different kind of year to 2014. Obviously the SPX went down (-1% but still down). I had moved from NYC to Singapore so my natural focus also shifted back to Asia, and in particular, Japanese stocks.

Shorting saved me in 2015, bigly. Here's how it went...
+39% vs SPX -1%, so obvi still a good outcome but it felt very hard at the time. My Sharpe fell, substantially, to 1.6 and I suffered a number of sizable drawdowns...making the yr much trickier:
Read 10 tweets
6 Jul
For the sake of total clarity, this was a JOKE. I was not +850% in 1H...but I appreciate all the (undeserved) 💕

Tbh I'm not really a fan of posting recent, out-of-context PnL. But I am a fan of looking back on past performance and trying to learn the right lessons...

THREAD
So I'm introducing a new segment, the 'Raper Capital Origin Story', pt1. if this is wildly unpopular it may prove to be part 1/1. Otherwise I will do these occasionally ad hoc.

Let's start at the beginning - 2014. I had just left a HF job (long/short credit), and was in NYC...
...having worked in finance for ~6yrs at the time (and invested PA for 12-13yrs at that point). But this was the first yr i attempted to 'prove' i could make it as a full-time investor.

My initial account was not large (sub 7 figs). Ie I needed to make big bets (fine w me!)...
Read 14 tweets
18 Jun
Hunter Douglas UPDATE $HDG.NA. Great news as acquirer formally drops squeeze out after tender ends w/ abysmally low participation (23% of minorities at 82 EUR).

The go-forward setup is, I think, the is best risk/reward I have seen, in my history in the markets. Why?

👇👇
What did we learn from the tender process?

- the 84% shareholder wanted to pay 82 EUR to acquire all minorities
- a Minority Group consisting of 45% of minorities thought fair value was 150-200 EUR/share
- Add Value fund, a key minority, thinks fair value is 160->200 EUR/share
What else did the tender accomplish?

- Everyone who wanted to sell anywhere near the current price (ie 82), sold. This was ~1.3mm shares
- All other sizeable shareholders of record think fair value is SIGNIFICANTLY higher than current. Not 10%, 20%, - more than DOUBLE....
Read 13 tweets

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