Thread by @althecat

Ok. So here's some more content that you probably won't want to see... but again its interesting as it reveals I think the TPLF current thinking.

Matt Bryden is a "senior strategic advisor" and director at Sahan, a private intel firm which works on Horn issues.

In a former life Canadian Bryden worked for the UN. But was sacked in 2012 for "lack of professionalism and political bias .... severely undermining the credibility of the United Nations." tesfanews.net/un-chief-fired…

At SAHAN Bryden works with @RAbdiAnalyst_ who was appointed to run social media for SAHAN, with a "team of young dedicare (sic.) analysts trained in social media monitoring, targeting, grooming and exploitation."

I.E. Social media psy-ops. Which explains a lot.

As we know Abdi seems to be in lock-step with Reda - and appears to be proud of his inside knowledge of TPLF plans (See his pinned tweet below from before the war), so it would be interesting to know what SAHAN thinks strategically about the conflict in Ethiopia.

Which where this comes in helpful. Matt Dryden has just done an interview with @theelephantinfo in which he gives us all a view inside his head. Which is deeply revealing, with a dystopian tinge. theelephant.info/videos/2021/07…

Mr Dryden begins with history lecture from a very TPLF vantage point. In passing he says he doesn't want to go into how the war started, which is disappointing. But then at 15 minutes he does. This link takes you to the preceding question from his host >>

He says the origins of the war are contested. Which they are by TPLF, opining that they really go back to Abiy's sidelining of them from Govt. And suggests the postponement of elections was a signal that an "escalation" was in the works.

He goes on to say that Eritrea's intervention in the war had been planned for months with the ENDF and that Amhara has its own agenda. I.E. TPLF talking points.

Then in relation to the recent victories during the June offensive he claims that TDF is so named because it is an umbrella force comprising Tigrayan fighters who are not TPLF. And says their victory "seems to have handicapped" the ENDF.

At which point it is I think important to understand where Bryden and Abdi (and therefore SAHAN) fit on @natnaelargawET's excellent diagram.

I.E. on the "We will kill you" face of the cube - its all about creating fear and demoralising Ethiopians.

https://twitter.com/natnaelargawET/status/1419964494617382913?s=20

He then turns to the Sudan border question. Saying it is "the only possible route of relief" to the seige. This is why Ethiopia closed the border to fleeing refugees. Had it stayed open a million more would have left he says.

He then moves on to atrocities in Tigray and targeting of Tigrayans inside Ethiopia. And because of this Tigrayans now see this conflict as an "existential effort for survival".

By now I am thinking, "Wow. so Bryden is working for TPLF and revealing exactly what the TPLF thinks".

His point suggests the Amhara defence of border areas is critically important. Afar attacks might even be a diversion. But maybe that's just what he wants us to think.

The next segment begins with the question: What are the implications for Ethiopia?

In this segment Bryden's views seem are very similar to those in my earlier thread today about the article in the homeland security publication in the U.S.

I.E. The problem is PM @AbiyAhmedAli, pure and simple. And Bryden has a long explanation on why.

hstoday.us/subject-matter…

And it's worth looking at it detail as its a nuanced and revealing argument.

Well not nuanced as we have all seen it already through @RAbdiAnalyst_ 's via social media operation. It start's with the position of embedded TPLF @NYTimes thesis, i.e. that the ENDF has been routed in during the TPLF election offensive.

Bryden adds a fact on the ground - not yet evident & which is necessary for his theories to not be bonkers.

He thinks the TPLF will soon the disputed parts of the Amhara region back, and establish Sudanese arms supply lines.

A summary follows:

1. The situation is alarming. Ethiopia was in trouble B4 the conflict. In bigger trouble now.
2. This is not just about Tigray. Others in Ethiopia are also up in arms (Cites: Benishangul Gumuz)
3. Problem is Abyi, who has only been elected a few weeks ago and has no real mandate.

4. The underlying issues are those related to federalism and Abiy has failed to "nurture coexistance.. without inciting conflict.
5. He inherited a constitution and then abrogated it, and now finds himself isolated with only the support of Amhara dreamers.

6. He has a dubious mandate from the election and it is a dubious Parliament.
7. "The harder he clenches his fist the less control he has." But it's not his fault, it was hard. But he has "manifestly failed to take Ethiopia in a positive direction".

8. He has changed foreign policy unilaterally.
9. His flip-flopping on the #GERD has alienated Sudan and pushed them into the Egyptian corner.
9. He has incited a border conflict in Fashoga and Sudan is increasingly irritated.

(the last 9 should be a 10 - and then Bryden's remarks starts to get a bit weird & possibly indiscrete.)
11. "The TPLF is going to fight its way to the Sudan border to lift the seige and open a pathway for millitary re-supply via Sudan." !!!

12. When this happens it will create tensions between Sudan and Eritrea, because: "if TPLF has access to arms Asmara in Eritrea will no longer feel safe."
13. To which Bryden says: "Well too late, you should have thought about that before invading Tigray region".

14: Djbouti will then get sucked in because "Abiy has mobilised paramilitaries police to fight (because the ENDF are handicapped) and soon we will see ethnic paramilitaries turned against each other."

[Possibly a reference to the ongoing Afar-Somali conflict.]

15: The TPLF Strategy is to cut the main road to Djibouti to force Abiy to negotiate. "Abiy is refusing negotiations because he doesn't recognise a legitimate interlocutor".

In summary then Bryden is all over the place.

And if his views on this are in some way informed by TPLF and or people who are backing the TPLF, his paying clients (which seems likely) then this may point to the TPLF also being all over the place.

Before we move to the final segment a couple of comments.

1. Sudan may be irritated about the #GERD but has ruled out going to war over it AFAIK. Egypt has also lost Arab support. It seems unlikely Sudan would risk war with Ethiopia by providing arms to the TPLF.

2. It's not that there is no legitimate interlocutor in Tigray. The issue is that the TPLF has rejected the ceasefire and is instead attacking Ethiopia.

As a result negotiations are not possible now. Mediation might be worth a shot. But ceasefire would be a pre-condition.

And it may now be too late for that.

Back to the final segment: "How do elites in Addis see this ? What would it take for Abiy to calm things down?

@theelephantinfo adds a bit of drama to this bit by adding: Beacause if Abiy can't calm it down it will bring "a really really bloody and ill wind".

Bryden as always has an answer.

1. Abiy needs to use common sense. "Leaders who make a wrong decision need to recalibrate. But here the conflict is so polarised, it might be impossible."

2. (take 2)... for Abiy to accept a ceasefire in Tigray followed by a national dialogue.

3. (take 3) But not a bilateral talk. That is where Abiy will find it difficult to accept.
4. There would probably have to be an interim government and he would be replaced.
5. The alternative to this is one of two options....

a) To see Ethiopia disintegrate into chaos.
or
c) To be removed through a palace coup.

6. TPLF needs to feel safe that war will not reoccur to come to the table. "He could be the winner if he could pull that together".

So on this question Bryden is all at sea too. I would be surprised frankly if even the TPLF are as incoherent as this.

Which begs one final question for me: who are Bryden and RAbdiAnalyst working for?

Well on this we have another data point, which relates again to the earlier thread about the Homeland Security publication.

One of the author's of that was a "Mohamed Ahmed" and it seems there is also a "Mohamed Ahmed" at SAHAN. linkedin.com/in/mohamed-ahm…

Which is a nifty link. But it doesn't really get us much further than explaining why the article is so crap. And for avoidance it doesn't mean Bryden is working for U.S. interests either.

There are I think three possibilities
1. For the TPLF or its surrogates.
2. For commercial interests who have some interest in what happens in Ethiopia.
3. For SAHAN's newsletter subscribers as part of a loss leading effort to obtain clients.

Or a combination of the above.

My bet is on number 3. As this pair are clearly complete clowns.

/ENDS

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