Thread by @FHeisbourg

Thread on the issue of the US credibility as a defence guarantor. There are 3 types of players: 1) the "guaranteed" countries: will confidence in the US guarantee diminish as a result of the Afghanistan debacle? The Saigon precedent suggests not: NATO wasn't badly weakened.1/7

NATO had/still has 🇺🇸 nukes & GI's on the spot. Asia: though 🇰🇷 & Taiwan🇹🇼 were tempted to go nuclear, the US managed to reassure
the Asians.
🇰🇷, 🇯🇵, 🇹🇼 face an immensely stronger 🇨🇳 today, with no US nukes on the spot anymore & no US troops in Taiwan. Unclear whether the...2/7

...fall of Kabul will change their perceptions & their policies. 2) the potential aggressors: the USSR+Cuba mounted several post-Saigon armed ops in the 3d world but no direct challenge was mounted against guaranteed countries; USSR simply hardened its stance in EUR (SS20s...)3/7

Similarly, 🇷🇺 is unlikely to change its risk analysis when it comes to NATO treaty territory. But it may be tempted to test the West in grey zones (Ukraine, Moldova, Caucasus...). 🇨🇳 's media mouthpieces are already comparing Taiwan & Afghanistan (see @globaltimesnews)...4/7

Like Afghanistan, Taiwan has no US troops, nukes nor even a NATO-style formal defence guarantee. Countries like people often end up by believing their own narratives. Chinese adventurism on Taiwan is one of the most dangerous potential consequences of the fall of Kabul. 5/7

3) the US guarantor, unlike its early 1970s predecessor (Nixon) hasn't had the opportunity to display forceful resolve against global competitors. Under Obama, Trump, Biden there has been no equivalent of the Kippur war DEFCON 2 decision (October 1973). US suffered a ... (6/7)

...self-inflicted wound during the August 2013 Red Line crisis. This reality, in combination with the fall of Kabul, can tempt a potential aggressor. In order to head off such a dangerous miscalculation, @POTUS will have to prove his resolve sooner rather than later (7/7)./.