@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 Okay, if I may have a go at breaking down @RoryStewartUK's account in the piece there: 1) He is absolutely correct in his assertion that the rapid departure of US air power and technical support has had a catastrophic effect. I don't think anybody sensible is questioning that.
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 2) Likewise I don't think anybody would particularly quibble with the fact that this was a comparatively small commitment with few (as @PatPorter76 correctly points out, injuries do still count) casualties, & under little domestic political pressure *at current levels* (& this...
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 bit is critical). 3) The point at which his account runs into a fatal problem is the following, & that is that the war is considerably wider than the West's current military commitment. He correctly asks "who exactly, who is President Biden asking to fight?" & then unfortunately
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 comes up with the wrong answer. It is not his female school teacher in Pul-e-Charkhi, but the soldiers of the Afghan National Army (unless, of course, said teacher volunteers to join it). This is force is, of course, the very reason why there have been so few Western casualties..
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 in recent years - the West has long been asking the people of Afghanistan to do the fighting. This is not new & has been going on for many years. 5) The ANA was (& I believe it is now fair to describe it in the past tense) far from a perfect force & post-mortems into its...
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 performance, or lack thereof, in recent days will continue to be long & loud, but the one thing that cannot be ignored - though I fear it is being ignored - is the fact that prior to its collapse there is good reason to suggest it was in fact losing. Despite the air support, the
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 technical support, the supplies, etc. the casualties were horrifying & almost certainly unsustainable (hence @TomTugendhat's & others' visceral reaction to President Biden's suggestion that the Afghans refused to fight). The ANA was, in essence, bleeding out. Again, this was well
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76@TomTugendhat known & a brief search will easily turn up reports on this from 2018, while The Economist has posted figures that suggest the matter has only deteriorated since then. The territorial picture was, I gather, not dissimilar (in other words,the guys in pickups
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76@TomTugendhat with heavy machine guns were already a reality for some, unfortunately). Absent serious evidence to the contrary, therefore, Western support *at current levels* was not preventing the catastrophic collapse we see before us now, merely staving it off, & for how much longer? At...
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76@TomTugendhat some point, & probably sooner than some would like to think (remember, the reports from 2018), the tipping point would have been reached & the west would either have been forced to accept the facts on the ground, or commit a larger number of its own forces once more & place them
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76@TomTugendhat in contact, with the consequent casualties once more, as air power cannot take & hold ground.
Shorter version? Yes, we could perhaps have got away with it for another year & we certainly could & should have handled the exit in some very difference ways,but @RoryStewartUK & others
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76@TomTugendhat need to address the wider war, as it was & where it was going, not merely its most recent status with regard to Western forces, & thereafter either present serious evidence that the above anaysis is incorrect, or start making the case for the *additional* forces, & potentially...
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76@TomTugendhat casualties, the West needed to apply in order to obtain stability, let alone roll-back (then we can also start discussing the reforms required to try to make it stick this time).
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76@TomTugendhat Oh & for the avoidance of doubt, the problem with the South Korea/German/Japan comparison again remains the wider war & domestic situation. In none of those examples have western (or indeed domestic) forces faced a multi-decade, externally backed, insurgency campaign. The closest
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76@TomTugendhat you get is the odd cross-border spat between North & South Korea, which are, in any case, external matters between two states, rather than internal insurgency in one, plus South Korean forces have hitherto been more than capable of dealing with them. Had they faced such issues...
A point from the Integrated Review that seems to have attracted little attention, but *might* be one of the most interesting moves of all is the "strategic hubs", which will be key to being "persistently engaged worldwide through forward deployment" (p. 73)gov.uk/government/pub…
For any talk of agility/mobility/etc., these hubs & whatever they comprise will form the "foundations" - the geography of any overseas strategy. Some of these hubs appear, in some respects, obvious & are based on pre-existing facilities.
For example, although the bulk of British forces left Germany in February 2020, the remnants at @BritishArmyDEU would seem a solid place to start with what is likely to be a predominantly land-based, continued commitment to @NATO & the defence of continental Europe.
With the announcement in this @BBCNews piece by @bealejonathan, that the @RoyalNavy is to receive a new "Multi Role Ocean Surveillance ship", to be in service by 20204, it's perhaps time for a little speculative #thread🧵(apologies, as always in advance😉) bbc.co.uk/news/uk-564726…
1st up, this isn't the first we've heard of something like this. Elements of the @RoyalNavy's survey squadron are approaching replacement point, most particularly @HMSScottRN which is currently scheduled to go in 2022, but @HMS_Echo & @HMSEnterprise are similarly due around 2028
The form & purpose of this new vessel would appear to be different, however, with a new emphasis on undersea cables. This isn't actually the 1st we've heard of this either as @AdmTonyRadakin raised it at Christmas (4.06 H/T this & much else to @NavyLookout)
On this day 1941, the @RoyalNavy's Force H under V/Adm Sir James Somerville, aboard the battlecruiser HMS Renown, with the battleship HMS Malaya, aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal & cruiser HMS Sheffield, arrived off the Italian port of Genoa & opened fire #WW2
Just a week before, Force H had attempted to breach the enormous Santa Chiara dam on Sardinia’s Tirso River (two years before the famous attack by @RoyalAirForce's @OC617Sqn), using torpedoes dropped by @RoyalNavy Fairey Swordfish from 810 NAS aboard HMS Ark Royal.
Led by Lt/Cdr Mervyn ‘Johnnie’ Johnstone, this spectacular attack on one of Europe's biggest dams was unsuccessful, thwarted by a combination of foul weather, Italian AA fire & what was believed to be an unexpected sandbank that grounded the torpedoes before they hit the dam wall
A couple of interesting historically-based @WarOnTheRocks holiday pieces: 1) @david_alman arguing that the @USNavy (&, realistically, other Western navies too), need to regain both the art & the structure to escort merchant ship convoys, a'la the #WW2#BattleOfTheAtlantic
2) A not entirely unrelated piece in which Christopher Booth looks back the the fabled "Shetland Bus Service" of fishing boats, that SOE used to help keep the Norwegian resistance going, as an example for supplying some future operations in the Pacific warontherocks.com/2020/12/the-mo…
Interestingly, Christopher Booth also has a @NavalInstitute Proceedings piece suggesting the US should consider bringing back amphibious aircraft, also for operations on Pacific islands (which historically was more the #WW2 SOE model in the Far East) (£) usni.org/magazines/proc…
On this day 1940 the German heavy cruiser Hipper, commanded by Cpt Wilhelm Meisel, began an attack on the large, Allied troop convoy WS5A, 800 miles west of Cape Finisterre.
Opening fire at 0838 Hipper's first targets were the HMT Empire Trooper & the SS Arabistan hitting both.
First to come to the aid of the two merchantmen was the small, Flower Class corvette HMS Clematis, whose Captain, Cdr York Cleeves, though obscenely outmatched by Meisel's Hipper, turned his vessel to fight, with its single, 4in gun.
Unbeknown to Capt Meisel, however, due to its importance, WS5A was already extremely well escorted, & just two minutes later, the largest of the three cruisers with the convoy, HMS Berwick, which matched Hipper in speed & eight 8in guns appeared through the squalls & opened fire.
It's worth saying that the Pacific Fleet off Japan wasn't the only @RoyalNavy fleet in the Far East on #VJDay. At Trincomalee lay the East Indies Fleet, under Adm Sir Arthur Power, just back from operating off Thailand, & preparing for the amphibious landings to recapture Malaya.
Though reduced from its peak the previous year by the transfer of the big, Illustrious & Implacable Class fleet carriers to the Pacific with Adm Fraser, the damage to HMS Valiant & the return home of HMS Queen Elizabeth & HMS Renown, Adm Power's fleet still packed a punch.
Replacing HMS Queen Elizabeth as flagship was HMS Nelson, fresh from refitting in the US, while the @MarineNationale battleship Richelieu would return just three days later, fresh from a refit at Durban in South Africa.