I don’t know whether we will see high or low inflation going forward – nobody does. Rather, I suggest considering the range of potential outcomes and their implications:
2. Beyond one’s prediction of inflation itself, it’s important to consider the macro assumptions that go along with it. If you expect low inflation because the asset bubble is about to implode, that is very different than expecting low-inflation in a strong growing economy.
3. Therefore, I propose the following matrix. (1) High vs. Low inflation vs. (2) Good and Bad Economy, and analyzing each of these quadrants in terms of their likelihood and implications:
4. First: Good Economy + Low Inflation = “Goldilocks”. Inflation is indeed transitory, and the strong economic growth continues. Supply chain disruptions caused by COVID resolve quickly and wage pressure abates as more employees return to the workforce.
5. Real earning power grows leading to growing consumption and GDP growth over the long term. QE and cheap rates can continue indefinitely and asset prices continue to rise indefinitely.
6. While the market continues to price this outcome - I think this scenario is highly unlikely, because there is no catalyst for an abatement in prices. The increased circulation of the massive increase in money supply will not lead to declining inflation.
7. With rising wealth effect, global growth supporting commodity prices, and consumers willing and able to pay high prices, I don't see prices decelerating. Supply chain easing simply translates into higher margins. However, if this scenario indeed proves true, get long on assets
8. Second: Good Economy + High Inflation = “Stalemate”. Inflation proves stickier than anticipated but the economy continues to improve as virus impact fades and global “normalization” continues. The acute supply chain pressures ease but core prices continue to rise well above 2%
9. This is a stalemate because nominal earning power will compete with higher inflation for real earnings growth. Increases in nominal earnings beget higher inflation, reducing the impact in real terms. Real consumption growth remains muted dampening the recovery.
10. Asset prices will struggle to continue gains as buying power does not increase uniformly, and markets remain fearful of Fed tightening. IMO – this is the most likely outcome if “good economy” is taken as a given.
11. Third: Bad Economy + Low Inflation = “Déjà vu”. In this scenario, a slowdown or outright decline in the economy crushes demand, commodities and asset prices, leading to rapid reduction in inflation back below historical levels.
12. I call it Déjà vu, because this is basically a repeat of recent advanced economy recessions, including the GFC. These arguments are have been well outlined by @coloradotravis, and I’m personally to sympathetic to them.
13. Indeed I’ve argued previously, the macro setup today does appear strikingly similar to 2008 at least at a high level. Fading stimulus, fading pent up demand, stock market collapse all are good arguments against inflation.
14. This scenario is “bad” because it assumes a bad economy – but at least its knowably bad and the monetary playbook employed the past decade continues to apply. Low rates, more printing, and eventually we will work our way out.
15. Four: Bad Economy + High Inflation = “Danger Zone”. Supply chain issues persist much longer than expected. Squeezed producers have only begun pushing prices onto consumers which will continue.
16. Wage pressure adds fuel to the fire while also limiting employment gains. Nominal earnings don’t grow, meanwhile inflation crushes real earnings power killing consumption. Limited inventories lead to higher prices even as buying power diminishes
17. Commodities (in particular, oil) are more resilient than 08 since starting from a much more subdued base. Keep in mind oil prices were $140 in 2008 dollars vs. $65 in 2021 dollars today. Core inflation looks worse, and monetary and fiscal stimulus have been much larger
18. Inflation forces a dramatic reversal in 50 years of loosening economic policy of monetary expansion which is devastating for an economy built on the assumption of cheaper and cheaper debt.
19. Asset prices are destroyed by crushed demand, crushed earnings, rising interest rates and monetary tightening. This scenario is unknowably bad. I don’t think it is the most likely – but I do think its possible, and that is pretty scary.
20. Finally - I'm just some dude on the internet. I really enjoy engagement with different perspectives so please add to the conversation!
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🚨🚨 China Credit - Writing on the Wall - and How to Trade It. (9/15/21)👇👇
2. In June, I described contagion in the Chinese credit as a tail risk - not necessarily a probability, a significant risk that was being underpriced. But now the fuse has been lit and no one is stamping it out. The collapse of the property sector is now a probability.
3. (If you're newer to the saga, I'd encourage you to read this master thread below thread in sequence as it provides necessary pretext. If you're up to date, then jump right in.)
This relates to EG's wealth management product ("WMP") of which 99% of employees are invested in (they are protesting). Some top brass left and were paid out before payments halted. WMPs are a huge funding source for developers. Citizens (who buy apts) are creditors. Disaster.
2. WMPs, which are funded by citizen's savings, totaled $1 TRILLION dollars according to BBG, and regulators are cracking down. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3. Reported: Staff of Shenzhen Financial Bureau: “We are not sure if Evergrande Wealth belongs to the Financial Bureau, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, or the People’s Bank of China. It is currently not on our P2P list.”
2. Evergrande is the Gorilla, but it is not unique nor is it the first. Below is the debt and equity trading of large stressed developers, in chronological order from when their debt began to fall. (these are USD bonds - onshore debt would be better but data is less accessible)
3. The First Domino: China Fortune Land Development ($61bn of liabilities): Defaulted in January - the first major default of this tightening cycle. Ping An - largest insurer in China - reported a $5.5bn loss relating to China Fortune in its 1H21 results.
🚨🚨China Credit Update- Gradually then Suddenly (9/7/21)👇👇
2/ Evergrande is dead. Long live Evergrande. For those paying attention, this has been a forgone conclusion for a while. Now is the critical juncture - what will be done to contain it. The fate of Chinese credit markets and banking sector and hang in the balance.
3/ Contagion is the next step. Contagion is a disease that spreads - its a crowd panic of self preservation. Creditors were forced to take losses on EG and for some it could be fatal. If you're are a lender to property developers you're only concern is saving your own ass.
Since initially warning about China's credit markets in June (an eternity in Twitter years), a lot has developed and so its worth zooming all the way out and re-evaluating the thesis:
2/ Recap: I argued that China's credit markets posed underappreciated risk as a massive growth in debt since the GFC was put strain on the banking system, and that the property sector was the key risk given its size, role in economic growth, and private wealth held in property
3/ This setup is not new, but Beijing's recent push to break moral hazard is. Faith in central invention has been the key to maintaining peaceful markets and therefore the push to break the backstop introduced a critical new risk that could make this episode unlike previous ones