With all this Debt Ceiling talk, here's another throwback:
What are shadow banks?
How did they spur the 2008 financial crisis?
"But shadow banks aren't a thing anymore, right?"
Wrong.
Today they underwrite more debt than regular banks.
Thread👇
1/ If it looks like a duck & quacks like a duck...
Is it a 🦆?
If a company moves money around and lends to other companies even (especially) when real banks refuse, then is it a bank?
In 2007, economist Paul McCulley named these things "shadow banks."
The name stuck around.
2/ What do they do?
4 things.
- Transfer credit risk: from loan originator to 3rd party
- Lever up: borrow $ to invest & make more $
- Transform liquidity: use cash-like liabilities to buy hard-to-sell assets
- Transform maturity: use short-term deposits to fund long term loans
Commercial banks do all 4 things too.
BUT the difference is: shadow banks aren't regulated, can't borrow from Fed in an emergency & deposits aren't insured.
So:
They can transfer credit risk (& lie about risk magnitude)
They can lever up (way beyond Dodd Frank's min cap reqs)
They can lend to high risk businesses (whose credit ratings are too low for most regular banks to touch).
They fall like dominos in a bank run (because no access to emergency cash).
And most importantly, they used to be owned by the regular banks themselves.
3/ Birth of shadow banking
Flash back to the 80s.
“Junk bonds" are the old NFTs.
Traditional banks won't lend to companies w/ less than blue-chip credit ratings. But meanwhile the street's investors are all hungry for yield.
Step in, new middleman. Make the match happen.
So these rando non-bank entities would come in, fund the low-credit corporates at some ridiculously high interest rate (read: high yield for investors), then sell them to the street as super juicy junk bonds.
Now flash forward to the 90s.
Time to land & expand.
They expanded into home mortgages & other consumer debt — auto loans, student loans, credit card debt — which they bought from banks, packaged together and sold to investors as bond-like securities.
The rest is history.
4/ Role in the 2008 crisis
As long as shadow banks ultimately put their funds into "safe" investments, everything should be ok.
So what went wrong in 2008?
The investments were garbage.
They were garbage posing as AA ratings w/ the help of S&P and Moody's.
But they were 💩.
Most of you have seen the Big Short.
TLDR: Investors got skittish and suddenly a bunch wanted to pull out. To repay these investors, shadow banks had to sell assets. These “fire sales” reduced the value of those assets. Book values on bank balance sheets tanked. Banks collapsed.
5/ Are shadow banks still a thing TODAY?
Yep.
In fact they're an even bigger thing now:
In 2007 the global shadow banking sector was $62 trillion.
In 2011 it reached $67T.
In 2009, non-banking loans accounted for only 25% of all US loans.
In 2018, they account for 45%.
6/ Why?
Why are shadow banks still ON THE RISE?
CLOs.
Because investors forever want YIELD (esp in QE-induced low interest rate environments) and CLOs offer yield.
Post-2008, shadow bankers shifted from mortgages to business lending, using the same securitization process to buy and package leveraged loans into CLOs.
Investors wanted them & highly-levered businesses needed them.
What could possibly go wrong?
7/ New Problems?
Lately, the CLO market has seen a huge wave of downgrades. Credit quality has deteriorated.
Deja vu?
The trend started in 2012 & has worsened ever since.
Diagram below shows U.S. leveraged loan downgrades hitting new highs in June 2020.
At 3X 2008 levels.
8/ What now?
Ok so are we screwed? Is this gonna be a replay of 2008?
According to the Fed: No.
What's different and why are we "safe" this time?
- Post- Dodd Frank, the US banking system is much better capitalized. Banks are passing stress tests & got enough RWAs.
- Bank runs are "structurally difficult" now, minimizing fire sale risk.
- Household debt < household income.
But are we really safe?
Before writing off the American debt problem as a complete non-issue, let's take another look at the parallels btw '08 & today:
- As before, growth in lending is driven by investors’ search for yield rather than borrowers need for new capital
- As before, lending standards are ever-loosening, first at the shadow banks and now at regulated banks too (who are anxious to compete & claw back market share)
China itself is one big Evergrande.
One big debt crisis.
For years massively over-levered shadow banks masqueraded as propcos, got drunk on credit, flirted w/ default & called for bailout like a late-night uber.
Contagion has begun
👇
1/ How Evergrande is Actually a (Shadow) Bank
On the surface Evergrande is a propco. It has insatiable demand for capital cuz it needs to buy land. That's what propcos do.
But then Evergrande started stuffing its commercial paper into WMPs & selling it off to its own employees.
Let's be more explicit.
In June 2019, Evergrande plowed 13.2B¥ into Shengjing Bank, acquiring 36% stake in a literal lender.
Shengjing was on the brink of default. Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio was 8.52%, barely above regulatory req.
From Fortune 500 to 1.95 Trillion in debt: How did China's #2 real estate giant get to this point?
How much cash does it *actually* have?
Will there be a bailout?
Who's gonna get f*cked?
Here goes. Story time.
👇
1/ First, how bad is the current situation?
There's not much info on Evergrande's finances on the Western web (aka Google) so I had to dig through the Chinese web (aka Baidu).
This poster shows China's top 3 most indebted real estate co's in 2020:
#1 is Evergrande (@ 1.95T ¥!)
2/ According to the company's 2020 annual report, 674B ¥ (35%) is interest-bearing debt, which means it incurs new interest liability of 180+M ¥ every day!
Comparatively, it only has 158B in cash to repay all its short term debt + interest which means...
1. Hot date 🔥 (or several) 2. Hot portco 🦄 (or several)
Turns out:
There's a famous game theory algorithm that maximizes ur chances of finding both.
It's called ...
👇
1/ What is the Secretary Problem?
Imagine ur in HR.
U wanna hire the best secretary from N applicants. So u interview them 1 by 1 until u decide to accept one. Rejected candidates can't be resurrected.
What strategy maximizes ur chances of choosing the BEST?
[code @ end of 🧵]
Now replace "ur in HR" with
"ur a normal guy" (or girl).
Replace "secretary" with
"hot date" &/or "hot portfolio company🦄."
The strategy that maximizes for the BEST secretary also maximizes for the BEST gf/bf also maximizes for the BEST investment. 🤯
In 1983, McDonalds struggled to launch the McNugget. Chicken volatility was too high.
"How can we set fixed prices w/out risking billions?"
Hedge funder Ray Dalio cracked the code.
Here's how his economic machine solved McDonald's 🐥problem.👇
1/ What is the Economic Machine?
Before talking about 🐥s, let's take a quick intro ride through Dalio's core macroeconomic insight:
While seemingly complex, the economy is mechanically & predictably driven by human nature.
i.e. Everything from debt cycles to GDP is a machine.
3 Forces drive Dalio’s economic machine:
#1 Productivity growth
#2 Long Term Debt Cycle
#3 Short Term Debt Cycle
The diagram above shows these 3 forces together in action.
#1 is shown by the monotonically increasing curve.
#2 wiggles sinusoidally along #1.
#3 wiggles along #2.