Thread by @AliVaez

I've followed the nuclear negotiations across 3 US & 3 Iranian administrations, been on the ground at multiple negotiation rounds, and written more reports pre- and post-JCPOA than I care to tally.

Based on that, some modest thoughts on where we stand. [Thread]

The deal's demise was predicted or pronounced from the day it was reached: It wouldn't survive because Iranians would cheat. It couldn't survive because Trump's withdrawal would doom it. And now, it won't survive - or is already dead - because negotiations have stalled. 2/

Why? Tehran believes the U.S. won't/can't deliver on the sanctions relief the deal envisions. That continued escalation could leverage greater concessions. And that having survived the worst of max pressure, their economy can muddle through even without those benefits. 3/

For its part, U.S. doesn't want to give a unilateral concession to cajole Iran back to the table. It's closed ranks with the Europeans in a complete turnaround from the Trump-era divide. It has levers to push at the IAEA, the UN, and there's always another sanctions target. 4/

Hence, impasse & talks of Plan Bs that both sides can deploy: for the West, more econ/dip pressure; from Iran, greater nuclear provocation and muscle flexing in the region. It's a return to the Ahmadinejad era-dynamic of centrifuges vs sanctions, w/ dash of military threat. 5/

Reality is that it's far easier to talk about what coercive measures or threats can be implemented than seriously contemplate what you're willing to offer the other side, particularly when digging in is a more politically enticing proposition when dealing with an adversary. 6/

The downside of that is ending up with the likelihood of a Plan B that is identical to the Plan A that got us here in the first place: Max Pressure 2.0, perhaps with European buy-in this time, against Max Resistance Plus. 7/

If it sounds a pessimistic picture, perhaps it is. But consider this, too: for all the criticism and challenges, JCPOA framework and core bargain underpinning it - limits on Iran's nuke prog for relief from sanx put in place bc of it - has proven the only formula that works. 8/

So, what could break the deadlock? Plenty of things. The new Iranian team could conclude that for all their criticism of predecessors, Vienna track was, up to June, making reasonable progress on a fair - if in their minds far less than ideal - framework for mutual compliance. 9/

That means that some asks, like relief from all Trump sanctions, aren't going to happen. That ironclad guarantees aren't something Washington can provide. That cooperating fully with the IAEA is absolutely vital. And that their own policies (cc: @FATFNews) are problematic. 10/

Closing gaps between P5+1 could also shift the calculus. Tehran believes, not without some justification, that daylight between the West and China in particular gives it breathing room, economically and diplomatically. But I don't think that daylight is perpetual. 11/

So by all means, we need to think of Plan Bs: and Cs and Ds and Es, especially if Iran's nuclear advances do pass the point of JCPOA no return. And I don't subscribe to inspirational quotes about how it's darkest before the dawn, que sera sera and all the rest of it. 12/

But don't dismiss so readily the possibility, albeit a dwindling probability, of finding ways through the current impasse. Easy? No. Simple? Hardly. Assured? If only. But to borrow from Kissinger, the absence of [good] alternatives clears the mind marvelously. 13/13