Raisi took office as Iran's 8th president.
Marked by a reputation for repression, bereft of experience in governance, facing growing internal & external challenges, there will no honeymoon for the deep state's groomed choice.
Our new report explains 🧵: crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
2| With Raisi's installation, hardliners control all IRI's elected & unelected institutions. His path was paved by an election that was unfree, unfair and - even by Iranian standards - uncompetitive.
How uncompetitive? If spoiled ballots were a candidate, they'd have come 2nd.
3| Why was the system willing to sacrifice elections, which it claims as pillar of its popular legitimacy, for a non-race? Because it's wagered that closing ranks at time of uncertainty is a price worth paying - especially if it shores up 30% of Iranians backing conservatives.
4| It's a massive gamble, and Raisi's to-do list is monumental: Jobs, inflation, COVID-19, water/electricity shortages, ongoing protests & labor strikes just some of the key challenges his admin faces. And even as the economy goes from red to black, it's badly in need of surgery.
5| Glass-half full view is that Raisi & Co realize scale of the task, and that having all responsibility on their shoulders, hardliners are better placed to implement difficult choices.
Perhaps.
But even that is a notch up from the prospects over socio-political reform:
6| System's default response to protests over econ/pol grievances is iron first; A sociologist said the system faces "silent tsunami" of resentment particularly acute in impoverished/underdeveloped border provinces.
Unaddressed, standoff b/w state & citizen looms.
7| When it comes to foreign policy, Raisi is untried & vague on actual policy. Iran's strategic decisions aren't set by the president, but tone and tactics of he and his team are key in how Iran is perceived by the world.
JCPOA's fate stands central to how this unfolds.
8| We trace talks that got underway in April, addressing 2+2 issues:
Core discussions on sanx/nukes for mutual compliance
Iran's ask for a guarantee US won't leave again
US wanting commitment for Iran to talk abt missiles/sunsets/regional
But since 20 June, all talks on hold.
9| How Raisi/Tehran approach JCPOA talks now the key variable: They could return to Vienna, pick up where Round 6 left off and seal a deal - or move to a brinksmanship gambit on the notion that it'll yield bigger returns.
US/E3 saying: Think very, very carefully.
10| Clock will be running as Iran's nuclear breaches approach the point of no return: Advances too substantial for JCPOA to fix.
With September IAEA BoG meeting on the horizon, Tehran could end up facing a censure resolution - and perhaps referral to the UNSC if it dithers.
11| As we argue in the report, mutual return to full compliance with existing deal is still the best path forward. Divide b/w the two sides is real but still bridgeable and better than reverting to race of sanctions vs. centrifuges that is in neither's interest. Failing that...
12| An alternative would be to shift toward a JCPOA-minus deal capping escalation process: Iran freezing key breaches of its nuclear obligations in return for partial sanctions relief. This is a way station toward a JCPOA+ or a more-for-more deal that both sides say they want.
13| Even then, some of the regional concerns around ballistic missiles & Iran's power projection don't have to wait for the JCPOA. Discussions with GCC rivals have been quietly taking place, offering real opportunity for defusing long-standing tensions. worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29731…
14|14 Iran's new govt takes over at a moment of major challenges & slender opportunities, & on the hardliners now falls the full burden of addressing myriad/intersecting political, economic & diplomatic crises.
Time will tell if they sink or swim together. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
هرچقدر پیروزی ابراهیم رئیسی در انتخابات کمرونق ۱۴۰۰ بیچالش بود، دوران ریاست جمهوری وی احتمالاً پر فراز و نشیب خواهد بود. گروه بحران در گزارش «معمای رئیسی» نگاهی انداخته به روند انتخابات و مشکلات عدیده پیش روی رئیسی در داخل و خارج. #رشتو crisisgroup.org/fa/middle-east…
۲/ پیروزی رئیسی حاصل انتخاباتی غیرآزاد و به شکل بیسابقهای غیررقابتی، نرخ مشارکت کمتر از ۵۰٪ و آرا باطله ۳.۷ میلیونی بود. برای نظام نه مشروعیت ناشی از مشارکت بالا، بلکه نتیجه انتخابات اولویت داشت تا حضور اصولگرایان در تمام مراکز اصلی انتصابی و انتخابی قدرت مقدر شود.
۳/ اشتغال، تورم، همهگیری کرونا، تظاهراتهای مردمی و صنفی صرفاً بخشی از مسائلی است که دولت رئیسی با آن روبروست. هنوز معلوم نیست که آیا حاکمیت یک دست، با پایگاه اجتماعی ۳۰ درصدی، قادر به رفع مشکلات کشور خواهد بود یا خیر.
Senior Israeli official tells @Reuters: "1 of the problems w/ the [JCPOA] is that it left Iran w/ a nuclear infrastructure in place which allows it - at a point of its choosing - to move ahead relatively rapidly... JCPOA puts infrastructure in the freezer or in mothballs".
2| Here's the thing: at no recent point has total denial of infrastructure been serious possibility, neither thru negotiations nor sabotage. JCPOA worked - and senior Israeli mil/intel officials noted this - bc mothballs, freezers are solid non-proliferation gains, undone now.
3| Don't take my word for it. Here's the recently-retired head of Mossad just last month [via @TimesofIsrael]
In the aftermath of the Natanz attack, Iranian hardliners are busy spilling all sorts of beans around intelligence & security. The best you can say is giving an impression that's anywhere from indiscreet to incompetent. [Thread]
2| First there's @arzakani4, perhaps best known for gloating about Iran controlling 4 Arab capitals in 2014 and giving every critic who overstates Iranian regional influence a footnote citation. bit.ly/3scyhgE
3| In an interview, he revealed that the explosion in Natanz last July was done with 300 lbs of explosives that were built into a centrifuge calibration working station that Iran had sent to Europe for repairs. It was detonated remotely by satellite.
I have nothing but respect for the @WSJ reporting team - @laurnorman, @SuneEngel and others are among the best in the game.
But goodness me does the Ed Board get it wrong. [thread 🧵] on.wsj.com/2PTerKs
2/ From day US left JCPOA, few major papers have as loudly & consistently banged max pressure drum.
"Prudence... suggests a wait-and-see attitude toward Mr Trump’s reversal", they said that May. "A year from now, the world may be safer without it".
Narrator: It wasn't.
3/ From the outset, today's editorial predictably uses the JCPOA critics' adjectives of choice - flawed, bad - to say we're going "back to the future of 2015-16".
I dunno, from a non-proliferation standpoint, that's not so shabby.
Despite the fact that Iran's nuclear program has rarely been off the front pages for better part of a decade, reporting and commentary around it continues to be riddled with basic misunderstandings and errors. A thread to help clarify a few things [1/5]:
2|"Iran is only weeks/months away from a nuclear weapon".
No. JCPOA put Iran's "breakout time" at 1 yr. This is time it would take to have enough fissile material for a weapon - not a complete nuke. US estimates are that this period is now 3-4 months; Israel pegs it at 6.
3| Something something "... nuclear weapons program".
There is no evidence of weapons-related work at present. Recent IAEA findings on radioactive traces relate to activities in late 90s/early 00s; even Trump admin noted that in here & now, no current weapons dimension:
There seems to be some confusion about the legislation Iranian parliament approved today and the Guardian Council turned into law. So here are the key fact: mashreghnews.ir/news/1151218/%…
1. 20% enrichment should start immediately and the govt is required to accumulate min of 120kg of 20% LEU every month
2. The govt should immediately increase below 5% enrichment to 500 kg per month (up from the current rate of around 170 kg)