Today @EU_Commission formally begins its “reflection/review” of EU fiscal rules. This is a BIG deal. The outcome will basically determine whether EU faces a fiscal cliff in 2023 or not. Short thread on 5 (worrying?) trends to watch that'll decisively shape how debate plays out 1/
1/ Process: As always in EU, key to substance. Fiscal hawks @VDombrovskis & Northern European member states want @EU_Commission annual fiscal surveillance cycle (starting next Apr) & fiscal review to be decoupled. Put diff: to default to old rules while new ones are worked out 2/
.@PaoloGentiloni believes momentum behind reform will be stronger if Commission’s surveillance & reflection are linked. Makes sense: why would @EU_Commission go back to old rules if it was clear they were changing? Whoever wins this process point will be 1/2 way on substance 3/
2/ Germany: @OlafScholz position on EU fiscal policy remains fundamentally ambiguous. He says SGP is “flexible enough” & doesn't support legislative changes. But he also says no sizeable austerity is expected from member states & is open to climate investments in EU 4/
His new🚦Govt will increase public inv at home (ostensibly respecting debt brake - 🧐 yeah right). But it's not clear whether this will be coherent with EU fiscal agenda or at the expense of it - not least given @c_lindner in FinMin. Where 🇩🇪 lands will obviously be key for EU 5/
3/ France: There's also worrying signs 🇫🇷 will be much more cautious - only seeking guarantees there will be no EDP & pushing for a general debate on inv/growth as senior figures around @EmmanuelMacron don't want a divisive debate in EU playing out at same time as his election 6/
But many in Bxl question whether @Elysee & Bercy (as Fin Min is known) are on same page. 🇫🇷 will be a key voice in EU fiscal debate - not least given French EU Presidency in first 6 months of next yr. How hard Fr chooses to push cd therefore have a decisive impact on outcome 7/
4/ Dutch/northern hawks: @MinPres will push hard for old rules to be FULLY implemented (incl EDP's) as new ones are worked out. Not bc he believes they will be, but bc he wants these to serve as baseline for negotiations - constraining how ambitious any changes will likely be 8/
Northern Europe remains very transactional (pushing for fiscal discipline for having signed off on €750bn Recovery Fund). @PaoloGentiloni is trying to reframe debate - this was exceptional support in exceptional circumstances; let's see what gradual steps South can now take 9/
5/ Last point is @EU_Commission is itself divided with @PaoloGentiloni on side of reform & @VDombrovskis & @JHahnEU arguing for minimal change. @vonderleyen is instinctively with reformers-but as a weak President facing several crises (energy, Pol) it's unclear she'll succeed 10/
This is political context in which reform of EU fiscal rules will take place. It's too early to say where substance will land - many in @EU_Commission think the review itself will help those pushing for change. Let's hope so - despite worrying signs from 🇩🇪 & 🇫🇷 & indeed 🇪🇺 ENDS
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But senior sources say UKG is still not resolved on compromise or conflict - & see risks & opportunities in both 1/
Without such a significant offer, UK ministers believe Johnson would have triggered Article 16, probably by end-November, to suspend all or (more likely) part of protocol. But UKG now has no choice but to seriously engage in talks - not just go through the motions 2/
Johnson’s allies think movement on ECJ will be needed to tip balance in favour of peace vs war, but this is something EU will find VERY difficult to do. How can Bxl offer ECJ concessions on SM/goods to 3rd country while insisting on court's writ with member states (ie Poland)? 3/
The @EU_Commission is going to continue withholding Recovery Fund €bn from Pol & Hu & I suspect WILL activate new Rule of Law mechanism against them. Not because @vonderleyen is worried about @Europarl_EN taking her to court. But because it's in COM's own interests to do so 1/
The most imp reason is the creation of Recovery Fund & governance arrangements underpinning it. These have fundamentally altered @EU_Commission incentives. There's a recognition A LOT is riding on its successful implementation 2/
For eg: 1) whether something similar could be done in the future if EU was faced with another external shock. Or 2) whether EU fiscal rules can be substantially amended to give member states more time to repair their public finances & create budget space for green investments 3/
The EU's proposals for addressing the problems in NI are substantive & far reaching. They will effectively do away with all paperwork for goods destined for NI - instead of a border in Irish Sea, think of a “green” (NI-bound) & “red” (Single Market) lane 1/
It has taken a lot of time & leadership from @MarosSefcovic & @vonderleyen to get Commission services & member states into line. Although EU capitals haven't seen the final package & all the details, they've been socialised with what's coming 2/
The Commission's ambition has been driven by 1) a desire to institute practical fixes to improve experience of citizens & businesses in NI, but also, importantly, 2) tactics 3/
What to make of the blizzard of French presidential polls in recent days? The racist far-right pundit Eric Zemmour (no apologies for the word racist) is at 15% in first round in one poll, just behind Marine Le Pen but miles behind President Macron 1/
In another poll, @EmmanuelMacron is seen soundly defeating all challengers in the two candidate second round on 24 April. He beats Zemmour 65-35, Le Pen 60-40 and the leading (for now) centre-right contender, Xavier Bertrand, 55-45 3/
Almost unnoticed, phaps bc it’s done with an English rather than a Hungarian accent, our populist, nationalist PM is setting out to weaken institutions that define a liberal democracy: he’s moving, Orbán style, to make it harder for his Govt to lose power theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
There is a pattern here, if we’re only willing to see it. A populist government hobbling those bodies that exist to keep it in check, trampling on democratic conventions and long-held rights, all to tighten its own grip on power.
We need to recognise it, even when it wears a smile and tousled hair, and speaks in the soothing cadences of Eton College
Germany now faces weeks - if not months - of political uncertainty which creates all sorts of policy risk for Europe. A real danger in the months ahead is a lengthy period without a new voice of any kind in Berlin, just as France plunges into an uncertain election of its own 1/
Because EU faces three extremely big, complex policy questions in the third & fourth quarter this year - over Rule of Law issues with Pol & Hungary; the EU's fiscal orientation in 2023 & how to manage UK escalation over NI Protocol - which are crying out for a political steer 2/
But with a lame-duck Govt now in Berlin, soon to be followed by same in Paris, no major EU policy decisions are likely under either. This risk is the problems fester, escalate & subsequently become harder to resolve 3/