$690.DE $6690.HK UPDATE - I am giving up on the spread trade (last ~49% discount on the D-share).
Obvi this is a v disappointing outcome as the discount never closed to the levels I thought appropriate (20%).
I will try to unpack a little my thought process...maybe useful 🙇♂️
When I wrote it up I expected two things to happen over the course of the year:
1) some less liquidity-sensitive portion of the natural HK/Asian shareholder base to gravitate towards the German line, and exchange liquidity for cheapness; and
2) some progress to be made from..
...the company towards closing the discount (via accretive buybacks/purchase by the parent Haier topco/maybe even the allowal of fungibility).
Looking back on it, I suppose it was perhaps presumptive to conclude the company/Haier topco would care about the discount...
...even though they gave initial signs of doing so, by reinstating the topco purchase intention, before abruptly canceling it.
But I was more confident some Asian $$ would rather own the D-shares at a 40%+ discount for the exact same economic exposure.
This was just wrong.
Whilst there may be hope here given the German IR has left the co, and there is some rumbling that the Ceinex may be shut down, I am simply unable to directly catalyze a fungibility event given the China topco here so am moving on to fresher pastures.
GLTA still involved 🙏🙏👊
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One way to think about what the 'reasonable' valn is for any name w/ idiosyncratic risk like this (Indo tycoon taking away your assets, etc), is benchmark the asset against itself. Ie what have ppl been willing to pay in the past?
Then think, is the same company better or worse (credit, cap allocation, cap returns, governance, etc) versus the average past?
$RE4.SI traded at ~3.8x LTM EV/EBITDA in early 2021 on the basis of FY20 numbers. Last yr they still put up $57mm of EBITDA but no real net earnings...
...and they still carried a bit of gross USD debt ($60mm) - a decent risk for a small-cap Indo co.
Simply using TIKR data, it looks like this shitco has generally traded 2.5-4x EV/EBITDA, on a LTM trailing basis. Avg looks like ~3-3.5x EV/EBITDA:
Ok Kingsgate $KCN.AX, let's do this. Aussie gold miner special sit. This is not without risk so big boy pants on, DYODD, I am long and think its compelling but again - caveat emptor bigly on this one.
That said - the stock is $1.25, i think imminently its $2+ and heading to $3-4
Mkt cap today is ~$275mm (AUD), $10mm cash, no debt.
Two main assets: the Chatree gold/silver mine in Thailand; and a development asset in Chile (Nueva Esperanza).
NE agreed sale to a Canadian junior for $69mm. Hasn't closed - let's forget it for now.
Chatree in Thailand. V complex story. Mine shut down in 2015 bec the Thai govt basically removed $KCN.AX licence overnight due to environmental concerns. These were never proven (in fact the opposite). Chatree had been mining since 2001, $KCN had invested >$1bn over time.
I have been thinking more and more about the $CAMB.LN outcome in the context of my own investment, but more in terms of what I want my Fintwit contribution to be.
Connor is a friend and a great advocate for minorities in situations like this, but there is more to be done.
If I think about what 'went wrong' w/ how Cambria turned out, clearly we had a conflicted and complicit board; an avaricious CEO; a weak regulatory framework; and a feckless institutional shareholder group.
But I prob could have, and should have, done more personally.
The main issue was trading liquidity was near zero - meaning both inability to build a blocking stake, and presenting huge headaches post-deal.
Nevertheless the solution would have been to more actively bid some of those same disinterested instos who just intended to tender.
Here's an interesting example for the commodity shitco degenerates in my feed: Stanmore Resources, $SMR.AX.
Note this is extremely illiquid, as a result I have a tiny position, I think its more of a speculation than an 'all in' type call. But it is certainly intriguing...
As always here at Raper Capital there is an event angle. $SMR.AX is 74% owned by a Singapore holdco, Golden Energy $AUE.SI, also v cheap but a different beast.
Note that Golden bid for the whole co at $1 last April...
Stock was in the low 80s at the time - despite coal prices being in the toilet (post COVID) and a few operational issues.
Unclear why they couldn't mop up the entire thing, I guess there were a few holdouts, they went from 31% to 75% but couldn't get it done.
We will come to the next chapter soon enough but here's a recap to catch you up. 2014-19 was an exploratory period where I developed my investment style; tried to launch a fund, 2x, and didn't get it going; and had overall success punctuated by extreme volatility at times...
I grossed 220% over six yrs (vs SPX ~100%), whilst running ~30% average net exposure (ie beta-adjusted neutral), but punctuated by bouts of extreme volatility and underperformance.
Indeed most all the outperformance was generated in the early years when credit analysis 'worked'
To recap:
2014: +119% vs SPX +12%
2015: +39% vs SPX -1%
2016: +1% vs SPX +10%
2017: +21% vs SPX +19%
2018: -25% vs SPX -6%
2019: +15% vs SPX +29%
Cumulative performance: +220% (21.5% CAGR) vs SPX +100% (12.2% CAGR)