Lately I have been thinking a lot about the need to engage in Machtkritik. This German term can be translated as ‘critique of power’. The latter requires us to address the issue of democratic political legitimacy (or lack thereof), eg of the Chinese party-state /1
I have noticed that when we talk about the CCP’s lack of democratic political legitimacy there is a tendency among many European elites to shy away from conflict & to praise the virtues of tolerance and to highlight the merits of suspending judgment in intercultural encounters /2
From such a vantage point any public critique of power is seen as contributing to polarisation. But who is polarising in the historical reality? The hard authoritarian turn of the Xi regime is real and affecting Chinese citizens as well as non-Chinese citizens around the world /3
And if the tension resulting from critique of power was resolved in favour of withholding judgment in intercultural encounters this would lead to an uncritical approach to power. That clearly cannot be a solution when dealing with the challenge of hard authoritarianism /4
Similarly, invoking the neutrality principle in academia is also problematic when we deal with systemic rivalry between democracies and autocracies. Having a position on this issue doesn’t mean being politically partisan /5
And how would a neutral position on the systemic rivalry look anyway? Not defending the principles and practices of liberal democracy? Or to pretend that there is no difference between democratic and autocratic political systems? /6
And more specifically, what would a neutral position on the CCP’s recent sanctions against European China scholars and the German think tank Merics look like? Not signing open letters and refraining to publicly condemn the CCP sanctions? /7
Such a position would be hardly neutral but a tacit acceptance of political censorship and self-censorship. This is why I would argue that without a critique of power (Machtkritik) scholars run the danger of cooptation /End

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Andreas Fulda

Andreas Fulda Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @AMFChina

26 Jul
With their cynical approach to the People's Republic of China 🇨🇳 the four chancellors Schmidt (1974-82), Kohl (1982-98), Schröder (1998-2005) and Merkel (2005-21) have done Germany 🇩🇪 a disservice. There is much to be learned from their leadership failures. A short thread 🧵 /1 Image
Chancellor Helmut Kohl is best known for his role in Germany's re-unification. Yet he also helped normalising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. In 1995 he was the "first Western leader to visit a Chinese military base" /2 nytimes.com/1995/11/09/wor…
Kohl's visit to the People's Liberation Army 196 Infantry Division outside Tianjin was highly symbolic. It was a clear signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the atrocities of 1989 were no longer an obstacle to western business engagement with China /3 scmp.com/article/138269…
Read 18 tweets
22 Jun
Former 🇩🇪 Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has published a highly problematic op-ed in @china_table.

Based on a critique of a supposedly 🇺🇸 initiated Cold War 2.0 - more about this later - he makes the case for unconditional 🇨🇳 engagement.

A short 🧵/1 table.media/china/standpun…
Fischer's analogy to Cold War 1.0 is a red herring. The threat which the Chinese Communist Party poses to peace within and outside 🇨🇳 can not be directly compared to the former USSR. It is a different kettle of fish. What I find worrisome is how Fischer misrepresents the CCP /2
Fischer describes 🇨🇳 as "a market economy under Leninist auspices". This "hybrid character" supposedly explains China's "success story" and its ability to overtake the 🇺🇸 technologically and economically by 2030. The many costs of China's political system do not feature at all /3
Read 17 tweets
21 Jun
The Board of the German Association for Asian Studies (DGA) has published a new statement about the state of Asian studies in Germany. Their explicit commitment to #academicfreedom is welcome. But many problems with the DGA's approach remain /1

asienforschung.de/stellungnahme-…
In the opening paragraph the DGA statement bemoans the supposed "return of dangerous stereotypical categorization patterns and woodcut-like world order models" without initially offering important context or country-specific examples /2
In the second paragraph, however, it becomes fairly clear that they are primarily concerned about the "power and system rivalry between the USA and the PR China" as well as "democratic backsliding / democratic regression in parts of Southeast Asia" /3
Read 7 tweets
17 May
Have you ever wondered how the Chinese Communist Party's censorship regime works at home and abroad? What follows is a short thread 🧵 /1
The CCP's sharp power works with the help of the *simultaneous* use of carrots and sticks. In my book "The Struggle for Democracy in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong" I called the carrots rule by bribery and the sticks rule by fear /2
A key instrument is the psychological warfare technique of ‘decomposition’ (Zersetzung) against domestic and international opponents of the regime /3
Read 18 tweets
20 Apr
In today's @china_table Berthold Kuhn has published a very problematic response to my rebuttal of @ESandschneider op-ed. Instead of defending #academicfreedom against CCP censorship Kuhn criticises @merics_eu supposedly 'confrontational China attitude' /1 table.media/china/2021/04/…
Whereas in March 2021 European Research Institute Directors roundly denounced the CCP's sanctions against @merics_eu Berthold Kuhn suggests that 'young scientists and business experts in particular are more likely to refrain from working with Merics' /2 statement-china-sanctions.vercel.app
While I welcome robust public debates about the logic & limits of Magnitsky sanctions I am dismayed that Berthold Kuhn's discussion of the Chinese Communist Party's sanctions against @merics_eu isn't prefaced with an unequivocal defence of #AcademicFreedom and #FreedomOfSpeech /3
Read 15 tweets
6 Apr
My op-ed "The case for a paradigm shift in German China policy" has been published in @china_table. It is a response to @ESandschneider's critique of "China bashing" from 31 March 2021. What follows is a translation of my German-language article /1
table.media/china/2021/04/…
In my op-ed I argue that Sandschneider overlooks the totalitarian turn in China under Xi Jinping. His demands for dialogue and cooperation may sound plausible. However under the conditions of "Document No. 9" there can be no open-ended intercultural dialogue with China /2
When reading Sandschneider's op-ed I had a sense of déjà vu. In an article for APuZ in 2012 - at that time he was director of the German Council on Foreign Policy - he formulated a very similar criticism of a value-based German foreign policy /3
bpb.de/apuz/75784/deu…
Read 46 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(