Cooperation on trade remedies (duties to countervail subsidies, anti-dumping actions, safeguard tariffs), customs, monitoring, and responses to “non-market excess capacity”.
2. PROPOSED GLOBAL ARRANGEMENT to “restore market-oriented conditions”
• Others can join
• In 2 years
• Bring into international forums
• Limit market access for non-market-oriented/carbon-intense exporters
• Discipline, coordinate own policies
If arbitration proceeds (not before Oct 31 2022, after 30 days of consultation), it continues work already done in the formal dispute panel. Arbitrators will be the same panellists, if available
The US also to restore normal tariffs (scrap additional tariffs) on specific quantities of EU steel/aluminium—a tariff quota—quantities based on pre-2018 historic import volumes
• Market access—nothing on tariff cuts, only transparency on applied tariffs (rates actually applied, at or below legally bound rates in the WTO)
• Export restrictions—notifications, exempting World Food Programme purchases from restrictions
First, a transcript of a White House briefing, including:
• The size of the tariff quotas—still to be announced
• The start of talks on a deal focusing on carbon intensity in the metals
• Avoiding Chinese content in EU steel—“melt-and-pour”
@BobWolfeSPS and I remain sceptical that the Ministerial Conference will deliver much of significance out of the broad range of critical problems confronting the @wto
Russia’s trade policy review—Day 1, Oct 27. Day 2: today.
These are periodic peer-review sessions (every 5 years for Russia), based on reports from the @wto Secretariat (factual) and the government being reviewed.
Comments Day 1: > 40 members + 1 observer (Serbia)
Briefly:
POSITIVE—Russia is constructive in @wto and for the coming Ministerial Conference
NEGATIVE—Import substitution policies, the role of the state in Russian economy
2/15
US: recognises steps taken in @wto, but concerns about turning inward, contrary to the principles—non-discrimination, predictability, transparency, fair competition, under import substitution and forced localization.
Includes investment, IT, SPS, government procurement
Quite a long thread on the China’s public response to its @wto Trade Policy Review
Lots of detail including: 1. comments covered by WTO rules: China will take seriously and fulfill them, 2. comments beyond WTO rules: unfair, unreasonable, and unacceptable for China.
Here are two threads from @fbermingham on some of the comments members made and China’s response, inside the @wto trade policy review of China, on days 1 and 2.
3. The on-going friction over negotiations in a sub-group of only part of the membership (“#plurilateral” talks, officially “joint-statement initiatives”, JSIs, seen as a way to progress when the membership is deadlocked) versus objections.