Excited for @BabsonFinance seminar on a cool new paper by Hadlock, Jing Huang (E&Y), Paul Obermann (U Alabama) and Joshua Pierce (U Alabama)
New data on S&P1500 division mngrs matched to segment performance. Connect managers to their CEOs (schools, prior employers, social orgs)
New data on S&P1500 division mngrs matched to segment performance. Connect managers to their CEOs (schools, prior employers, social orgs)
https://twitter.com/BabsonFinance/status/1456608341594185746
Managers who are connected with the CEO:
• MUCH less likely to depart/more likely to get promoted
• No performance–dismissal sensitivity (it’s there for the unconnected)
• ≈ Same for hired vs. inherited connections!
Good for the shareholders? Hard to say but…
• MUCH less likely to depart/more likely to get promoted
• No performance–dismissal sensitivity (it’s there for the unconnected)
• ≈ Same for hired vs. inherited connections!
Good for the shareholders? Hard to say but…
…looks like this “friends-with-benefits” situation is bad:
• Outside labor market outcomes after departure much poorer for dismissed connected managers than unconnected (the “retread” market)
• Appointing connected managers not associated with performance improvements
• Outside labor market outcomes after departure much poorer for dismissed connected managers than unconnected (the “retread” market)
• Appointing connected managers not associated with performance improvements
Also learned about their other fun paper in @ILRReview on how rookie TT finance profs tend to publish if they're hired by co-nationals (spoiler alert: not well) vs. alums of their grad school (spoiler alert: well; access to private info?) journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.11…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
