How to grasp Eric Zemmour’s non-candidacy? This week for #FrenchFriday, @BlochAgneska and I highlight a new report from @j_jaures that analyzes his ideology, image, electorate, and where things might be headed. Some takeaways ⬇️ 1/14 jean-jaures.org/publication/le…
At the heart of @j_jaures report, the conviction that there is a need to take @ZemmourEric's (almost) candidacy seriously, especially at a time when many in the media, like Trump in his time, tend to take him literally but not seriously. Is Zemmour a bubble close to bursting? 2/
No, bc there is a deep ideology at the heart of his discourse. @MiloMLB and @PotierFred show his intellectual roots, from Drumont to Bainville to Maurras --- and how Zemmour doesn’t believe in politics, only in persecutions. To repress the demographic trends he abhors. 3/
As @finchelstein & @BriceTeinturier wrote for @lemondefr, 65% of Z’s voters are radical to very radical (vs 31% of French overall). Their primary worries are immigration (75%) & delinquency (51%). 21% are "worried," 10% "revolted," 9% "angry."4/ lemonde.fr/politique/arti…
Are we making too much out of him? asks @matsouq. Not really, because “Zemmourism” has deep roots. Populism has taken root in France, even before yellow vests/antivaxxers: 9 French out of 10 believe political leaders take decisions that go against the interests of the people. 5/
France tilts also increasingly to the right on immigration issues. Zemmour recipe is 1/3rd populist, 2/3rd ultra-nationalist : it might just work for him as it did for Trump. Especially as Marine Le Pen is lost credibility, even in her own camp. 6/
Of Z’s current ~16% support, 9pts come from MLP voters, 2 from Bertrand, 1 from Dupont-Aignan, 1 from Macron, and 2 from voters who didn’t intend to go to the polls/did not express any voting intention. (@A_Bristielle, @TristanGuerra & @victoria_grt discuss Z supporters too.) 7/
Compared to Le Pen and Bertrand voters esp, Z’s voters come from varied backgrounds: 13% of under 35s and 17% of 60+ support him. Support from those of upper and lower socio-professional status is similar (14 vs 16%). 8/
Zemmour is also singularly disliked. Among women – with a 6pt gender gap. Among the French too: 70% do not believe he has the makings of a President, 37pts behind Macron, 10 behind Le Pen. 57% of French are worried about Z, 71% think he tarnishes France’s international image. 9/
Remember, though that radicality, populism, ultra-nationalism only take you so far. Per @finchelstein & @BriceTeinturier, the French are just not as angry as they were in 2018. They are tired, longing for leadership and reform. Profound change. 10/
Can Zemmour be the personification of this change? For now, he is masterful at story-telling. @Raphael_llorca tells us Zemmour is campaigning “to the death”, both with words and with images – remember his stunt with the sniper? 12/
Zemmour is also launching a Netflix-style campaign, according to @Raphael_llorca, with the 3 elements of a good show: a main character with a simple and consistent personality, changes in rhythm, and suspense management.
A dark, sad show, to be sure. 13/
Zemmour has not declared his candidacy yet, but if @Raphel_llorca is right that his campaign is following the rhythm of a Netflix series, the current lull should be followed by a big announcement in no time. 14/14
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Earlier today, @POTUS met with French Prez @EmmanuelMacron at the French Embassy to Vatican. A highly anticipated meeting, a month and a half after infamous AUKUS spat, producing long joint statement. What’s the status of the FR-US relationship? Here, a thread. #FrenchFriday 1/
After France called AUKUS a “betrayal”&"stab in the back”, US quickly determined there was a need to fix the situation. Couldn’t afford a crisis of such magnitude with #OldestAlly. So Macron and Biden had decided on a process of “in-depth consultations” 2/ whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
Consultations have been taking place in a sustained way over the past month. Americans have indeed brought out the big guns – a succession of high-level US officials passed through Paris or met bilaterally with French counterparts, and a lot has been discussed. 3/
July 4th has come and gone, and, with it, all remaining illusions that travel will reopen between Europe and the US. As I have shared in this @washingtonpost article, this policy is only causing hardship. 1/
Since I started writing on the issue, European officials, as well as Europeans under travel ban, have repeatedly professed their faith that travel will reopen “soon,” that reciprocity is “around the corner,” that “Americans will realize the policy doesn’t make sense anymore.” 2/
“You’ll see, Joe Biden will announce it before his European tour in June.” He didn’t. “You know, Sec Blinken will address it when he visits Italy for G20.” He hasn’t. “Come on, Biden is just waiting for his own July 4th deadline, and then he will lift the ban”.
He. Did. Not.
3/
For the past few weeks, French politics have been colored in 50 shades of Right. A year ahead of the foretold presidential duel between Macron and Le Pen, France is already battling against some of the foulest aspects of nationalist politics. #FrenchFriday THREAD 1/
Squeezed between Macron’s LREM and Le Pen’s RN, Les Républicains (LR) are struggling to stake out their territory. With the regional elections approaching in June, negotiations are taking place at the local level to determine if and how to unite against the far right. 2/
LR Renaud Muselier, from the PACA region, negotiated a unity list with LREM, only to be rebuffed by his party and forced to renounce the idea. The pushback could lead LR to continue losing to LREM, although it is unclear which needs the other. 3/ lemonde.fr/politique/arti…
Yesterday French president Macron participated in an event in honor of the creation of the @AtlanticCouncil new Europe Center. A discussion with @benjaminhaddad packed with elements of Macron's doctrine - and some contrast to Biden's own foreign policy speech on the same day 1/
Macron insisted on the need for a "result-oriented multilateralism". In his view, Western powers have lost ground to China due to their inability to deliver results, including on vaccine. So, to regain credibility, making the multilateral system work is priority 2/
Biden doesn't talk about multilateralism, but about global cooperation to restore U.S. leadership. So the contrast is more a question of degree than nature: for the French, multilateralism should be inclusive to be efficient. The US wants to lead again. 3/
Les événements actuels sont sans précédents et dramatiques. Ayant épuisé les recours juridiques, Trump et ses avocats poussent des théories complotistes pour contester le résultat de l’élection et font pression sur les républicains locaux pour falsifier les résultats.
Trump met en œuvre le playbook décrit avec prescience par Barton Gellman dans the Atlantic en septembre theatlantic.com/magazine/archi…
Tous les observateurs politiques ainsi que le camp Biden s’accordent pour dire que leur tentative échouera. Mais le simple fait d’essayer est une évolution catastrophique pour la démocratie américaine.
Je lis ce matin la nouvelle note de @_Terra_Nova par @brunepoirson, intitulée « Pourquoi le trumpisme va survivre à Donald Trump ». Jusqu’au titre, on est d’accord.
Mais pour le reste, je suis en desaccord profond avec l’analyse. Un thread 👇
B. Poirson explique que les élites démocrates n’ont rien appris de la victoire de Trump en 2016. Après avoir «contribué à le porter au pouvoir», ils ne se seraient s’intéressé à ses electeurs. Les Dems continueraient d’opposer à Trump la «morale» au lieu d’idées ou un projet 2/
Biden ferait un "catéchisme aspirationnel" pour des elites dans "leur forteresse". Constat cinglant de B.Poirson : « Si Trump est détestable, l’attitude des démocrates et de l’élite américaine maintient bien vivant le terreau du trumpisme. Ils font vivre Trump malgré Trump."3/