Thread by @AliVaez

On the JCPOA, guarantees, and political realities: A thread 🧵👇

Let's start with one thing Tehran and many pro-JCPOA voices agree on - the Trump administration's unilateral withdrawal raises real & reasonable concerns regarding Washington's long-term commitment to an agreement.

2/ These concerns are made all the more credible when anti-JCPOA voices in DC are loudly and repeatedly threatening that in the event power changes hands under the next admin, they will work to renege on U.S. commitments just as Trump did.

https://twitter.com/tedcruz/status/1454897019055710209

3/ Result is presenting an immediate obstacle to talks, as Iran again insisting against possible Trumpian redux as a condition for rejoining deal now, & a medium-term obstacle to delivering sanx relief under a revived deal because of continued uncertainty.
reuters.com/business/energ…

4/ The latter is not an insignificant consideration. When @CrisisGroup surveyed business execs during the deal's full implementation, even the specter of U.S. sanctions returning was a key concern for engaging anew.
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…

5/ Over the course of previous 6 rounds of talks, Iranian negotiators were quite aware of what a U.S. admin could and could not guarantee. Going back to litigating what can/should/must be hashed out for future admin doesn't change these three core facts:

6/ (i) The Biden admin isn't spending time and effort to negotiate the JCPOA's revival just to leave it again so long as Iran remains in compliance.

7/ (ii) Saying that a treaty is a more stable arrangement is fine in principle but in practice: a) the Venn diagram between a deal that gets 67 votes and what Tehran could conceivably agree to does not overlap b) Still doesn't preclude an executive withdrawal.

8/ (iii) JCPOA critics in Washington apparently have no qualms about returning to a policy that resulted in Iran expanding its nuclear program. That they still argue for leaving the deal a second time defies logic after the experience of the past 3+ years, but there you go.

9/ Implications: If Tehran serious re reviving deal, have to be clear & honest on what is and isn't possible. If bottom line is open-ended guarantee, it's simply not on the cards. But do they want to tell Iranians they turned down sanctions relief because it wasn't perpetual?

10/ The only way Iran can get what it needs is to restore the JCPOA, and continue negotiations on a follow-on agreement with an strict exit clause, some relief from primary sanctions, and predetermined financial cost for any unwarranted western violations.

11/ A key point in 30 Oct E3/U.S. statement also needs to underscored by Washington & European allies: If deal is revived, economic benefits the deal envisions should be realized. And that requires good faith efforts from DC and elsewhere to facilitate legitimate trade.

12/ Finally, let's remember that the brilliant proposals of DC's Iran hawks are what got us here in the first place. Having spent half a decade promising a better deal, and only ended up delivered a bigger nuclear program. Repeating the line that "max pressure was working"...

13/13 Doesn't make it true. By every metric, Iran's nuclear program is more advanced & less transparent than it was pre-2018. If the "Bomb Mafia's" best case now is to chase unicorns a second time, it should be challenged based on a track record of clear and indisputable failure.