#Nigeria: ISWA images from their ambush of the relief convoy to Askira Uba, #Borno (Not the raid on the town itself)
Seems that the NA lost a Steyr 4K 7FA APC (w/ PK), Isotrex Phantom 2 APC (IED strike) & 12x AKM(S)/T56(-1) AKs, 3x PG-7V/VM projectiles, quantities of HMG ammo.
3 dead soldiers can be seen (as claimed from the ambush) as well as Brigadier General Dzarma Kennedy Zirkusu. Seems that ISWA also stripped a HMG (Usually W85/DShK) from the Phantom 2 before burning it, and took the 4K 7FA for later use.
ISWA Technical w/ NSV/M02 can be seen.
Your weekly reminder that ISWA (Lake Chad Area) are the only branch of the Islamic State worldwide known to operate heavy armour and artillery howitzers in 2021.
No other branch comes close since Spring 2018 when the Baghuz Pocket lost it's last hardware.
There are claims that the NA recaptured the APC. If it's the same one (seems rather likely), then it seems that IS took it to a local hide site for retransfer but didn't manage to keep it hidden from NA.
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Making a collection of my threads on #Afghanistan & IS-K; various people have asked for my opinion (not that it matters)& others seem to like Not-Analysis™️
1st: Thread in August when IS Khorasan was wakingup & people were weirdly expecting TB CT genius 👇
#Nigeria#Borno Capture from ISWA after a large attack (incl. an ambush on reinforcements) on the town of Askira Uba, including a fascinating semi-standardised armoured troop transport made by grafting armour from a Panhard VBL scout car (plus additional plate) onto a technical.
V. fascinating; represents current progression of the complexity of ISWA's Armoured Vehicle production, quite reminiscent of developments in Iraq/Syria. Isn't the 1st time- we saw a v. similar type recently- suggests they're producing a (limited) fleet.
Ofc, who can forget this up armoured vehicle back in late June. Suggests that (w/ possible IS-C engineering guidance) ISWA have made a sustained ability to produce improvised armoured vehicles with good reliability/speed from their considerable captures.
#Nigeria: ISWA released pics from an attack against CJTF/Police points in #Damboa, Borno.
By far the most interestingly it seems that the West Africa affiliate of the Islamic State is now the 2nd after Iraq/Syria to operate the 2A28 Grom 73mm cannon (from BMP-1) on a technical!
Plenty of other materiel seen (AKs/FN MAG/FAL/DShK(M)/PK etc) but another v. standout aspect is the use of an up armoured technical (Improvised troop carrier, essentially) to carry fighters into battle.
Another marker of the increasing technical/organisational progress of ISWA.
Having read the AP article again, I feel I should clarify this. I actually understand why the conclusion what it is; operators operated reasonably within the constraints of the process.
The reason this happened is because the entire process, both manned & unmanned, is broken.
This stuff was an issue in FATA in the mid 2000s, in Raqqa a few years ago, in 🇦🇫 for 20 years, we can go on and on. Indeed, often with these strikes the most reasonable conclusions were reached with the information available.
[THREAD] #Nigeria: ISIS released a video covering activities of ISWA in the Lake Chad region. It's entitled "Makers of Epic Battles 5", part of a series covering IS activity in various locales.
It shows attacks in #Borno & #Yobe, mostly from the 1st half of 2021.
Some notes👇
This propaganda can be observed to serve multiple purposes; a) To show to the global IS "Community" that the group remains strong over the world, b) For local audiences and to serve as a visual counter to constant NA-affilated claims that ISWA is about to collapse, weak, etc.
To that end, modern captures are very prominent in this video; an example is this speech by a commander, in which he holds an ex-Chadian Galil ACE 32 & Bulgarian GHO-1/2 & GHD-2/3 nades are in abundance. We also see Type 80 MG, AKM(S) & potent RHEF-7MA/RHEF-7LDMA RPG projectiles.
[THREAD] As a idiot and not as an Analyst™ I think that whilst it's important that emphasising that current IS activity in Afghanistan doesn't represent a sudden increase in capability; it's more important to consider a possible trajectory of the insurgency.
If what we see at present is the activation (and rejuvenation via hundreds of escapees) of preexisting Islamic State networks across the country; then it is obviously right to be fearful for the people of Afghanistan. That does not translate into a wider danger (yet).
If the question is just how sophisticated their insurgency can be, then we don't have to look far. These are the same people that carried out complex operations such as the Jalalabad Jailbreak in 2019, the PBIED in the Taliban funeral a few days ago, etc.