#Nigeria#Borno Capture from ISWA after a large attack (incl. an ambush on reinforcements) on the town of Askira Uba, including a fascinating semi-standardised armoured troop transport made by grafting armour from a Panhard VBL scout car (plus additional plate) onto a technical.
V. fascinating; represents current progression of the complexity of ISWA's Armoured Vehicle production, quite reminiscent of developments in Iraq/Syria. Isn't the 1st time- we saw a v. similar type recently- suggests they're producing a (limited) fleet.
Ofc, who can forget this up armoured vehicle back in late June. Suggests that (w/ possible IS-C engineering guidance) ISWA have made a sustained ability to produce improvised armoured vehicles with good reliability/speed from their considerable captures.
Back to Askira Uba, info is scarce & I prefer not to parrot unreliable pro NA accounts but it appears that ISWA overran the NA in the town and ambushed reinforcements from Chibok but were hit by invaluable NAF airstrikes after withdrawing. Hence, a couple of technicals were lost.
ISWA also lost a quantity of small arms that is consistent with ~2 technicals (& men) being hit by air (or ground) fire; W85 & Type 85 HMG, HK21[E] & 5x T56/AKM rifles.
I will await the ISWA claims/photosets and will update accordingly but by all account it was a serious raid.
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#Nigeria: ISWA released pics from an attack against CJTF/Police points in #Damboa, Borno.
By far the most interestingly it seems that the West Africa affiliate of the Islamic State is now the 2nd after Iraq/Syria to operate the 2A28 Grom 73mm cannon (from BMP-1) on a technical!
Plenty of other materiel seen (AKs/FN MAG/FAL/DShK(M)/PK etc) but another v. standout aspect is the use of an up armoured technical (Improvised troop carrier, essentially) to carry fighters into battle.
Another marker of the increasing technical/organisational progress of ISWA.
Having read the AP article again, I feel I should clarify this. I actually understand why the conclusion what it is; operators operated reasonably within the constraints of the process.
The reason this happened is because the entire process, both manned & unmanned, is broken.
This stuff was an issue in FATA in the mid 2000s, in Raqqa a few years ago, in 🇦🇫 for 20 years, we can go on and on. Indeed, often with these strikes the most reasonable conclusions were reached with the information available.
[THREAD] #Nigeria: ISIS released a video covering activities of ISWA in the Lake Chad region. It's entitled "Makers of Epic Battles 5", part of a series covering IS activity in various locales.
It shows attacks in #Borno & #Yobe, mostly from the 1st half of 2021.
Some notes👇
This propaganda can be observed to serve multiple purposes; a) To show to the global IS "Community" that the group remains strong over the world, b) For local audiences and to serve as a visual counter to constant NA-affilated claims that ISWA is about to collapse, weak, etc.
To that end, modern captures are very prominent in this video; an example is this speech by a commander, in which he holds an ex-Chadian Galil ACE 32 & Bulgarian GHO-1/2 & GHD-2/3 nades are in abundance. We also see Type 80 MG, AKM(S) & potent RHEF-7MA/RHEF-7LDMA RPG projectiles.
[THREAD] As a idiot and not as an Analyst™ I think that whilst it's important that emphasising that current IS activity in Afghanistan doesn't represent a sudden increase in capability; it's more important to consider a possible trajectory of the insurgency.
If what we see at present is the activation (and rejuvenation via hundreds of escapees) of preexisting Islamic State networks across the country; then it is obviously right to be fearful for the people of Afghanistan. That does not translate into a wider danger (yet).
If the question is just how sophisticated their insurgency can be, then we don't have to look far. These are the same people that carried out complex operations such as the Jalalabad Jailbreak in 2019, the PBIED in the Taliban funeral a few days ago, etc.
[THREAD] The Islamic State of Iraq released a new video entitled "So await; we are awaiting with you.", a reference to a line in Surah at Tawbah (Verse 52). A better title for it is "more of the same" as it is a showcase of typical IS tactics in 2020 & 21.
The video covers various attacks across Iraq from early 2020 until just last month. They're in all of IS' usual areas of operations; Diyala, Anbar, Salahuddin, North Baghdad, Kirkuk, etc. There is no major tactical shifts although I do note some interesting aspects.
In terms of small arms, it's all standard stuff- M16A4 & A2, along with M4 variants, are the favourites as ever, along with AK variants, PK(M), RPG-7/Type 69 (Uusually with PG-7VM, OG-7V, PG-7V, T69-1, etc), and a couple of bigger pieces. Mortars too, usually 60mm.
#Afghanistan: Whilst I still think that the TTP is more important than IS-K when it comes to discussion of the situation in/around Afg. in coming months, I think it's reasonable to consider what the group (may be) looking to do. A few notes of mine:
1: The Islamic State was totally aware that the Afghan Govt. was going to fall, as was everyone else except Biden and his sycophants. This is no obstacle to their operations, as the new Taliban state inherits the same structural liabilities.
2: The Taliban's "CT" abilities shouldn't be assumed to be superior to NDS & USG, and IS has been engaging in a slow burn asasssination campaign against Taliban commanders, particularly those responsible for the demolition of IS in 2019.