Thread by @VeliVirmajoki

I have been studying the future of science for 18 months now. In this thread, I will (slowly) list some of the insights gained thus far on the estimating of futures of science (EFS).

1. The goal of EFS is not so much to predict future discoveries and innovations as to (i) understand the structural features of the future, and (ii) critically engage with conceptions of science that shape the visions and actions for the future.

2. There are many interesting similarities between approaches in futures research and philosophy of science. For example, philosophy of science has provided insight similar to those provided by causal layered analysis (CLA).

There are different levels in our conceptions of science and the critical analysis of each level requires different approach. It is one thing to analyze Planck's principle ("science advances one funeral at a time"), it is another thing to engange with deep cultural stories.

3. To understand the possible futures of science, we have to both (i) cherish our current understanding of science and use it in scenario-building and (ii) distance ourselves from our received views.

Philosophy of science is a powerful tool for this. It has produced clear theories of different aspects of science but also critical discussion about the theories and the limits of of our epistemic predicaments in general.

A good example is scientific realism vs. pessimistic metainduction and unconveiced alternatives. There are powerful arguments for realism but also these challenges that should make us cautious towards epistemic optimism.

These debates have drawn upon historical evidence (or intepretation) and thereby suggested different ways of looking at the historical development of science. While the historical considerations are not decisive, they have value in themselves.

First, they provide novel or more detailed accounts of science and its development (disruptions vs. continuity, and so on).

Secondly, they have made us reflective on the second-order question of the nature of accounts of historical human phenomena such as science...

Are the accounts descriptive, normative, heuristic - or something in between? How can they be tested against the history (if at all)?

Questions such as these are of utmost importance for the goals of futures research.

This means that studying EFS does not only increases our understanding of science but also provides novel insight on the foundations of our thinking about human phenomena and their futures.

... to be continued.

4. It might appear that there is an ethical barrier for EFS. Perhaps the development of science should not be planned according to some presumed future, as
there are some seriously bad experiences about cases (e.g. Lysenkoism) ...

where science failed
because its presumed future was foretold. Polanyi argued that “Any attempt at guiding scientific research towards a purpose other than its own is an attempt to deflect it from the advancement of
science” (1962, 62)

Merton famously alarmed us about planning the future of science: “Science must not suffer itself to become the handmaiden of theology or economy or state. The function of this sentiment is likewise to preserve the autonomy of science...

[--] In other words, as the pure science sentiment is eliminated, science becomes subject to the direct control of other institutional agencies and its place in society becomes increasingly uncertain.” (1968, 597)

Here we should note that ethical decision-making and work towards desirable futures are possible only if we
understand the causal role of decisions within the patterns of development.

The study of patterns of development of the future of science does not preclude decision making but makes it possible. Only if we understand the causal network where decisions are made, we can understand the consequences of those decisions.

For example, sometimes we “try to ‘force’ nature into ‘boxes;' but nature resists” (Godfrey-Smith 2003, 177) and the consequences of the resistance can be harmful when the decisions do not receive an adequate reality check, like in the case of Lysenkoism.

It is, of course, a major question how the resistance and other related issues in the development of science
should be understood and conceptualized. Nevertheless, it is obvious that there are limitations to our ability to simply decide the future of science.

The study of estimating futures of science is needed to make those limitations clear. We should neither exaggarate nor understate our ability to decide the future. In the between exists ethically sound strategies.

#science #future #philsci #ethics #futuresresearch

5. A more subtle ethical question concerning the EFS is how to study desirable futures of science. In order to make decisions, we have to be able to identify the desirability of a possible future.

The problem is that our values and needs change. What we value/find significant in science might change as the world surrounding science changes.

In general, the future of values (axiological futurism) has not received enough philosophical attention.

Again, the answer partly depends on our conceptions of science. Different takes on the questions of how science works and what it achieves provide the backbone of the answer.

Still, there is a gap between (i) how science now works and why we value it, and (ii) how science should work and what we value in the future.

Notice that "how science works" may refer to things in many levels, e.g. institutional workings vs. most general epistemic concerns...

Different levels of science probably change in different pace and may be under our control in different degrees. This increases the complexity of getting from what exists today to what is desirable in the future.

It seems that only way to approach the issue is to attempt to balance our current values with possible future changes. A desirable future can neither be imagined from scratch nor be a mere projection of our current preferences.

Only one thing is for sure: If we do not understand deeply science and its history, our visions of desirable (or undesirable) futures will be mere mirages without adequate reality check. Here philosophy of science and science studies are of utmost importance for #future. #philsci

6. While philosophy of science has challenged conventional views of science, it has also produced metalevel arguments concerning the limits of our ability to distance ourselves from the present science.

First, in the inevitability vs. contingency issue, it has been suggested that, in order to really know whether there could be successful alternative science, one should build one. This is known as the “put up or shut up” argument. The obvious problem with this ...

argument is that establishing a scientific tradition requires enormous resources. The lack of alternative science might not tell us anything about the plausibility of the alternatives but only about the allocation of resources.

Secondly, there is a strong argument, known as “the problem of unconceived alternatives”, by Kyle Stanford, that we simply are not able to conceive alternative theories to those we have at any given point of time. The argument has also later been generalized by Rowbottom.

I have discussed unconceived alternatives from the perspective of the future of science and futures researrch blogit.utu.fi/futuresofscien…

Thirdly, Tambolo (2020) has pointed out that even counterfactual histories may not be able to distance us from the present science. Tambolo argues that “In the case of general history, it is often possible to imagine a consequent dramatically different from actual history, ...

and yet plausible; in the case of history of science, imagining outcomes far removed from the results of actual science seems more complicated”. The problem is that, in order to construct a counterfactual narrative, we need knowledge of how the world works. Given that the ...

science provides this knowledge, the present science leaks into the counterfactual narratives thus shaping their direction towards the present state of science.

I have discussed the issue here blogit.utu.fi/futuresofscien…

It follows that, while the philosophy of science can distance us from the current science, there might be general limitations to the ability to make the present remarkable. However, we should not be demoralized by this. Rather, the arguments should be seen as a crucial ...

methodological insight: Even if we cannot (in some cases) distance ourselves from the present world, it does not follow that the present world is inevitable and the only possibility. Rather, the present might look inevitable only because we do not have the tools to think it away.

I have discussed axiological futures here blogit.utu.fi/futuresofscien…

The distancing and its limits also has interesting connections with causal layered analysis in futures research. "Distance" belongs to the so-called poststructural toolbox. This exemplifies the fruitful similarities between #philsci and #futuresresearch.

#future #science

7. Some of the most explicit (or even radical) suggestions concerning the future of science are often rather sweeping. While based on the idea of plurality and historical change of science, they still build on some notions of what science in general is like. This is a problem.

Scientific practices consist of an intertwined web of theories, models, concepts, ontological assumptions, values, methods, instruments, means of communication, and so on. The nature of the different items on the list varies between different periods and different sciences.

The complexity and heterogeneity that characterize science and its history are difficult to tame intellectually and the first step towards the management of the complexity should be acknowledging it.

Still, the idea of a “modern science” as some sort of a monolith dominates the scattered debates on the future of science.

For example, in their classical work, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) treat what they call “normal science” as a monolith that will be challenged by another understanding of what science is. This is called “post-normal science”.

The characterization has two problems that are common in the discussions about science. First, it is based on one conception of science, a Kuhnian one. Secondly, it simplifies the conception in order to provide a straightforward vision for the future.

It is difficult to understand what kind of alternative future the concept of #postnormal #science constructs when its basic conception of actual science is simplified and unchallenged by alternative conceptions.

Given these difficulties, it might be that the whole enormous discourse about post-normal science is built upon challenging science that never existed and modifying a conception that was never held.

At least, we would need subtler distinctions between different sciences and different levels of science in order to understand the implications of post-normal science and the contrast between it and previous science. #future #futureofscience

A tendency to provide sweeping claims about science is something that often characterizes especially critical stances towards to current science and the world it is embedded in. This is a shame. The criticism loses its bite if it cannot compete with more detailed pictures...

provided by those who already have institutional power.

It is weird that, whereas historiography of science is charazterized by almost excessive detail, specification, and contextualization, very little of this has carried on our futures-thinking.

#philsci #historyofscience

8. There are many problems in estimating the futures of science. Two of them are the most fundamental:

First, the main argument against EFS stems from the idea that important scientific results involve conceptual innovations that cannot be predicted: ...

if we could predict those conceptual innovations, we would already have the new conceptual apparatus, which is a contradiction.

A related problem is that we need to use our current (scientific) knowledge to estimate the future. However, the EFS is based on the idea that ...

science might change. What is more, we cannot just bypass the possibility of a different science as a fact of our fallibilistic life because that possibility is the very subject we are interested in. #prediction #innovation #science

Secondly, there might be facts about the universe and our methods that limit what is possible for us to know. There might exist things and mechanisms in the universe that are such that we cannot know them due to the way these things and mechanisms are structured and distributed

For example, the properties of the Higgs boson are such that its discovery required certain kind of technology. Had that technology not been produced, scientists would not have discovered the boson.

In a sense, the scientists (and the whole society) were lucky enough not to quit before building the Large Hadron Collider.

It is interesting to notice that even though we might have theoretical reasons to believe that something could be discovered, ...

we might still be unable to estimate whether that something will be discovered because we do not know whether the universe is such that it allows the right kind of causal connection between us and that something.

Here the problem is not about the relationship between two conceptual systems but about the contingent causal relationship between us and the universe.

This two problems reflect roughly two poles of constructivism-realism spectrum about our knowledge. Those who underline the role of our epistemic systems in producing pictures of reality might see the first problem more fundamental...

whereas those who underline the influence of the world on our pictures of reality might see the second problem more fundamental.

That the constructivism-realism issue rises in EFS in not a surprise, given how fundamental philosophical issue it is.

#philsci #future #science

9. The fundamental problems of EFS force us to ask the awkward question whether there is any point of estimating the future, given the constant failures in the task. A common accusation against the building of future scenarios is that those scenarios often go wrong.

Three common responses:

(i) Our choices affect the future and sometimes the fact that a scenario did not actualize can be a good sign. If we are able to avoid an undesirable scenario, we have made the right decisions.

(ii) The future depends on so many factors that it is natural that we sometimes fail to understand it. Rather that predicting the future, we should exhaust the space of possibilities as far as we can.

(iii) Failures come in different scales. It is one thing to fail to predict that in 2020 a pandemic takes hold, but another to fail to understand the likeliness of a pandemic at some point of the (near) future.

These responses are all well known. Whether or not we consider the creation of future scenarios as worthwhile practice depends on how strong these responses are, given the problem at hand. The debate over the value of professional future scenarios continues.

However, the problem of failures can be turned upside-down. Rather than concluding that futures research is inferior to other fields, we should ask what the constant failures tell us about other fields.

For example, one could argue that all knowledge, no matter what the field, is based on ideas of how the world works. If we understand some domain, we know how the domain works. If we really know this much, how can we fail to estimate the future?

It seems that our failures to estimate the future radiate through the epistemic justification in many other fields as well. It might be unfair to pinpoint the failures on futures research who alone has the courage to fully engage with the future.

We could also ask whether the failures of estimating the future are really more common than failures to describe and understand other phenomena, especially historical phenomena.

Our accounts of historical events and processes often improve over time. We may even come to consider as false some previous account.

The difference between historiography and futures research seem to stem from the fact that we move away from the past but towards the future.

This has two consequences. First, we do not have unlimited amount of time to study a feature of the future before the future is here. However, there is no such restriction for the study of the past.

Secondly, we will face the reality that futures research studies but we will never face the past. We have no historiography-independent way of counting the amount of failures to capture the past. It is easy to appear humble when the commitments are blurred.

Our failures to understand the past are less obvious than our failures to estimate the future. Yet, this is hardly a reason to give up estimating the future or explaining the past.

There are many problems in estimating the future but we should not make sweeping claims about the (relative) severity of these problems on the basis of failures. Rather, we should make a detailed investigation concerning the source of the problems.

Moreover, the problems in our knowledge of the past, the future and their connection should not lead to the denial of the value of the ideal of achieving such knowledge.

It is quite astonishing that some people think that, because we fail so often, the humble thing to do is to define the goodness of a scholarly result with respect to our knowledge rather than reality. To me, this appears more cowardly than humble.

What our knowledge tells about the future might be all wrong but so what? We can never know the future if we do not take all the potentially relevant considerations into account.

It is far from obvious that avoiding errors is the right thing to do

Refusing to discuss the future because of the errors is like committing suicide in the fear of death.

Read more

blogit.utu.fi/futuresofscien…

#philsci #future #futuresresearch #history #historiography

10. There has been discussion about the relevance of historians’ “toolkit of thinking” in futures studies. In order to understand the possible connections between historiography and futures studies, the claims made about historiographical toolkit must be critically examined.

Counterfactual thinking is a case that has been discussed. Unfortunately, the ideas presented in some futures research writings on the topic are misleading.

David J. Staley (2002) has argued that important questions in historiographical analysis require that we study and track counterfactual histories, i.e. histories that did not happen but would have happened, had some historical event or process been different. [I share this view].

Staley claims that the basic strategies that are used in tracking counterfactual histories can be used in scenario building: if we are able to track alternative histories, we are also able to track alternative futures.

However, counterfactual histories have often been criticized as mere speculation and there exists a genuine question of what makes a counterfactual scenario plausible. We cannot have evidence of counterfactual scenarios (because, by definition, they did not happen).

If we are not able to distinguish between plausible and far-fetched counterfactual scenarios, there is little hope that we are able to distinguish between plausible and far-fetched future scenarios on the basis of historiographical toolkit.

Therefore, Staley asks “But how does the historian determine which alternatives are plausible, when one could imagine an infinite number of different scenarios?”. (2002, 85.)

Staley cites a suggestion by Niall Ferguson: “The answer to the question is very simple: We should consider as plausible or probable only those alternatives which we can show on the basis of contemporary evidence that contemporaries actually considered.” (1997, 86.)

Staley is not alone with his view that Ferguson’s approach is able to define plausible historical scenarios and to connect futures studies and historiography. Alix Green has also argued that “This [approach] makes counterfactuals and scenarios ontologically similar” (2012, 175).

In my view, there are fundamental problems in the suggestion that plausible counterfactuals are identical with Ferguson-style counterfactuals (let’s call them “f-counterfactuals”).

That some historical agents thought some scenario S to be possible (or plausible) is neither necessary nor sufficient for S to be possible (or plausible).

At the end of the 19th century, fundamental changes in physics were not considered as plausible (not necessary), and it was thought as a plausible scenario that physics would improve only in a piecemeal manner (not sufficient).

If scenarios and counterfactuals (in Ferguson’s sense) are “ontologically” similar, then the value of scenario-work in analyzing the possible futures is not obvious, given the problems In f-counterfactuals.

Are there reasons to believe that scenarios and f-counterfactuals are similar? At the first glance, it seems that there might be.

Both scenario-work and f-counterfactuals are based on what someone thinks as possible: in the case of scenarios, the relevant agent is us and, in the case of f-counterfactuals, historical actors.

However, scenarios and f-counterfactuals are not epistemologically identical: What people at certain point of time thought was possible was usually not based on systematic analysis in the same way as scenario-work is.

The whole point of scenario-work being that the futures are analyzed more reflectively). If plausible future scenarios were defined by what we happen to consider as possible, then there would be not point of improving our understanding of the future.

No matter how lazy we were, we would always know, by definition, the most plausible futures.

What makes a counterfactual or future scenarios plausible does not depend on what some actors happen to think but on how the world works.

Understanding counterfactual thinking in history can be highly relevant for futures research but we should not lure ourselves to think that historiographical counterfactuals are easy.

We cannot take a short-cut into future scenarios by looking at historiographical counterfactual-building as it is no more transparent what good historiographical counterfactual analysis consist of than what good scenario-building consists of.

Understanding counterfactuals are extremely important in the case of future of science because many important philosophical debates about science have counterfactuals in their structure (e.g. contingency vs. inevitability).

If there is a intimate connection between historiographical counterfactuals and possible futures, then we could translate these debates to future-oriented insights in EFS.

11. The present state of the world reinforces its hegemony and continuity through multiple conceptual and epistemological mechanisms.

Formulating future scenarios and visioning alternative futures require that one is able to conceive and reason about states of affairs that differ from the current state. The question is usually how to systematically formulate and identify relevant and plausible scenarios.

It is actually remarkable that the underlying ability to conceive and reason about possible futures is often taken for granted, and the main questions concerns how to tease out, resource, and encourage the ability – methodological concerns.

There have also been warnings about the ethical problems in creating scenarios for alternative futures that are not adequately connected to the lived situations that shape the future – ethical concerns.

The common theme is that our ability to conceive alternative futures might be used insufficiently or in an excessive manner.

The problem with these discourses is that it is unclear to what degree we in fact have the ability to conceive alternative states of affairs. Philosophy of science suggests that there are serious limitations to this ability.

First, the *problem of unconceived alternatives* suggests that there are historical reasons to believe that science has alternatives that we cannot conceive.

There are conceptual, methodological and institutional reasons for our failure to consider relevant alternatives, at least in science.

If such failures occur in science, then they probably occur also elsewhere. It is difficult to believe that some area of life, such as politics, would be more able to exhaust the space of possibilities.

Secondly, it has been argued that there are epistemic limitations in our ability to see how science could have developed differently. All what-if speculations seem to converge towards the actual state of the world.

This is due to the fact that our current knowledge and conceptions guide the counterfactual what-if narratives towards the actual state. The plausibility of a narrative is judged in the light of our current knowledge and conceptions because that is all we really have.

For the same reason, it might be that plausible future scenarios are anchored, by epistemic and conceptual force, in the continuity of the current state of the world. After all, other pasts and alternative futures are our symmetrical creations.

Thirdly, it has been argued that we can never convince ourselves that things could be differently until they actually are differently. Until then, the alternatives can be dismissed as mere speculation. We can always question whether an alternative is a *genuine one*.

In science, this leads to a circle where the current state reinforces itself. Given that there are no genuine alternatives, the current state seems justified. Given that it is justified, there is no need to allocate resources to alternatives…

... Given that there are no resources for alternatives, they cannot be shown to be genuine. In this way, the current state of affairs smoothly reinforces its own hegemony through epistemic mechanism.

In sum, our ability to conceive and reason about possibilities has been historically limited. It is also limited by our ability to make sense of the history from the present point of view.

The underlying problem is that we trapped in our conceptual, epistemic, and institutional predicaments. Our understanding of possibilities are limited by them. Historical conciderations make this theme visible, but it is not unique to our gaze at history.

There are many mechanisms by which the present state of the world reinforces its own hegemony, continuity, and inevitability. Both with respect to past and with respect to future.