2/ The pledging summits began in 2014 and have significantly increased the capabilities registered in the UN's🇺🇳 strategic force generation system: the #Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System pcrs.un.org/SitePages/Home…
3/ Ideally, the UN🇺🇳 wants it Member States to offer capabilities that are most in demand in its #PeaceOperations and to fill capability gaps in existing missions. Here's the pledging guide for the 2021 ministerial peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/…
4/ The pledging meetings enable 🇺🇳 Member States to discuss key #peacekeeping issues of the day, but they've also become a useful tool for civil society groups to advocate for national commitment to @UNPeacekeeping🇺🇳 Here's an example from 🇺🇸
5/ Although the UN🇺🇳 hasn't established a new #peacekeeping operation since #MINUSCA🇺🇳🇨🇫 in 2014, personnel & assets are constantly rotating in/out of the existing missions. Force generation is a perpetual & complex job; hence the need for updated pledges. pcrs.un.org/Lists/Resource…
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The latest round of serious fighting in #Somalia🇸🇴, finally sees the FGS going after its no.1 enemy: #AlShabaab.*
*Of course not, the FGS is fighting ASWJ, a longstanding religious-inspired militia that has resisted #AlShabaab pretty effectively since at least 2008. 😒
Meanwhile, the UN🇺🇳 Panel of Experts on #Somalia🇸🇴 recorded 1,047 #AlShabaab attacks on #SNA🇸🇴 & international targets over 9 months: 16/12/20-6/9/21. They were mainly hit & run attacks with few designed to hold or capture towns or overrun military bases. reliefweb.int/report/somalia…
1/ The UN🇺🇳 & @_AfricanUnion🟩 have now both conducted "independent" assessments of how best to provide international support to #Somalia🇸🇴 after 2021. The 🇺🇳 team recommended continuing with a reconfigured @amisomsomalia, the AU🟩 team a hybrid AU-UN multidimensional mission.
2/ The AU🟩 team's envisaged AU-led-UN-hybrid mission (AU-UNMIS) would be 50% police (IPOs + FPUs), 35% military, 15% civilian personnel with expanded political powers for the head (Joint🇺🇳🟩 Special Representative). Overall personnel numbers r unspecified.
3/ The @AUC_PAPS appears to want the hybrid AU-UNMIS to be comprised of only #African personnel but financed💰 entirely by the UN's🇺🇳 assessed peacekeeping contributions. I was unclear about the logistics & mission support model the AU🟩 team envisage.
1/ What military options are available if you’ve got a nasty insurgency attacking parts of your country & citizens? If you're, say, #Mozambique🇲🇿, it turns out the menu of potential options is quite large. Of course, they might not work but here’s the menu as I see it...
2/ In no particular order. Option 1: #Mozambique🇲🇿 could handle its insurgency alone with its own national security forces.
3/ Option 2: #Mozambique🇲🇿 could supplement its national security forces with bilateral security force assistance #SFA programs from other states e.g. 🇺🇸🇫🇷🇵🇹 etc. Training, equipping, advising, maybe field mentoring etc.
1/ It's fair to say @UNPeacekeeping🇺🇳 is currently in a financial crisis caused largely but not solely by the 🇺🇸 Trump administration. Here's a thread explaining the state of play undocs.org/a/73/809
2/ First a caveat: the numbers fluctuate regularly so what follows are just snapshots. @UNPeacekeeping & its troop- & police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) are reimbursed after the fact. Here's an explainer of how it works via @ipinstGOtheglobalobservatory.org/2018/10/in-us-…
3/ When UN Member States don't pay their @UNPeacekeeping dues in full and on-time it hurts 1) T/PCCs; 2) mission effectiveness in the field; and 3) the reputation of the UN's🇺🇳 general effective system for financing #PeaceOperations.
3/ For information-environment context, photos of the damage caused by the mortar attack was already circulating on Twitter when @amisomsomalia posted its Tweet. Here’s an example: