1) Okay, an interesting proposal that obviously one has to caveat with the obligatory point that the @RoyalNavy & @RoyalMarines particularly, have, in fact, been training annually in the Arctic for years.*
*Okay, one doesn't actually *have* to, but I'm going to do it anyway😂
2) However, it's not just the @RoyalNavy & @RoyalMarines who can & do operate there, indeed the @RoyalAirForce is already busy lifting & shifting @BritishArmy@ArmyAirCorps Apache gunships (among much else), to Norway for the annual Exercise Clockwork 2022.
3) While, earlier this year, the @RoyalAirForce were testing new tactical refuelling capabilities to enable rapid deployment of Typhoon strike fighters to Norway.
5) However, there are a few questions that need to be asked here, for example what might be available to "develop a force that can rapidly deploy to -40C", beyond, presumably, those mentioned that already basically can?
6) The @BritishArmy would seem to be the prime candidate here, but it is taking yet another cut in numbers, & reportedly will currently struggle to field a full division, at least for the next few years.
7) Additionally the @BritishArmy is also about to lose a significant portion of its heavy armour, all of its tracked Armoured Personnel Carriers, has & other problems in vehicle procurement.
8) Together, these might suggest the need for a choice to be made regarding the direction of Britain's @NATO commitments, & in some respects the vehicle problems might even be construed as an opportunity to reconfigure to the requirements of the Arctic & Scandinavian littorals.
8) This seems unlikely however, given the @BritishArmy has also just essentially been recommitted to Germany, which, as the site of it's principal Euopean land "hub", would presumaby be the site of its main force in any major European War.
9) Plus, of course, the Germany "hub" & forces in central Europe can & will be heavily served by Europe's excellent rail system, while a commitment to Norway would require sea & air lift, the latter of which has just been cut by 1/3rd for financial reasons committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/2…
10) In any case, such a move would also be somewhat politically fraught, with both domestic & allied concerns almost certainly being aired about Britain "relegating" itself from what is still perceived to be @NATO's "main" continental front, to a comparative, maritime periphery.
11) As a consequence, on current budgets, while Norway & the High North are strategically vital & support for them is to be applauded, it's difficult to see what more Britain might be able to rapidly deploy to the region, beyond current levels, without serious risk of overstretch
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@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 Okay, if I may have a go at breaking down @RoryStewartUK's account in the piece there: 1) He is absolutely correct in his assertion that the rapid departure of US air power and technical support has had a catastrophic effect. I don't think anybody sensible is questioning that.
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 2) Likewise I don't think anybody would particularly quibble with the fact that this was a comparatively small commitment with few (as @PatPorter76 correctly points out, injuries do still count) casualties, & under little domestic political pressure *at current levels* (& this...
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 bit is critical). 3) The point at which his account runs into a fatal problem is the following, & that is that the war is considerably wider than the West's current military commitment. He correctly asks "who exactly, who is President Biden asking to fight?" & then unfortunately
A point from the Integrated Review that seems to have attracted little attention, but *might* be one of the most interesting moves of all is the "strategic hubs", which will be key to being "persistently engaged worldwide through forward deployment" (p. 73)gov.uk/government/pub…
For any talk of agility/mobility/etc., these hubs & whatever they comprise will form the "foundations" - the geography of any overseas strategy. Some of these hubs appear, in some respects, obvious & are based on pre-existing facilities.
For example, although the bulk of British forces left Germany in February 2020, the remnants at @BritishArmyDEU would seem a solid place to start with what is likely to be a predominantly land-based, continued commitment to @NATO & the defence of continental Europe.
With the announcement in this @BBCNews piece by @bealejonathan, that the @RoyalNavy is to receive a new "Multi Role Ocean Surveillance ship", to be in service by 20204, it's perhaps time for a little speculative #thread🧵(apologies, as always in advance😉) bbc.co.uk/news/uk-564726…
1st up, this isn't the first we've heard of something like this. Elements of the @RoyalNavy's survey squadron are approaching replacement point, most particularly @HMSScottRN which is currently scheduled to go in 2022, but @HMS_Echo & @HMSEnterprise are similarly due around 2028
The form & purpose of this new vessel would appear to be different, however, with a new emphasis on undersea cables. This isn't actually the 1st we've heard of this either as @AdmTonyRadakin raised it at Christmas (4.06 H/T this & much else to @NavyLookout)
On this day 1941, the @RoyalNavy's Force H under V/Adm Sir James Somerville, aboard the battlecruiser HMS Renown, with the battleship HMS Malaya, aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal & cruiser HMS Sheffield, arrived off the Italian port of Genoa & opened fire #WW2
Just a week before, Force H had attempted to breach the enormous Santa Chiara dam on Sardinia’s Tirso River (two years before the famous attack by @RoyalAirForce's @OC617Sqn), using torpedoes dropped by @RoyalNavy Fairey Swordfish from 810 NAS aboard HMS Ark Royal.
Led by Lt/Cdr Mervyn ‘Johnnie’ Johnstone, this spectacular attack on one of Europe's biggest dams was unsuccessful, thwarted by a combination of foul weather, Italian AA fire & what was believed to be an unexpected sandbank that grounded the torpedoes before they hit the dam wall
A couple of interesting historically-based @WarOnTheRocks holiday pieces: 1) @david_alman arguing that the @USNavy (&, realistically, other Western navies too), need to regain both the art & the structure to escort merchant ship convoys, a'la the #WW2#BattleOfTheAtlantic
2) A not entirely unrelated piece in which Christopher Booth looks back the the fabled "Shetland Bus Service" of fishing boats, that SOE used to help keep the Norwegian resistance going, as an example for supplying some future operations in the Pacific warontherocks.com/2020/12/the-mo…
Interestingly, Christopher Booth also has a @NavalInstitute Proceedings piece suggesting the US should consider bringing back amphibious aircraft, also for operations on Pacific islands (which historically was more the #WW2 SOE model in the Far East) (£) usni.org/magazines/proc…
On this day 1940 the German heavy cruiser Hipper, commanded by Cpt Wilhelm Meisel, began an attack on the large, Allied troop convoy WS5A, 800 miles west of Cape Finisterre.
Opening fire at 0838 Hipper's first targets were the HMT Empire Trooper & the SS Arabistan hitting both.
First to come to the aid of the two merchantmen was the small, Flower Class corvette HMS Clematis, whose Captain, Cdr York Cleeves, though obscenely outmatched by Meisel's Hipper, turned his vessel to fight, with its single, 4in gun.
Unbeknown to Capt Meisel, however, due to its importance, WS5A was already extremely well escorted, & just two minutes later, the largest of the three cruisers with the convoy, HMS Berwick, which matched Hipper in speed & eight 8in guns appeared through the squalls & opened fire.