Take the 'mean-median gap', maybe the very simplest measure of whether a party will struggle to translate their popular majority into a congressional majority.
Across the 241 districts drawn so far, the mean-median gap is 0.00, down from R+2.4 in these same states in 2020 pres.
So, to this point, the map is not simply 'not as bad' for Democrats as feared. The first 241 districts so far are basically fair, thanks to a mix of both Democratic and Republican gerrymandering cancelling the other out
A little less abstractly: the new districts were Biden 135, Trump 106 in 2020. On the old map, it was Biden 131, Trump 108.
With respect to the national vote, the new districts have 127 leaning left to 114 leaning right; before it was 121 to 118. (the completed states tilt D)
From there there's still a ton of uncertainty: Dems have a huge opportunity in NY. A commission will help in MI. They have opportunities to undo a GOP edge in NC/OH state courts.
The GOP OTOH has opportunities in GA, FL, TN, MO, KY.
So there's a ton of moving pieces left
Georgia's new map, which is expected to finalize soon, alone will be enough to create a mean-median gap of R+.6.
So there's a long way to go.
And similarly, the mean-median gap was R+.6 before CA finished up. This bounces around a lot, and when one side puts together a string of good news in a row things can quickly look different.
And some good Democratic opportunities v. 2010, like Michigan, can wind up adding to their mean-median gap in '20.
If Michigan adopts the Chesnut plan, it'll help the Democrats v. 2010 but, along with GA, would give the GOP a R+1.1 mean-median gap nationwide
(i believe this is true of basically all of the michigan plans; chestnut is just the one i've had downloaded as a placeholder)
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I think this piece is broadly right, but a lot of what looks like a huge surprise in redistricting comes from two separate measures of the effect of redistricting: change in party control v. change in PVI nymag.com/intelligencer/…
Take NV. It had a 3-1 Dem delegation in '20; it will have a 3-1 map in '21. No change, as expected before redistricting.
But the districts got quite a bit stronger for Democrats.
In '20, it was 3-1 to the right of the national vote, now it's 3-1 to the left.
Before redistricting, most of the analysis was done in terms of that former measure--expected seat flips.
Now that we have actual districts, most of the analysis is being done with the latter.
I think there's a lot to agree with here, especially if you're still optimistic about BBB's prospects.
The better question is why it feels that Biden's accomplished so little theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
The rescue package really stands out for me in that regard. Doesn't really feel like Biden/Democrats already spent $2tn in party line spending this year, does it?
I don't remember the backstory on why the CTC wasn't made permanent at that point, but that's an example of how it could have done more. Or maybe they could have gotten paid leave in there (framed as making sure people can take off work if they test positive)
Obviously we'll see soon enough, but are we 100.0% convinced Manchin just killed BBB? His statement led with "cannot vote to continue," which sounds like whether to start debate on the current bill (which he was against).
Now, he used some really strong "can't get there" language--so maybe it's the whole thing, not just the House blueprint. But you can also construe his comments to still allow for, say, 1.7bn over 10 years with fully funded programs, as he's implied before. Worth clarifying
After all, he later leveled his long-standing critique of the House bill: it didn't fully fund programs, but instead partially funded a bunch of things.
Perhaps it still leaves the door open for fully funded/prioritized bill, as he's argued over and over
From a political standpoint, it seems increasingly likely that the main consequence of omicron will be to accelerate the end of the coronavirus crisis/state of emergency
Yes, the short-term effect is a wave of cases, which may or may not increase in hospitalization/deaths (depending on how the lower severity x higher transmissibility equation sorts out).
But even assuming there is a wave of hospitalizations/death, this will be a changed pandemic.
There won't be a fantasy of crushing a highly transmissible variant with the ability to evade vaccines. And at the same time, the risks may seem more acceptable, due to diminished severity, growing immunity and improved treatment options
A really staggering share of the replies (*on twitter*, though conspicuously not on any other channel) essentially just assert that the media is singularly responsible for Biden's low approval rating
As best I can tell, this is founded on two basic arguments: 1) Many economic indicators (growth, unemployment) are good, inflation isn't especially bad, therefore perceptions of a bad economy must be driven by poor reporting and an unfair narrative
2) Biden's policies are popular, voters do/should judge policies based on policy, and therefore Biden's inability to claim credit for his popular policies reflects a media failure to give sufficient attention to the substance of his agenda
A few thoughts on the disconnect between Biden's popular policies and his personal unpopularity nytimes.com/2021/11/27/us/…
TLDR... I think it is worth fully internalizing the century-long pattern of voters a) rewarding parties for presiding over peace/prosperity; b) punishing presidents for enacting ambitious agenda.
The obvious implication: a popular, ambitious policy agenda doesn't do you much good if there isn't normalcy/peace/prosperity, especially if that agenda is not seen as attempting to respond to immediate challenges at hand