Some theory-driven and comparative thoughts on violence, geography, and political regime in #Kazakhstan uprising. There is no actual "youth bulge", it's not from the peripheries to the capital, the "authoritarian modernization" is overrated.
The Kazakhstan uprising very quickly escalated to violence in comparison with most other post-Soviet revolutions. The younger is the population, the likelier is political violence in the country. The median age in Kazakhstan - 32. In Russia, Ukraine, Belarus: 40-41.
But Kazakhstan is younger because of the kids under 14, not because of the "youth bulge" of 15-24 - a large number of frustrated youth of the "combat age" without jobs and career prospects fitting their ambitions - one of the key factors in revolutions and violent uprisings.
Like other post-Soviet states, Central Asia suffered a sharp decline in birth rates in the 1990s and only later did they return back to the rates of the booming 80s generation. This is an important difference from the Arabic countries in 2011 with over 50% of the population <25.
Demography may have something to do with predominant nonviolence in Belarusian, Ukrainian, Russian protests. But it does not make the violence of the Kazakh uprising self-evident. I would be attentive to the role of organized violent groups.
In the "European" part of ex-USSR, the most intense revolutionary events happened in the capitals (with an exception of Ukr. where the uprising in the West was no less important than Kiev events but the protests in the capital were certainly the largest). journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.11…
However, the Kazakh uprising is not really along with the "Third World" model - revolting "periphery" and mostly quiet capital until the very end as it may seem. The cities with the most intense events these days are among the richest in the country.
They lost control over the largest ex-capital city after a couple of days of violent but not-so-large protests and requested help from foreign armies. The deployed CSTO forces are not large, nothing close to actually occupying the huge country.
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The highest popularity of pro-Soviet attitudes in the history of Levada-Center surveys in Russia has no relation at all to the popularity of left identity.
In August, 49% supported "the Soviet system as it was before the 90s", 18% - "the current system", 19% - "Western-style democracy".
Besides, 62% supported the economic system based on state plan and distribution, while only 24% supported the system based on private property and market relations.
Yeah, #Azov is like deliberately making fun of those propaganda "experts" who want us to believe "Azov is a regular unit of the National Guard" and "even if #Protasevich served in Azov, so what?"
Is "Kim", the Belarusian volunteer in #Azov, expressed far-right views in the interview for Radio Svoboda? Not touching whether he and #Protasevich are the same person, there are pros and cons. But, yes, his views are far-right.
He responds to a very generic question about his and other Belarusians' in "Pahonia" squad political views. First thing, he says we are all nationalists. Then he prefers limited democracy. Then about gays, then about migration, then about democracy without "some absurdities".
I think a proper stance on #Protasevich should accept the following: 1) Whataboutism is wrong. 2) He must be released, even though he is a propagandist, his Telegram Nexta provoked hate and violence, and he apparently spent some time with the far-right Ukrainian regiment Azov.
3) Ban on flights and sanctions beyond personal hurt primarily Belarusian (and Ukrainian) people, not Lukashenka.
Although it's really difficult to feel personal sympathies to #Protasevich, not only because he served in Azov but also for the provocative role his Telegram Nexta played in Belarusian protests, I don't think his far-right links have any significance in this case.
Really fun to see a wave of similar comments questioning the confirmation of Protasevich's link to Azov by one of the oldest reputable Ukrainian newspapers. zn.ua/international/…
The Times:
"In 2014 Protasevich is reported to have travelled to eastern Ukraine, where he joined the Azov Battalion, a far-right group that fought Russian-backed separatists." thetimes.co.uk/article/hijack…
Some thoughts on the resumed talk that if #Ukraine implements the Minsk accords fully including the political provisions, it may throw the country into a civil war. /Thread
There are some very tentative hopes that Germany and France may start pushing a little bit harder within that "cluster" approach to the Minsk accords to make Ukraine finally implement at least some of the political provisions that they all signed in 2015. /1
This happens after six years of ignoring Ukraine's practical sabotage of the Minsk accords and only after Russia's recent "saber-rattling". I am not even sure that there is anything more than rumors and wishful thinking behind those hopes. /2