1) sale of stake held by co in Mindtree to LnT for ~ 2700 cr. This was actually done when VGS was still alive. just months b4 his unfortunate death
2) sale of real estate asset global village tech park to blackstone for approx EV 2000 - 2500 cr
3) CDE lost controlling stake in its subsidiary Sical Logistics as lenders invoked collateral shares. SCL had debt of 1500 cr which used 2 add 2 CDE consolidated debt
But no control = SL no longer subsidiary = it's debt can't show in consol debt of CDE. Just an accounting thing
So as you can see, most debt reduction has come from selliing prime non core assets. Not operating cash flows!
And another 1500 cr debt disappeared from book because they lost control of a subsidiary due to defauls
Malavika Hegde is in a tough spot and may be fighting hard to save CDE. There still are some other non core assets which can b sold to pay dues. But overall the CCD biz is struggling - unlike what the current narratives being planted by someone are saying
Look for yourself : the ccd operations are shrinking. This screenshot is from their annual report
Also even though networth is 3900 cr on consol basis, there are about 2700 cr of related party loans on asset side. These i think are part of what investigations revealed: some 3500 cr of loans to related party.
No news on how, if and when this money is coming back.
Other auditor qualifications in annual report also paint a pic of a company struggling with cash flows and many dues.
The last credit rating report also said : issuer not cooperating
There are just too many red flags.
The planted articles r trying to suggest the biz is turning around
I wish it does cause CCD has a lot of good memories. But then there r economic realities
& unlike the planted narrative, no investors pumped in money. I couldn't find ne news
The thread is not a recommendation to buy or sell. Do your own home work.
Atleast read the management's and auditors own words in the annual report.
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I can't tell you how important it is to calculate your PMS/ RIA / AIF annual performance on post tax basis. Use this no to compare against benchmark
Benchmarked performance shown by PMS/AIFs/RIAs (including on SmallCase) is usually post fees & costs but NOT post taxes
The reason most don't talk about post tax performance is that for each client the tax implications will be different. hence it's messy. Fair enough
Therefore as a client it's for you to go back & c what the performance was post tax
Usually an index is used as benchmark to compare performance. Remember, when any PMS/AIF/RIA uses an index as benchmark, they are in some ways comparing how their active investing worked against just buy & hold index strategy
A thread on some observations from #Nazaratechnologies DRHP - largely to do with revenue analysis. The IPO notes of i-bankers aren't delving on these points. Since I noticed them, I am putting them out here.
(not an opinion or recco wrt to IPO)
Reported consolidated revenues:
Sep 2020 (6m) = 200 cr (~annualised 400 cr)
Mar 2020 (12m) = 248 cr
Mar 2019 (12m) = 170 cr
Mar 2018 (12 m) = 172 cr
Interesting insight into the 200 cr rev for 6 months ended Sep '20:
1) 79/200 cr is from segment 'gamified early learning'. This entire 79 cr is attributable to subsidiary, paper boat apps: makers of Kiddopia. Nazara owns 51% - acquired in '20. Entire 79 cr rev is from N America
Competition would like Vodaidea gone. But Vodaidea has bought itself a couple of yrs of survival from AGR verdict as they will be able to raise enough funds to last a couple of years by convincing board that 'as ARPU's rise things will get better'
To kill Vodaidea competition needs to keep ARPUs low for 2 more years. But competition itself doesn't make enough money at these ARPUs. So will they want to self inflict pain for 2 more yrs?
Forced selling by NBFC's who have loaned against shares (LAS) is exacerbating sell off in cash mkts. There is a case for RBI to reduce margin requirments for LAS to mitigate some of this stress with little impact to lenders @RBI@nsitharaman@FinMinIndia
I explain:
Currently RBI mandates that a minimum 50% LTV be maintained at any point for LAS. So if one borrowed 50 against share worth 100, then if share falls to 80, investor should bring in additional 10 as collateral. OTH, if share goes to 120, investor can borrow an additional 10!
With this rigid margining system, in a rapidly falling market, NBFCs r forced to sell collateralised shares if clients can't meet margin requirements within mandated time frames. While forced selling is theoretically possible, r markets clearly lack ability to absorb this selling