The Ukraine media coverage is mirroring last summer’s Afghan withdrawal commentary - the same tropes, hyperventilating, belligerence, and blob writers.
Bleh. The sheer cut-and-paste laziness coupled to endless belligerence is as embarrassing as it is exhausting.
No need
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to learn about these places or re-consider given that US interventionism since the Gulf War has been at best a mixed bag, at worst a disaster.
You can always make the same claims about American ‘weakness’ contrasted with autocratic ‘strength’;
make the same analogies to the
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1930s, Chamberlain, or Carter;
demand the same absurdly aggressively redlines to trigger US intervention;
breezily recommend relentless escalation which you can later disclaim as ‘badly implemented’ when it turns into a disaster;
make the same arguments about any crisis
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anywhere without knowing anything about Afghanistan, Taiwan, Ukraine, Iran, N Korea, Syria - because they’re all the same, amirite? - because they have no agency at all, because everything is about America, POTUS’ approval rating, and the blob's status-craving as experts even
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though it keeps getting Western intervention in the periphery wrong with disastrous consequences.
And should anyone disagree and encourage calm, you can just completely lose your mind and argue that world order itself is at stake! That China & its Russian wingman are seeking
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no less than global domination! Which seems to be particular obsession of the FT every time there’s a crisis somewhere: ft.com/content/d307ab…
The best take I've seen on Ukraine comes from @kdrum, who's not even a big name foreign policy analyst but is far less personally
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vested in a relentlessly hawkish US foreign policy.
He's basically correct: Ukraine will turn into a quagmire if Russia invades, and the war will isolate R even further from the world economy. If it really goes bad and returns lots of civilian
casualties and massacres, R may get expelled from SWIFT & Nord Stream 2 may be ended. All this will make Russia even more dependent on China, which the Chinese will take advantage of mercilessly. It will also drive all the small countries around R toward NATO & the US for help
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Putin knows all this which is why he hasn't invaded yet. Unlike the blob's mindless worship of Putin's 'strength' and tactical genius - where's America's Republican Daddy to protect our stock portf-, er, the American people! - Putin knows Russia is weak. Its GDP smaller than S
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Korea's and its economy is extremely corrupt. R's capacity to fight protracted counterinsurgency while under ever-tightening sanctions is limited. The parallels to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are pretty obvious.
I don't have any particular policy advice on this. It's
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a thorny issue outside my lane. I lean toward offering Ukraine training and aid of some kind. We certainly should not agree that Putin gets a veto on who can apply to NATO. That's blackmail by a gangster
My concern rather is to note the lazy, repetitive quality of blob op-ed
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page analysis of crises in world politics. It's practically interchangeable, no matter where the conflict is or who the players are. Cp. the Ukraine writing to Afghanistan last summer. It's so hackneyed, hyperbolic, predictable, & hawkish, u don't even need to read it anymore
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I don’t mean to argue that hawkish responses or the blob’s analysis is always wrong. I am hawk myself on N Korea, for example. My concern, instead, is the cookie-cutter analytic template returning the same diagnosis and advice again and again:
- minimal local knowledge of
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the specific crisis
- turning it all into a debate about US and its supposed ‘weakness’ (the craving for a chest-thumping Republican Daddy-figure is just embarrassing)
- casually recommending escalation and belligerent messaging
- constant 1930s references as if every US
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opponent is Hitler
- regular hyperbole that no less than the world order is at stake.
Needless to say, more nuanced analyses would almost certainly return different response options for different crisis. For example, even though I am a NK hawk, I am kinda dovish on China.
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This is only inconsistent if you take a neocon-blob view of the world where everything is a test of US resolve, dominoes are falling everywhere, and the US must therefore constantly be aggressive. If you don’t see the world order collapsing every time there’s a Western
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setback (go re-read, below, the absurd alarmism over last summer’s Afghan withdrawal), if crises are limited in scope, if our opponents are not Alexander the Great or Hitler, then more mixed response options open up.
I've always thought China overvalues N Korea as a 'buffer.'
TLDR:
"China’s support for NK alienates much of the world. It undercuts any claim to Chinese principled or benevolent leadership. It tars Beijing with partial
responsibility for every outlandish act Pyongyang engages in. It provides ongoing justification for a large US presence in northeast Asia. It empowers a nuclear-armed regime which does not listen to Beijing and routinely violates the most basic norms of global governance. It
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spreads corruption and rot in the Chinese banking system, and among party and military elites with connections to NK. It proliferates. It dealt meth in China. And the conventional deterrent value purchased for all this headache is decreasing as US/allied technology outstrips
The decline of the liberal international order and the United States are not the same thing.
An LIO requires liberal foreign policy behavior from even illiberal states, esp. China & Russia. This was always a tenuous outcome, and it required huge liberal power - i.e., American
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unipolarity and strong coordination in the Free World - to push liberal global rules (WTO, IMF) on states ideologically & nationalistically uncomfortable with extreme American dominance.
As unipolarity has receded in the last decade, so has the ability of the US and Free World
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to push China, Russia, and others into an LIO. Hence all the talk about its collapse.
This is mostly the result of China's rise and consequent US relative decline. But the US worsened this drift back toward bipolarity by repeated errors like Iraq, the Great Recession, and
The reason they’re not making this obvious argument is also obvious, and illustrates why the whole EoW debate is pointless:
N Korea will not stop provoking SK or even consider surrendering that card - even though it’s the very logic of the declaration!
And even if NK said it
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would, no one serious would believe them.
NK can’t make credible commitments on any major issues anymore. Their long history of mendacity and provocation undercuts the whole point of something as grandiose as this EoW.
This is why I always argue to start small with NK. Go
Leto is a mediocre, basically good person struggling & failing w/ forces beyond him. He wants to rule consensually, feels a sense of duty to his liege, loves his family, & dies for these values. This makes him relatable and sympathetic.
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Paul starts as a brat (like Luke) and just gets worse. He is surrounded by religious fanatics and becomes one himself in fairly short order. He drinks the kool-aid that he is some kind of messianic semi-divine being, a mash-up of Jesus and Plato's philosopher-king, and then
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gets carried along to lead an interplanetary religious holocaust killing tens of billions
I've never understood how Paul & Fremen are supposed to be sympathetic. The ancien regime may have been corrupt & decrepit, but Harkonnens & Emperor weren't murdering ppl in the billions
Worth remembering just what a boondoggle give-away to North Korea the Kaesong Industrial Zone was. 'Detente' it was not:
"Throughout its life cycle until its closure in 2016, the Kaesong complex faced nagging questions - not only about slave labor & unsafe working conditions,
but also about the use of its proceeds to fund Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program...Kaesong provided Pyongyang nearly $100 million a year in hard currency. No one but Kim Jong-un really knew where the money went. The N Korean workers at Kaesong were selected by the regime, had
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no rights to strike or bargain for better working conditions, were not permitted to speak to their S Korean managers, and received as little as $2 a month out of $130 a month in “wages” paid to the N Korean government by the S Korean manufacturers who invested there. None of