Let's acknowledge from the outset that for arms control to help, Putin has to want to defuse the crisis. I have no idea whether he does.
But *if* he does, I think arms control can help to address various Russian *and* U.S./Russian/NATO security concerns. (2/n)
It's not clear from the @wsj report exactly what was in the U.S. proposal. The WSJ mentions the Biden admin has given consideration to a reciprocal scale-back of military exercises and new rules governing the back sea.
But I'll focus here on three proposals.
(3/n)
First, Putin has long floated the idea of a moratorium of INF-type missiles in Europe. The proposal includes unspecified verification and covers the 9M729 (even though Russia continues to deny, unpersuasively IMO, that it violated the INF Treaty).
U.S./NATO officials previously dismissed this idea because of the mobility of the 9M729. Plus verification would not be easy. But, under currently circumstances, the U.S. government is rightly interested in the concept again; it'd have benefits for both sides. (5/n)
Second, Putin tied his proposal to inspections of Aegis Ashore facilities in Europe. Significantly, Warsaw is apparently open to this idea (on the basis of reciprocity). (6/n)
Such inspections could demonstrate that Aegis Ashore launchers were not loaded with cruise missiles and that their SM-3 interceptors could not catch Russian ICBMs.
Finally, U.S. officials are reportedly concerned that Russia might move nonstrategic nuclear weapons toward NATO and apparently discussed this general concern in the recent Geneva talks. (8/n)
A second Acton/MacDonald/Vaddi proposal for inspections of *empty* actual or suspected warhead storage facilities to demonstrate the *absence* of nuclear warheads could be useful here. (9/n)
For sure, it's difficult to be optimistic! As I say, Putin may not be looking for a way out and, even if he is, his demands may go far beyond these kinds of technical measures.
(10/n)
That said, be careful about taking certain Russian statements at face value.
*IF* Russia is open to arms control approaches--and again, it may not be!--officials would play down that interest to try and drive harder bargain in negotiations. (11/11)
I think it's quite likely that China will restart fissile material production--but I am NOT convinced by the argument in CMPR that it has already decided to do so.
China is believed to have ceased production of missile material for weapons, but it has never declared a formal cut-off. Presumably, it wants the option to restart production. And, given other developments, no-one should be surprised if it exercises that option.
BUT... (2/n)
I'm somewhat skeptical that China's fast reactor program is--today, at least--intended to produce plutonium for weapons. It requires China to master two difficult technologies: operating fast reactors and reprocessing oxide fuel. (Fuel fabrication may not be simple either). (3/n)
<*Really* wonky THREAD>Did China's recent test of a probable gliding orbital nuclear weapon catch the U.S. by surprise, as @HudsonInstitute and others claim?
I think NO. I suspect the U.S. IC has been monitoring the development of the glider since 2014--if not earlier. (1/n)
Back in Jan 2014, reports started to surface that China had begin testing of a glider, first called Wu-14 (a U.S. label) and subsequently DF-ZF (a Chinese one). (2/n)
At least seven tests between January 2014 and April 2016 are known based on notifications China released to warn aviators. It's quite possible there were more tests. (3/n)
Personally, I'm open to both possibilities. Perhaps the denial is untrue and a G-FOBS test really did occur. Perhaps, the @FT report (which, frankly, was pretty confused) was wrong.
2. How will Australia acquire the material? Domestic enrichment? Purchase?
3. Who will supply the fuel? Or will it be fabricated domestically?
4. At what point will IAEA safeguards on the reactor fuel be terminated? And reinstated?
(2/n)
5. Does the Australian government accept that removing nuclear material from safeguards will set a bad precedent, even if it believes that the benefits to Australia of doing so outweigh the risks? If so, what it will do to mitigate this precedent?
I'm NOT particularly concerned that Australia will acquire nuclear weapons. I AM concerned that other states will use this precedent to exploit a serious potential loophole in the global nonproliferation regime. (2/n)
Because non-nuclear weapon states are not prohibited by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, IAEA safeguards permit them to remove nuclear material from safeguards for "non-proscribed military activity." (3/n)
The shell game idea was originally developed--but never implemented--in the Cold War by the US, which planned to hide 200 ICBMs in 4,600 silos (seriously!) to complicate Soviet efforts to destroy them preemptively. (2/n)
.@DeptofDefense assesses that China's current "operational warhead stockpile" is in the low 200s and that China has enough fissile material on hand to double its warhead stockpile. (3/n)