Personally, I'm open to both possibilities. Perhaps the denial is untrue and a G-FOBS test really did occur. Perhaps, the @FT report (which, frankly, was pretty confused) was wrong.
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
(3/n)
So, why does China want this technology?
There is an obvious (and likely correct) reason: defeating U.S. missile defenses. But that answer by itself doesn't explain why China wants to use FOBS to launch a glider? Why not just send a glider around the south pole? (4/n)
A glider on the southern route would be every bit as effective as G-FOBS at evading missile defenses. Perhaps marginally more so.
But, that assumes that China can build a glider capable of reaching the US via the southern route... and maybe that assumption is wrong. (5/n)
Building a glider with sufficient range is very difficult--not least because of the need to manage the huge quantity of heat generated over such a long flight. U.S. tests of a 17,000km-range glider, the HTV-2, failed because of thermal management issues. (6/n)
By contrast, because G-FOBS is in space for much of its trajectory, thermal management becomes significantly easier.
So, *perhaps*, China is developing G-FOBS (if, indeed, it is) because it can't yet build a glider with sufficient range to reach the U.S. via the south. (7/n)
Finally, if China is building G-FOBS, does it matter?
As someone who lives within the 5psi blast radius of a large nuclear detonation over the Pentagon, I say no...
(8/n)
The 👏 US 👏 IS 👏 ALREADY 👏 INESCAPABLY 👏 VULNERABLE 👏 TO 👏 CHINESE 👏 ICBMS.👏
I'm indifferent as to whether the warhead that fries me is carried by an ICBM or a G-FOBS system--or, for that matter, a glider, a nuclear-powered torpedo, a cruise missile...
(9/9)
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2. How will Australia acquire the material? Domestic enrichment? Purchase?
3. Who will supply the fuel? Or will it be fabricated domestically?
4. At what point will IAEA safeguards on the reactor fuel be terminated? And reinstated?
(2/n)
5. Does the Australian government accept that removing nuclear material from safeguards will set a bad precedent, even if it believes that the benefits to Australia of doing so outweigh the risks? If so, what it will do to mitigate this precedent?
I'm NOT particularly concerned that Australia will acquire nuclear weapons. I AM concerned that other states will use this precedent to exploit a serious potential loophole in the global nonproliferation regime. (2/n)
Because non-nuclear weapon states are not prohibited by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, IAEA safeguards permit them to remove nuclear material from safeguards for "non-proscribed military activity." (3/n)
The shell game idea was originally developed--but never implemented--in the Cold War by the US, which planned to hide 200 ICBMs in 4,600 silos (seriously!) to complicate Soviet efforts to destroy them preemptively. (2/n)
.@DeptofDefense assesses that China's current "operational warhead stockpile" is in the low 200s and that China has enough fissile material on hand to double its warhead stockpile. (3/n)
Essentially, I suspect that China will seek to hide a relatively small number of real ICBMs in a much larger number of silos and dummy ICBMs--a form of "shell game" intended to complicate U.S. efforts to destroy China's nuclear forces. (2/n)
This scheme was originally developed in the Carter administration for the MX missile. The US planned to build 4,600 (not a typo!) shelters to hide 200 ICBMs. Ultimately, the Reagan administration changed plans, largely for reasons of domestic politics. (3/n)
China's nuclear regulator, NNSA (NOT the same organization as @NNSANews), says the reactor contains more than 60,000 fuel rods. Based on the following IAEA doc, I believe the exact number is 63,865. (241 assemblies, each containing 265 rods). (2/n)
The idea of using SM-3 IIAs against ICBMs isn't new, though interest has ebbed and flowed over the last decade. By demonstrating at least some capacity in a test, however, this idea is no longer just theoretical.
But is it practical? (2/n)
Given the locations of the target launch (Kwajelain Atoll) and the interceptor (northeast of Hawaii), it's clear that the target missile was intercepted on its way down.
See this helpful picture dug up by my colleagues, @nktpnd. (3/n)