Thread by @james_acton32

<*Really* wonky THREAD>Did China's recent test of a probable gliding orbital nuclear weapon catch the U.S. by surprise, as @HudsonInstitute and others claim?

I think NO. I suspect the U.S. IC has been monitoring the development of the glider since 2014--if not earlier. (1/n)

Back in Jan 2014, reports started to surface that China had begin testing of a glider, first called Wu-14 (a U.S. label) and subsequently DF-ZF (a Chinese one). (2/n)

freebeacon.com/national-secur…

At least seven tests between January 2014 and April 2016 are known based on notifications China released to warn aviators. It's quite possible there were more tests. (3/n)

carnegieendowment.org/files/Acton_Te…

Note the ranges of all these tests were fairly short--maximum of 2,100 km. At the time, I made two assumptions: (i) all tests were of the same weapon; and (ii) the weapon was an intermediate-range glider. (4/n)

In 2017, @nktpnd reported tests of an intermediate-range (or medium-range depending on definitions) glider, DF-17, with an estimated range of 1,800 to 2,500 km.

So I assumed that the DF-17 was a weaponized version of the DF-ZF. (5/n)

thediplomat.com/2017/12/introd…

Then, in October 2019, China exhibited the DF-17 at a military parade and I stopped thinking much about the publicly available testing history of China's gliders. (6/n)

washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/…

The recent test of China's probable gliding orbital weapon has made me rethink. I now think that THIS weapon (the orbital one) was the Wu-14/DF-ZF and that the DF-17 (tested ~2017) has a different lineage. (7/n)

Here's the smoking gun--or at least the UDMH-enveloped missile body. These photos are from debris taken after China's August 2014 DF-ZF test (which probably failed).

The booster (a Long March) is derived from the DF-5 ICBM.

armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207443… (8/n)

This booster is totally different from the much smaller and less powerful one used for the DF-17. Which suggests that the DF-ZF actually travels significantly faster than the DF-17.

Which makes me think that the Wu-14/DF-ZF is the glider for the new orbital system. (9/n)

But, if the Wu-14/DF-ZF is part of an intercontinental system was it tested over a shorter distance?

Two possible answers:

(1) We don't yet know how far the glider flew by itself in China's recent tests--so maybe it didn't fly that much further than the 2014-2016 tests. (1/n)

(2) Maybe China ran out of room to conduct a longer test because the technology wasn't up to flying loops and it didn't want to test beyond its borders (at least until the orbital system was ready).

(Big H/T to @Joshua_Pollack for this point.)

(11/n)

armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207443…

In short, I think tests of China's probable gliding orbital weapon have been reported for over 7 years--but we (ahem, me) didn't realize what was being tested.

We've had some other hints, though, from USG about what was in the pipeline. (12/n)

In Feb 2020, Gen. O'Shaughnessy mentioned an intercontinental Chinese glider and compared it to Avangard.

Now Avangard is an ICBM armed with a glider--so it's a bit different from the Chinese gliding orbital system. (13/n)

armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/…

So it's not totally clear that O'Shaughnessy was referring to the gliding orbit weapon. There's various possibilities here, but I wouldn't be surprised if China soon tests an ICBM armed with a glider--perhaps the same glider used in the probable orbital weapon. (14/14)